The material below is intended to provide preprints and offprints in electronic form, for purposes of education, research, scholarly communication, or critical commentary, all in conformity with "fair use" and the established practice of authors' providing single preprints and offprints for noncommercial use.

  Published Papers  

  • 'Instinct and explanation in Thomas Reid's theory of action', Ruch Filozoficzny (2018) 74:3 (special issue on the Scottish Enlightenment)
  • 'Reid on instinctive exertions and the spatial content of sensations', in Todd Buras & Rebecca Copenhaver (eds.), Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge and Value, OUP Mind Association Occasional Series (2015)
    A paper on Reid's account of the role of instinctive exertions in the development of one's conception of power. I consider whether such exertions can shed any light on the matter of how certain sensations can appear to us to possess spatial content (for example, how a pain can seem to be located in the toe). Reid denies that sensations have such content; I argue that the introduction of instinctive exertions into his account might allow Reid to avoid some of the less palatable consequences of denying spatial content to sensations.
  • 'Hume and Reid on Newtonianism, naturalism and liberty', in Ilya Kasavin (ed.), David Hume and Contemporary Philosophy, CSP (2013)
    Paper presented at the 'David Hume and Modern Philosophy International Conference', Moscow State University, the Higher School of Economics and The Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia, to celebrate Hume's tercentenary.
    This paper concerns the respective Newtonian and naturalistic commitments of the two contemporaries. After examining the methodological positions of Hume and Reid, I argue that both are in breach of their respective commitments when it comes to their positions on human liberty.
  • 'Thomas Reid on scepticism about agency and the self', The Journal of Scottish Philosophy (inc. Reid Studies) (2005) 3:1, 19-33
    I aim to show that Reid's account of action does not generate a serious sceptical worry about the authorship of actions, as has been suggested by Roger Gallie and Maria Alvarez. The worry can be avoided by paying attention to Reid's comments about the relations between an agent and her body. Having argued this, I go on to argue that the dualistic components of Reid's theory nevertheless give rise to a sceptical worry of a different sort.



  • A review of John Shand (ed.) Fundamentals of Philosophy. Routledge, 2003. Philosophical Books, 46:1 (January 2005).
  • A review of Jane Heal Mind, Reason and Imagination. Cambridge University Press, 2003. Philosophy in Review, 24:2 (April 2004).
  • A review of Robert C. Solomon (ed.) What Is an Emotion? Classic and Contemporary Readings (second edition). Oxford, 2003. Metapsychology Online.