Dr J Adam Carter

  • Lecturer (Philosophy - Epistemology) (Philosophy)

telephone: +44 141 330 2000 ext 2031
email: Adam.Carter@glasgow.ac.uk

ORCID iDhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-1222-8331

Research interests

Adam's research is mainly in epistemology with particular focus on the following issues: virtue epistemology; know-how; relativism; social epistemology; epistemic luck; epistemic value; group knowledge; understanding; and epistemic defeat. His monograph Metaepistemology and Relativism was published by Palgrave MacMillan in 2016.

Adam's work has increasingly explored connections between epistemology and other disciplines, including bioethics (especially human enhancement); the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (especially extended cognition); and the philosophy of language (especially assertion). He is currently working on a book project entitled The Future of Knowing: Knowledge, Radical Enhancement and Epistemic Autonomy (see here for a working version).

For links to published and forthcoming papers, as well as works in progress, see here.

 


Publications

List by: Type | Date

Jump to: 2020 | 2019 | 2018 | 2017 | 2016 | 2015 | 2014 | 2013 | 2012 | 2011 | 2010 | 2009 | 2008
Number of items: 117.

2020

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. (2020) Is searching the Internet making us intellectually arrogant? In: Tanesini, A. and Lynch, M. P. (eds.) Arrogance and Polarisation. Routledge. ISBN 9780367260859 (In Press)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2020) Intellectual humility and assertion. In: Alfano, M., Lynch, M. P. and Tanesini, A. (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. , Mi, C., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (2020) Introduction to special issue: knowledge, virtue and action—eastern and western perspectives. Synthese, (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02662-8) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2020) Cognitive goods, open futures and the epistemology of education. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 54(2), 449-466-449-466. (doi: 10.1111/1467-9752.12420)

Carter, J. A. and Rupert, R. D. (2020) Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale. Synthese, (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. and McKenna, R. (2020) Skepticism motivated: on the skeptical import of motivated reasoning. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2020) De Minimis Normativism: a new theory of full aptness. Philosophical Quarterly, (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. and Mortini, D. (2020) Higher-order defeat in collective moral epistemology. In: Klenk, M. (ed.) Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge: New York. ISBN 9780367343200

2019

Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (2019) Well-founded belief: an introduction. In: Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9781138503755

Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (2019) The superstitious lawyer's inference. In: Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9781138503755

Carter, J. A. and McKenna, R. (2019) Relativism and externalism. In: Kusch, M. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. Routledge: London. ISBN 9781138484283

Carter, J. A. and McKenna, R. (2019) Kornblith versus Sosa on grades of knowledge. Synthese, 196(12), pp. 4989-5007. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1689-8)

Carter, J. A. , Pritchard, D. and Shepherd, J. (2019) Knowledge-how, understanding-why, and epistemic luck: an experimental study. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10(4), pp. 701-734. (doi: 10.1007/s13164-018-0429-9)

Carter, J. A. , Leffetz, G. and Dechauffour, G. (Eds.) (2019) Special Issue of Synthese: Scepticism and Epistemic Angst [Guest Editors]. Springer. (In Press)

Carter, J. A. and Broncano-Berrocal, F. (2019) The philosophy of group polarization: a collective vice theory. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. and Meehan, D. (2019) Vices of distrust. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 8(10), pp. 25-32.

Carter, J. A. and Littlejohn, C. (2019) This is Epistemology. Wiley. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. and McKenna, R. (2019) Absolutism, relativism and metaepistemology. Erkenntnis, (doi: 10.1007/s10670-019-00147-w) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2019) Radical scepticism and the epistemology of confusion. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 9(3), pp. 223-237. (doi: 10.1163/22105700-20191387)

Carter, J. A. (2019) On behalf of a bi-level account of trust. Philosophical Studies, (doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01311-2) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2019) Autonomy, cognitive offloading and education. Educational Theory, 68(6), pp. 657-673. (doi: 10.1111/edth.12338)

Carter, J. A. and Kallestrup, J. (2019) Varieties of cognitive integration. Noûs, (doi: 10.1111/nous.12288) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2019) Exercising abilities. Synthese, (doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02227-4) (Early Online Publication)

Kotzee, B., Carter, J. A. and Siegel, H. (2019) Educating for intellectual virtue: a critique from action guidance. Episteme, (doi: 10.1017/epi.2019.10) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A. , Mi, C., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2019) Special Issue of Synthese: Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Eastern and Western Perspectives [Guest Editors]. Springer. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2019) The epistemology of cognitive enhancement. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 44(2), pp. 220-242. (doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhy040) (PMID:30877778)

Carter, J. A. (2019) Epistemic luck and the extended mind. In: Church, I. M. and Hartman, R. J. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of The Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy. Routledge: New York, pp. 318-319. ISBN 9780815366591

