Adam Smith Business School

Professor Yosuke Yasuda, Osaka University and ISEG University of Lisbon (visiting)

'Squid Voting Game: Rational Indecisiveness in Sequential Voting' (joint paper with Yuichiro Kamada)
Tuesday 12 April 2022, 1pm-2.15pm
Main Building, Room 305AB

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Abstract

We consider a model of common-value sequential voting in which voters are differentiated in their information. We ask whether the intuition as in the simultaneous-voting case – voters with no information would vote so as not to influence the outcome – would be valid, to imply long voting in our sequential setting. We find that any voting outcome, including short voting, can arise in equilibrium, and hence the intuition from the simultaneous voting does not apply. We discuss conditions under which a long voting results. We also show that a voter may vote against her information in equilibrium and that may improve welfare.

Biography

Yosuke YASUDA is an Associate Professor of Economics at Osaka University in Japan. He is currently visiting the ISEG, University of Lisbon. His research focuses on Game Theory and Industrial Organization with a primary interest in Market Design. His research papers are published in such economics journals as the American Economic Review and RAND Journal of Economics. Before joining Osaka University, he was an Assistant Professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo. He received his Ph.D. from Princeton University in 2007.

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First published: 16 March 2022