Brad Thompson "Perceptual Demonstratives and Hallucination"

The use of a perceptual demonstrative in hallucination presents a puzzle.  On the one hand, it has seemed undeniable to many that the subject of a hallucination can succeed in picking out a real existing thing or property that is present to the mind.  But it also seems correct to say, as many have, that the use of a perceptual demonstrative in hallucination is defective, purporting to refer to something that is not there.  Acknowledging only the first intuition would seem to quickly lead to a form of indirect realism.  On the other hand, endorsing only the second intuition leads to difficulties in properly accounting for the phenomenal character of hallucination.  I present a view that attempts to respect both of the natural intuitions about the status of perceptual demonstratives in hallucination.  I argue that there are two distinct types of uses for perceptual demonstratives.  One use of a perceptual demonstrative purports to pick out something experience-transcendant that is represented by the experience, whereas the other use picks out properties of the experiences themselves that serve as vehicles of representational content.  The existence of these two uses of perceptual demonstratives is supported independently by considering the phenomenon of perceptual constancy.  I will argue that the resulting view has the resources to properly account for the phenomenal character of perceptual and hallucinatory experiences while vindicating a moderate version of direct realism.