Carter, J. A. (2019) Epistemic perceptualism, skill and the regress problem. Philosophical Studies, (doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01243-x) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A. and Broncano-Berrocal, F. (Eds.) (2019) The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (Eds.) (2019) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9781138503755

Carter, J. A. (2019) Virtue perspectivism, externalism, and epistemic circularity. In: Crețu, A.-M. and Massimi, M. (eds.) Knowledge From a Human Point of View. Series: Synthese library (Studies in epistemology, logic, methodology, and philosophy of science), 416. Springer: Cham, pp. 123-140. ISBN 9783030270407 (doi:10.1007/978-3-030-27041-4_8)

2018

Carter, J. A. (2018) On behalf of controversial view agnosticism. European Journal of Philosophy, 26(4), pp. 1358-1370. (doi: 10.1111/ejop.12333)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2018) Extended self-knowledge. In: Pedrini, P. and Kirsch, J. (eds.) Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative. Series: Contributions to phenomenology (96). Springer: Cham, pp. 31-49. ISBN 9783319986449 (doi:10.1007/978-3-319-98646-3_3)

Carter, J. A. (2018) Archimedean metanorms. Topoi, (doi: 10.1007/s11245-018-9586-9) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2018) Socially Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198801764

Carter, J. A. (2018) Meta-epistemic defeat. Synthese, 195(7), pp. 2877-2896. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1187-9)

Carter, J. A. and McDonnell, N. (2018) Welcome to the machine. Philosophers' Magazine, 81, pp. 33-39. (doi: 10.5840/tpm20188144)

Carter, J. A. , Clark, A. and Palermos, S. O. (2018) New humans? Ethics, trust, and the extended mind. In: Carter, J. A., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 331-351. ISBN 9780198769811

Carter, J. A. and Kallestrup, J. (2018) Extended circularity: a new puzzle for extended cognition. In: Carter, J. A., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 42-63. ISBN 9780198769811

Carter, J. A. , Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2018) Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198769811

Carter, J. A. (2018) Virtue epistemology, enhancement, and control. Metaphilosophy, 49(3), pp. 283-304. (doi: 10.1111/meta.12304)

Pritchard, D., Carter, J. A. and Turri, J. (2018) The value of knowledge. In: Zalta, E. N. (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University: Stanford, CA.

Carter, J. A. and Poston, T. (2018) A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How. Series: Bloomsbury critical introductions to contemporary epistemology. Bloomsbury. ISBN 9781472514929

Alfano, M., Carter, J. A. and Cheong, M. (2018) Technological seduction and self-radicalization. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 4(3), pp. 298-322. (doi: 10.1017/apa.2018.27)

Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (2018) The basing relation and the impossibility of the debasing demon. American Philosophical Quarterly, 55(3), p. 203.

Carter, J. A. (2018) Sosa on knowledge, judgment and guessing. Synthese, (doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1181-2) (Early Online Publication)

2017

Carter, J. A. (2017) Epistemic pluralism, epistemic relativism and ‘hinge’ epistemology. In: Coliva, A. and Pedersen, N. J.L.L. (eds.) Epistemic Pluralism. Series: Palgrave innovations in philosophy. Palgrave, pp. 229-252. ISBN 9783319654591

Carter, J. A. (2017) Virtuous insightfulness. Episteme, 14(4), pp. 539-554. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2016.37)

Carter, J. A. and Czarnecki, B. (2017) (Anti)-anti-intellectualism and the sufficiency thesis. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98(S1), pp. 374-397. (doi: 10.1111/papq.12187)

Carter, J. A. , Gordon, E. C. and Jarvis, B. W. (Eds.) (2017) Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198716310

Carter, J. A. and Navarro, J. (2017) The defeasibility of knowledge-how. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 95(3), pp. 662-685. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12441)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2017) Cognitive bias, scepticism and understanding. In: Grimm, S. R., Baumberger, C. and Ammon, S. (eds.) Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Routledge: New York, pp. 272-292. ISBN 9781138921931

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (Eds.) (2017) The Moral Psychology of Pride. Series: Moral psychology of the emotions. Rowman and Littlefield: London. ISBN 9781783489084

Carter, J. A. (2017) Intellectual autonomy, epistemic dependence and cognitive enhancement. Synthese, (doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-1549-y) (Early Online Publication)

Heersmink, R. and Carter, J. A. (2017) The philosophy of memory technologies: metaphysics, knowledge, and values. Memory Studies, (doi: 10.1177/1750698017703810) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, A. (2017) Review of Epistemology by Ernest Sosa. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2017, [Book Review]

Carter, J. A. (2017) Are theism and atheism totally opposed? Can they learn from each other? In: Harris, M. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Philosophy, Science and Religion for Everyone. Routledge: New York, pp. 82-92. ISBN 9781138234215

Carter, A. , Collin, J. H. and Palermos, O. (2017) Semantic inferentialism as (a form of) active externalism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 16(3), pp. 387-402. (doi: 10.1007/s11097-016-9458-y)

Carter, J. A. and Peterson, M. (2017) The modal account of luck revisited. Synthese, 194(6), pp. 2175-2184. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1047-7)

Carter, J. A. (2017) Assertion, uniqueness and epistemic hypocrisy. Synthese, 194(5), pp. 1463-1476. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0766-5)

Carter, J. A. (2017) Epistemological implications of relativism. In: Ichikawa, J. J. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Taylor and Francis, pp. 292-301. ISBN 9781138818392

Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (2017) Epistemic luck. In: Crane, T. (ed.) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Taylor and Francis.

