Economics Lunchtime Seminar Series. Equitable Stable Matchings under Modular Assessment
Published: 29 September 2025
8 October 2025. Professor Ahmet Alkan, Sabanci University
Professor Ahmet Ugur Alkan (Sabanci University)
Equitable Stable Matchings under Modular Assessment
Wednesday, 8 October 2025, 13:00–14:00
Room 383, Adam Smith Business School
Abstract
Conceptualizing fairness in the Stable Marriage Game has defied many attempts. This is even though stable marriages form a lattice where the interests of the two sides are opposing each other in remarkably orderly fashion. Also, several optimal selection rules have turned out to be computationally complex. Here, we provide a framework that goes a long way in addressing the selection problem both conceptually and computationally. This is achieved by restricting selection to have the novel “mixture closedness” property.
Biography
- Professor, Economics, Sabanci University since 1999
- Professor, Management, Boğaziçi University, 1979-1999
- PhD Operations Research, UC Berkeley 1975
- Member, Turkish Academy of Sciences, 1998
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First published: 29 September 2025