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2017) Googled assertion. Philosophical Psychology, 30(4), pp. 490-501. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1285395)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2017) Inference to the best explanation and epistemic circularity. In: McCain, K. and Poston, T. (eds.) Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198746904

2016

Carter, J. A. and Church, I. M. (2016) On epistemic consequentialism and the virtue conflation problem. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 5(4), pp. 239-248. (doi: 10.1002/tht3.218)

Carter, J. A. , Peterson, M. and van Bezooijen, B. (2016) Not knowing a cat is a cat: analyticity and knowledge ascriptions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7(4), pp. 817-834. (doi: 10.1007/s13164-015-0279-7)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2016) Objectual understanding, factivity and belief. In: Grajner, M. and Schmechtig, P. (eds.) Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter, pp. 423-442. ISBN 9783110496345 (doi:10.1515/9783110496765-020)

Carter, J. A. (2016) Epistemology and Relativism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

Carter, J. A. and Kallestrup, J. (2016) Extended cognition and propositional memory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92(3), pp. 691-714. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12157)

Carter, J. A. , Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2016) Special Issue of American Philosophical Quarterly: Varieties of Externalism: Epistemic, Content, Vehicle [Guest Editors]. University of Illinois Press.

Carter, J. A. and Czarnecki, B. (2016) Extended knowledge-how. Erkenntnis, 81(2), pp. 259-273. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-015-9738-x)

Carter, J. A. and Peterson, M. (2016) On the epistemology of the precautionary principle: reply to Steglich-Petersen. Erkenntnis, 81(2), pp. 297-304. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-015-9740-3)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2016) Perceptual knowledge and relevant alternatives. Philosophical Studies, 173(4), pp. 969-990. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-015-0533-y)

Carter, J. A. (2016) Group peer disagreement. Ratio, 29(1), pp. 11-28. (doi: 10.1111/rati.12077)

Carter, J. A. (2016) Robust virtue epistemology as anti-luck epistemology: a new solution. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 97(1), pp. 140-155. (doi: 10.1111/papq.12040)

Carter, J. A. and Palermos, S. O. (2016) Is having your computer compromised a personal assault? The ethics of extended cognition. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2(4), pp. 542-560. (doi: 10.1017/apa.2016.28)

Carter, J. A. , Kallestrup, J. and Palermos, S. O. (Eds.) (2016) Special Issue of Logos and Episteme: Intellectual Humility [Guest Editors]. Institute for Economic and Social Research of The Romanian Academy.

Carter, A. and Pritchard, D. (2016) Intellectual humility, knowledge-how, and disagreement. In: Mi, C., Slote, M. and Sosa, E. (eds.) Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn Toward Virtue. Routledge: New York, pp. 49-63. ISBN 9781138925168

Carter, J. A. (2016) Metaepistemology and Relativism. Series: Palgrave innovations in philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, NY. ISBN 9781137336637

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2016) Knowledge, assertion and intellectual humility. Logos and Episteme, 7(4), pp. 489-502. (doi: 10.5840/logos-episteme20167444)

Carter, J. A. , Gordon, E. C. and Palermos, S. O. (2016) Extended emotion. Philosophical Psychology, 29(2), pp. 198-217. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2015.1063596)

Kerr, E. T. and Carter, J. A. (2016) Richard Rorty and epistemic normativity. Social Epistemology, 30(1), pp. 3-24. (doi: 10.1080/02691728.2014.971914)

2015

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2015) Knowledge-how and epistemic value. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93(4), pp. 799-816. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2014.997767)

Carter, J. A. and Palermos, S. O. (2015) Epistemology and active externalism. In: Oxford Bibligraphies Online: Philosphy. Oxford University Press. (doi:10.1093/OBO/9780195396577-0285)

Baghramian, M. and Carter, J. A. (2015) Relativism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, pp. 1-60.

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2015) Knowledge-how and epistemic luck. Noûs, 49(3), pp. 440-453. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12054)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2015) Knowledge-how and cognitive achievement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 91(1), pp. 181-199. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12094)

Carter, J. A. , Jarvis, B. W. and Rubin, K. (2015) Varieties of cognitive achievement. Philosophical Studies, 172(6), pp. 1603-1623. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-014-0367-z)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2015) On cognitive and moral enhancement: a reply to Savulescu and Persson. Bioethics, 29(3), pp. 153-161. (doi: 10.1111/bioe.12076)

Carter, J. A. and Peterson, M. (2015) On the epistemology of the precautionary principle. Erkenntnis, 80(1), pp. 1-13. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-014-9609-x)

Carter, J. A. (2015) Group knowledge and epistemic defeat. Ergo, 2(28), pp. 711-735. (doi: 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0002.028)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2015) MOOCS, by Jonathan Haber. Teaching Philosophy, 38(4), pp. 455-458. [Book Review]

2014

Carter, J. A. , Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2014) Special Issue of Philosophical Issues: Extended Knowledge [Guest Editors]. Wiley.

Carter, J. A. , Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (2014) Varieties of externalism. Philosophical Issues, 24(1), pp. 63-109. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12026)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2014) Openmindedness and truth. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 44(2), pp. 207-224. (doi: 10.1080/00455091.2014.923247)

Carter, J. A. and Nickel, P. J. (2014) On testimony and transmission. Episteme, 11(2), pp. 145-155. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2014.4)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2014) A new maneuver against the epistemic relativist. Synthese, 191(8), pp. 1683-1695. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-013-0357-2)

Carter, J. A. (2014) Disagreement, relativism and doxastic revision. Erkenntnis, 79(S1), pp. 155-172. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-013-9450-7)

Carter, J. A. (2014) Relativism, knowledge and understanding. Episteme, 11(1), pp. 35-52. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2013.45)

Carter, J. A. (2014) Review of Tim Henning and David P. Schweikard (Eds) Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Essays on Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2014, [Book Review]

2013

Carter, J. A. (2013) Extended cognition and epistemic luck. Synthese, 190(18), pp. 4201-4214. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-013-0267-3)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2013) Intelligence, wellbeing and procreative beneficence. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 30(2), pp. 122-135. (doi: 10.1111/japp.12011)

Carter, J. A. (2013) Faulkner, Paul, Knowledge on Trust. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91(2), pp. 409-413. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2013.775169)[Book Review]

Carter, J. A. (2013) A problem for Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology. Erkenntnis, 78(2), pp. 253-275. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-011-9315-x)

Carter, J. A. (2013) The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Quarterly, 63(250), pp. 184-187. (doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00096.x)[Book Review]

Carter, J. A. , Jarvis, B. and Rubin, K. (2013) Knowledge: value on the cheap. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91(2), pp. 249-263. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2012.694455)

2012

Carter, J. A. and Jarvis, B. (2012) Against swamping. Analysis, 72(4), pp. 690-699. (doi: 10.1093/analys/ans118)

Carter, J. A. and Chrisman, M. (2012) Is epistemic expressivism incompatible with inquiry? Philosophical Studies, 159(3), pp. 323-339. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-011-9710-9)

Carter, J. A. (2012) On Stanley’s intellectualism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 20(5), pp. 749-762. (doi: 10.1080/09672559.2012.741820)

Carter, J. A. (2012) Recent work on Moore’s proof. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2(2), pp. 115-144. (doi: 10.1163/221057011X560974)

2011

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2011) Norms of assertion: the quantity and quality of epistemic support. Philosophia, 39(4), pp. 615-635. (doi: 10.1007/s11406-011-9317-6)

Carter, J. A. (2011) Kvanvig on pointless truths and the cognitive ideal. Acta Analytica, 26(3), pp. 285-293. (doi: 10.1007/s12136-010-0114-9)

Carter, J. A. (2011) Radical skepticism, closure, and robust knowledge. Journal of Philosophical Research, 36, pp. 115-133. (doi: 10.5840/jpr_2011_2)

2010

Carter, J. A. (2010) Anti-luck epistemology and safety’s (recent) discontents. Philosophia, 38(3), pp. 517-532. (doi: 10.1007/s11406-009-9219-z)

Carter, J. A. (2010) Review of E. Sosa's "Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge," Volumes I and II. ProtoSociology, [Book Review]

2009

Carter, J. A. (2009) On Cappelen and Hawthrone's "Relativism and Monadic Truth". ProtoSociology, [Book Review]

2008

Axtell, G. and Carter, J. A. (2008) Just the right thickness: a defense of second-wave virtue epistemology. Philosophical Papers, 37(3), pp. 413-434. (doi: 10.1080/05568640809485229)

This list was generated on Wed Jun 3 18:58:10 2020 BST.
Number of items: 117.

Articles

Carter, J. A. , Mi, C., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (2020) Introduction to special issue: knowledge, virtue and action—eastern and western perspectives. Synthese, (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02662-8) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2020) Cognitive goods, open futures and the epistemology of education. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 54(2), 449-466-449-466. (doi: 10.1111/1467-9752.12420)

Carter, J. A. and Rupert, R. D. (2020) Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale. Synthese, (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. and McKenna, R. (2020) Skepticism motivated: on the skeptical import of motivated reasoning. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2020) De Minimis Normativism: a new theory of full aptness. Philosophical Quarterly, (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. and McKenna, R. (2019) Kornblith versus Sosa on grades of knowledge. Synthese, 196(12), pp. 4989-5007. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1689-8)

Carter, J. A. , Pritchard, D. and Shepherd, J. (2019) Knowledge-how, understanding-why, and epistemic luck: an experimental study. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10(4), pp. 701-734. (doi: 10.1007/s13164-018-0429-9)

Carter, J. A. and Meehan, D. (2019) Vices of distrust. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 8(10), pp. 25-32.

Carter, J. A. and McKenna, R. (2019) Absolutism, relativism and metaepistemology. Erkenntnis, (doi: 10.1007/s10670-019-00147-w) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2019) Radical scepticism and the epistemology of confusion. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 9(3), pp. 223-237. (doi: 10.1163/22105700-20191387)

Carter, J. A. (2019) On behalf of a bi-level account of trust. Philosophical Studies, (doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01311-2) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2019) Autonomy, cognitive offloading and education. Educational Theory, 68(6), pp. 657-673. (doi: 10.1111/edth.12338)

Carter, J. A. and Kallestrup, J. (2019) Varieties of cognitive integration. Noûs, (doi: 10.1111/nous.12288) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2019) Exercising abilities. Synthese, (doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02227-4) (Early Online Publication)

Kotzee, B., Carter, J. A. and Siegel, H. (2019) Educating for intellectual virtue: a critique from action guidance. Episteme, (doi: 10.1017/epi.2019.10) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2019) The epistemology of cognitive enhancement. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 44(2), pp. 220-242. (doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhy040) (PMID:30877778)

Carter, J. A. (2019) Epistemic perceptualism, skill and the regress problem. Philosophical Studies, (doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01243-x) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2018) On behalf of controversial view agnosticism. European Journal of Philosophy, 26(4), pp. 1358-1370. (doi: 10.1111/ejop.12333)

Carter, J. A. (2018) Archimedean metanorms. Topoi, (doi: 10.1007/s11245-018-9586-9) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2018) Meta-epistemic defeat. Synthese, 195(7), pp. 2877-2896. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1187-9)

Carter, J. A. and McDonnell, N. (2018) Welcome to the machine. Philosophers' Magazine, 81, pp. 33-39. (doi: 10.5840/tpm20188144)

Carter, J. A. (2018) Virtue epistemology, enhancement, and control. Metaphilosophy, 49(3), pp. 283-304. (doi: 10.1111/meta.12304)

Alfano, M., Carter, J. A. and Cheong, M. (2018) Technological seduction and self-radicalization. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 4(3), pp. 298-322. (doi: 10.1017/apa.2018.27)

Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (2018) The basing relation and the impossibility of the debasing demon. American Philosophical Quarterly, 55(3), p. 203.

Carter, J. A. (2018) Sosa on knowledge, judgment and guessing. Synthese, (doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1181-2) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2017) Virtuous insightfulness. Episteme, 14(4), pp. 539-554. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2016.37)

Carter, J. A. and Czarnecki, B. (2017) (Anti)-anti-intellectualism and the sufficiency thesis. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98(S1), pp. 374-397. (doi: 10.1111/papq.12187)

Carter, J. A. and Navarro, J. (2017) The defeasibility of knowledge-how. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 95(3), pp. 662-685. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12441)

Carter, J. A. (2017) Intellectual autonomy, epistemic dependence and cognitive enhancement. Synthese, (doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-1549-y) (Early Online Publication)

Heersmink, R. and Carter, J. A. (2017) The philosophy of memory technologies: metaphysics, knowledge, and values. Memory Studies, (doi: 10.1177/1750698017703810) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, A. , Collin, J. H. and Palermos, O. (2017) Semantic inferentialism as (a form of) active externalism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 16(3), pp. 387-402. (doi: 10.1007/s11097-016-9458-y)

Carter, J. A. and Peterson, M. (2017) The modal account of luck revisited. Synthese, 194(6), pp. 2175-2184. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1047-7)

Carter, J. A. (2017) Assertion, uniqueness and epistemic hypocrisy. Synthese, 194(5), pp. 1463-1476. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0766-5)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2017) Googled assertion. Philosophical Psychology, 30(4), pp. 490-501. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1285395)

Carter, J. A. and Church, I. M. (2016) On epistemic consequentialism and the virtue conflation problem. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 5(4), pp. 239-248. (doi: 10.1002/tht3.218)

Carter, J. A. , Peterson, M. and van Bezooijen, B. (2016) Not knowing a cat is a cat: analyticity and knowledge ascriptions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7(4), pp. 817-834. (doi: 10.1007/s13164-015-0279-7)

Carter, J. A. (2016) Epistemology and Relativism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

Carter, J. A. and Kallestrup, J. (2016) Extended cognition and propositional memory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92(3), pp. 691-714. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12157)

Carter, J. A. and Czarnecki, B. (2016) Extended knowledge-how. Erkenntnis, 81(2), pp. 259-273. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-015-9738-x)

Carter, J. A. and Peterson, M. (2016) On the epistemology of the precautionary principle: reply to Steglich-Petersen. Erkenntnis, 81(2), pp. 297-304. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-015-9740-3)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2016) Perceptual knowledge and relevant alternatives. Philosophical Studies, 173(4), pp. 969-990. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-015-0533-y)

Carter, J. A. (2016) Group peer disagreement. Ratio, 29(1), pp. 11-28. (doi: 10.1111/rati.12077)

Carter, J. A. (2016) Robust virtue epistemology as anti-luck epistemology: a new solution. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 97(1), pp. 140-155. (doi: 10.1111/papq.12040)

Carter, J. A. and Palermos, S. O. (2016) Is having your computer compromised a personal assault? The ethics of extended cognition. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2(4), pp. 542-560. (doi: 10.1017/apa.2016.28)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2016) Knowledge, assertion and intellectual humility. Logos and Episteme, 7(4), pp. 489-502. (doi: 10.5840/logos-episteme20167444)

Carter, J. A. , Gordon, E. C. and Palermos, S. O. (2016) Extended emotion. Philosophical Psychology, 29(2), pp. 198-217. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2015.1063596)

Kerr, E. T. and Carter, J. A. (2016) Richard Rorty and epistemic normativity. Social Epistemology, 30(1), pp. 3-24. (doi: 10.1080/02691728.2014.971914)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2015) Knowledge-how and epistemic value. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93(4), pp. 799-816. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2014.997767)

Baghramian, M. and Carter, J. A. (2015) Relativism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, pp. 1-60.

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2015) Knowledge-how and epistemic luck. Noûs, 49(3), pp. 440-453. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12054)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2015) Knowledge-how and cognitive achievement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 91(1), pp. 181-199. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12094)

Carter, J. A. , Jarvis, B. W. and Rubin, K. (2015) Varieties of cognitive achievement. Philosophical Studies, 172(6), pp. 1603-1623. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-014-0367-z)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2015) On cognitive and moral enhancement: a reply to Savulescu and Persson. Bioethics, 29(3), pp. 153-161. (doi: 10.1111/bioe.12076)

Carter, J. A. and Peterson, M. (2015) On the epistemology of the precautionary principle. Erkenntnis, 80(1), pp. 1-13. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-014-9609-x)

Carter, J. A. (2015) Group knowledge and epistemic defeat. Ergo, 2(28), pp. 711-735. (doi: 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0002.028)

Carter, J. A. , Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (2014) Varieties of externalism. Philosophical Issues, 24(1), pp. 63-109. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12026)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2014) Openmindedness and truth. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 44(2), pp. 207-224. (doi: 10.1080/00455091.2014.923247)

Carter, J. A. and Nickel, P. J. (2014) On testimony and transmission. Episteme, 11(2), pp. 145-155. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2014.4)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2014) A new maneuver against the epistemic relativist. Synthese, 191(8), pp. 1683-1695. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-013-0357-2)

Carter, J. A. (2014) Disagreement, relativism and doxastic revision. Erkenntnis, 79(S1), pp. 155-172. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-013-9450-7)

Carter, J. A. (2014) Relativism, knowledge and understanding. Episteme, 11(1), pp. 35-52. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2013.45)

Carter, J. A. (2013) Extended cognition and epistemic luck. Synthese, 190(18), pp. 4201-4214. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-013-0267-3)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2013) Intelligence, wellbeing and procreative beneficence. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 30(2), pp. 122-135. (doi: 10.1111/japp.12011)

Carter, J. A. (2013) A problem for Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology. Erkenntnis, 78(2), pp. 253-275. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-011-9315-x)

Carter, J. A. , Jarvis, B. and Rubin, K. (2013) Knowledge: value on the cheap. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91(2), pp. 249-263. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2012.694455)

Carter, J. A. and Jarvis, B. (2012) Against swamping. Analysis, 72(4), pp. 690-699. (doi: 10.1093/analys/ans118)

Carter, J. A. and Chrisman, M. (2012) Is epistemic expressivism incompatible with inquiry? Philosophical Studies, 159(3), pp. 323-339. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-011-9710-9)

Carter, J. A. (2012) On Stanley’s intellectualism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 20(5), pp. 749-762. (doi: 10.1080/09672559.2012.741820)

Carter, J. A. (2012) Recent work on Moore’s proof. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2(2), pp. 115-144. (doi: 10.1163/221057011X560974)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2011) Norms of assertion: the quantity and quality of epistemic support. Philosophia, 39(4), pp. 615-635. (doi: 10.1007/s11406-011-9317-6)

Carter, J. A. (2011) Kvanvig on pointless truths and the cognitive ideal. Acta Analytica, 26(3), pp. 285-293. (doi: 10.1007/s12136-010-0114-9)

Carter, J. A. (2011) Radical skepticism, closure, and robust knowledge. Journal of Philosophical Research, 36, pp. 115-133. (doi: 10.5840/jpr_2011_2)

Carter, J. A. (2010) Anti-luck epistemology and safety’s (recent) discontents. Philosophia, 38(3), pp. 517-532. (doi: 10.1007/s11406-009-9219-z)

Axtell, G. and Carter, J. A. (2008) Just the right thickness: a defense of second-wave virtue epistemology. Philosophical Papers, 37(3), pp. 413-434. (doi: 10.1080/05568640809485229)

Books

Carter, J. A. and Broncano-Berrocal, F. (2019) The philosophy of group polarization: a collective vice theory. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. and Littlejohn, C. (2019) This is Epistemology. Wiley. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. and Poston, T. (2018) A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How. Series: Bloomsbury critical introductions to contemporary epistemology. Bloomsbury. ISBN 9781472514929

Carter, J. A. (2016) Metaepistemology and Relativism. Series: Palgrave innovations in philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, NY. ISBN 9781137336637

Book Sections

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. (2020) Is searching the Internet making us intellectually arrogant? In: Tanesini, A. and Lynch, M. P. (eds.) Arrogance and Polarisation. Routledge. ISBN 9780367260859 (In Press)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2020) Intellectual humility and assertion. In: Alfano, M., Lynch, M. P. and Tanesini, A. (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. and Mortini, D. (2020) Higher-order defeat in collective moral epistemology. In: Klenk, M. (ed.) Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge: New York. ISBN 9780367343200

Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (2019) Well-founded belief: an introduction. In: Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9781138503755

Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (2019) The superstitious lawyer's inference. In: Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9781138503755

Carter, J. A. and McKenna, R. (2019) Relativism and externalism. In: Kusch, M. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. Routledge: London. ISBN 9781138484283

Carter, J. A. (2019) Epistemic luck and the extended mind. In: Church, I. M. and Hartman, R. J. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of The Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy. Routledge: New York, pp. 318-319. ISBN 9780815366591

Carter, J. A. (2019) Virtue perspectivism, externalism, and epistemic circularity. In: Crețu, A.-M. and Massimi, M. (eds.) Knowledge From a Human Point of View. Series: Synthese library (Studies in epistemology, logic, methodology, and philosophy of science), 416. Springer: Cham, pp. 123-140. ISBN 9783030270407 (doi:10.1007/978-3-030-27041-4_8)

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2018) Extended self-knowledge. In: Pedrini, P. and Kirsch, J. (eds.) Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative. Series: Contributions to phenomenology (96). Springer: Cham, pp. 31-49. ISBN 9783319986449 (doi:10.1007/978-3-319-98646-3_3)

Carter, J. A. , Clark, A. and Palermos, S. O. (2018) New humans? Ethics, trust, and the extended mind. In: Carter, J. A., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 331-351. ISBN 9780198769811

Carter, J. A. and Kallestrup, J. (2018) Extended circularity: a new puzzle for extended cognition. In: Carter, J. A., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 42-63. ISBN 9780198769811

Pritchard, D., Carter, J. A. and Turri, J. (2018) The value of knowledge. In: Zalta, E. N. (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University: Stanford, CA.

Carter, J. A. (2017) Epistemic pluralism, epistemic relativism and ‘hinge’ epistemology. In: Coliva, A. and Pedersen, N. J.L.L. (eds.) Epistemic Pluralism. Series: Palgrave innovations in philosophy. Palgrave, pp. 229-252. ISBN 9783319654591

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2017) Cognitive bias, scepticism and understanding. In: Grimm, S. R., Baumberger, C. and Ammon, S. (eds.) Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Routledge: New York, pp. 272-292. ISBN 9781138921931

Carter, J. A. (2017) Are theism and atheism totally opposed? Can they learn from each other? In: Harris, M. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Philosophy, Science and Religion for Everyone. Routledge: New York, pp. 82-92. ISBN 9781138234215

Carter, J. A. (2017) Epistemological implications of relativism. In: Ichikawa, J. J. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Taylor and Francis, pp. 292-301. ISBN 9781138818392

Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (2017) Epistemic luck. In: Crane, T. (ed.) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Taylor and Francis.

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2017) Inference to the best explanation and epistemic circularity. In: McCain, K. and Poston, T. (eds.) Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198746904

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2016) Objectual understanding, factivity and belief. In: Grajner, M. and Schmechtig, P. (eds.) Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter, pp. 423-442. ISBN 9783110496345 (doi:10.1515/9783110496765-020)

Carter, A. and Pritchard, D. (2016) Intellectual humility, knowledge-how, and disagreement. In: Mi, C., Slote, M. and Sosa, E. (eds.) Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn Toward Virtue. Routledge: New York, pp. 49-63. ISBN 9781138925168

Carter, J. A. and Palermos, S. O. (2015) Epistemology and active externalism. In: Oxford Bibligraphies Online: Philosphy. Oxford University Press. (doi:10.1093/OBO/9780195396577-0285)

Book Reviews

Carter, A. (2017) Review of Epistemology by Ernest Sosa. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2017, [Book Review]

Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2015) MOOCS, by Jonathan Haber. Teaching Philosophy, 38(4), pp. 455-458. [Book Review]

Carter, J. A. (2014) Review of Tim Henning and David P. Schweikard (Eds) Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Essays on Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2014, [Book Review]

Carter, J. A. (2013) Faulkner, Paul, Knowledge on Trust. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91(2), pp. 409-413. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2013.775169)[Book Review]

Carter, J. A. (2013) The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Quarterly, 63(250), pp. 184-187. (doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00096.x)[Book Review]

Carter, J. A. (2010) Review of E. Sosa's "Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge," Volumes I and II. ProtoSociology, [Book Review]

Carter, J. A. (2009) On Cappelen and Hawthrone's "Relativism and Monadic Truth". ProtoSociology, [Book Review]

Edited Books

Carter, J. A. , Leffetz, G. and Dechauffour, G. (Eds.) (2019) Special Issue of Synthese: Scepticism and Epistemic Angst [Guest Editors]. Springer. (In Press)

Carter, J. A. , Mi, C., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2019) Special Issue of Synthese: Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Eastern and Western Perspectives [Guest Editors]. Springer. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. and Broncano-Berrocal, F. (Eds.) (2019) The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (Eds.) (2019) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9781138503755

Carter, J. A., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2018) Socially Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198801764

Carter, J. A. , Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2018) Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198769811

Carter, J. A. , Gordon, E. C. and Jarvis, B. W. (Eds.) (2017) Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198716310

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (Eds.) (2017) The Moral Psychology of Pride. Series: Moral psychology of the emotions. Rowman and Littlefield: London. ISBN 9781783489084

Carter, J. A. , Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2016) Special Issue of American Philosophical Quarterly: Varieties of Externalism: Epistemic, Content, Vehicle [Guest Editors]. University of Illinois Press.

Carter, J. A. , Kallestrup, J. and Palermos, S. O. (Eds.) (2016) Special Issue of Logos and Episteme: Intellectual Humility [Guest Editors]. Institute for Economic and Social Research of The Romanian Academy.

Carter, J. A. , Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2014) Special Issue of Philosophical Issues: Extended Knowledge [Guest Editors]. Wiley.

This list was generated on Wed Jun 3 18:58:10 2020 BST.

Grants

I have just been awarded (as PI) a 3-year research grant A Virtue Epistemology of Trust (Co-Is: Chris Kelp and Mona Simion) from the Leverhulme Trust. This project will run from 2020-2023 and will include a PhD student and a Postdoc. More details soon! See here for further info.

Paper prizes: 

  • Winner: 2019 Philosophical Quarterly essay prize for my paper 'De Minimis Normativism: A New Theory of Full Aptness' (£1500)
  • Philosopher's Annual (2018): my paper 'Technological Seduction and Self-Radicalization' (with M. Alfano and M. Cheong) was selected for inclusion in the Philosopher's Annual as one of the 10 best papers published in Philospohy in 2018.

Supervision

I am happy to supervise students working on most topics in epistemology. 

Current PhD students (as lead or co-supervisor): 

Daniella Meehan

Dario Mortini

Martin Miragoli

Finn McCardel

Daniel Abrahams

Ruaridh Gilmartin

Francis Jose

Lysette Chaprionere

Dani Pino Sanchez (Seville)

Anne-Kathrin Koch (Vienna) 09/2019-09/2020


Teaching

[Autumn 2019] SH26 Virtue Epistemology

[Spring 2019] MSc Phil. Methodology: Williamson's Metaphilosophy (syllabus)

[Spring 2019] SH26 Virtue Epistemology 

[Autumn 2018] MSc Epistemology: Intellectual Autonomy (syllabus)

[Spring 2018] SH26 Virtue Epistemology (syllabus)

[Spring 2018] JH7 Philosophy of Mind (syllabus)

[Autumn 2017] MSc Epistemology A (syllabus)

[Spring 2017] SH26 Virtue Epistemology (syllabus)


Additional Information

I am director and co-founder (with Chris Kelp and Mona Simion) of COGITO Epistemology Research Centre. For details about the Centre, see here