Elite and Mass Conceptions of the Scottish Nation in 1997

Murray Stewart Leith (Politics: University of Glasgow)

The end of the 20th Century saw the creation of a devolved parliament for Scotland, which was the culmination of several decades of political agitation for such an institution. Many of the claims made for the establishment of a purely Scottish legislature had been made on the need for Scotland to have a national assembly addressing national needs. However, who or what is the Scottish nation? While the political elites within Scotland and the United Kingdom present an idea of what the borders and boundaries are in regards to belonging to Scotland, are these borders and boundaries the same for the masses within Scotland? In order to consider these questions, this work shall focus on the theoretical and practical analysis of national identity.

The role of the elite[1] in nationalist movements and politics has been widely recognised and discussed among the social science literature.[2] The existence and importance of elite activity has been highlighted across a wide range of approaches to nationalism and national identity. Brown (2000), drawing on support from Kedourie, Bruielly, Brass and Hobsbawm supports the modernist approach. This states that the idea of nationalism as a created ideology has been formulated in a number of ways in a variety of contexts. Historical symbols are employed by contending state elites, who construct the idea of the "natural" nation by a selective re-interpretation of such myths (Brown 2000) and thus the nation is presented as being a historical continuity. It is important to note that the modernist approach argues that the constructed nationalism may not be historically accurate and the legitimacy and power to mobilise does not rest on accuracy either. Indeed, certain arguments within this broad approach, such as those of Hobsbawm (1990) or Gellner (1983) have been seen as arguing that nationalism is an invented doctrine altogether. Wallerstein (1991) agrees and argues that the nation is a product of the capitalist world system.

Other approaches also consider the use of history to be an important aspect in the formation of national identity in contemporary society. Whether it be primordialists (often employed as a pejorative term) or ethno-symbolists[3] they do not dispute the impact of the modern world system on nationalism and identity (Hearn 2000). However, unlike the modernist approach considered above they do stress the importance of tracing ethnicity back beyond modern times, and do not see this process as one of invention, either partially or completely. The modern system processed ethnic groups into nations as the world state system emerged (Smith 1986). Therefore, a direct link can be drawn between the ethnic groups of yesteryear and the nations of today (Smith 1991).

Modernists thus contend that 'nations' of today and the basis of national identity are formulated by elites. The legitimacy and power of the system is based on the ability of elites to employ symbols that embody cultural authority. This is done to ensure that nationalist myths are successfully transmitted through such state controlled institutions as the education system and thereby become accepted in the contemporary culture (Brown 2000, Kedourie 1985). Contending elite groups invent this created ideology as part of the modern state system in order that they may hold, or gain, power and authority (Kedourie 1985). Smith, one of the leading thinkers of the ethno-symbolist school of thought, argues that the modernist argument is far too weighted in favour of elite ability to mould national identity. For any elite led movement to be successful, it must engage within the previous existent social and cultural contextual framework for the national group in question (Smith 1998).

Another argument against the modernist approach is the lack of importance the modernists place upon the non-rational and passionate qualities of nationalism and national identity (Connor 1994). The modernists are attacked for their discarding of such individual focused issues. Doing so underestimates the significance of the ethnic component of nationalism and national identity: In other words, the importance of language, religion, tradition and culture (Geertz 1963, Connor 1994).

Smith has presented a clear conceptualisation of the ethno-symbolist approach, the introduction of the ethnie concept. He argues that there is a clear link between the nations of today and the ethnic communities that existed in previous times (Smith 1986). Among the various attributes of the ethnie that Smith employs as a link is the idea of group solidarity, a feeling of belonging, being part of a group that shares all the characteristics that separate them from other peoples. This allows an individual to acquire an identity outside of themselves and beyond their immediate environment. This group consciousness echoes the idea propounded by Benedict Anderson (1983). In this theory, the nation is a shared community of the mind - that "imagined community" where all members think of themselves as part of the greater nation. For Anderson, it is an impossibility that each member of the nation should know the others on a personal or even social level. The bond of belonging is created on an individual level. Thus the nation is a group of individuals that see themselves as being a collective entity. This collectiveness is based on the binding myths employed by the elites to create a sense of identity. It is this idea of identity, of belonging, that brings together the elites and the masses in the nation. For Anderson, this creation of a common identity was achieved by a combination of the success of a common vernacular language and the emergence of mass printing. This combination allowed the communication of this identity beyond isolated individual groups to the whole nation. This consideration seems built upon the ideas of Deutsch (1966) who saw a framework of mass social communication creating a community of like-minded people.

These theoretical considerations of nationalism show general agreement on the concept of the nation, while disagreeing as to how and when the nation came into being. The nation can be widely agreed to be a group of individuals who see themselves as being part of a greater community. The theoretical approaches briefly discussed above agree that elites are considered to employ imagery and other cultural and social identifiers that provide a framework to turn individuals into an associated group. The group cohesion is created and continued through the use of certain symbols and myths. It is the basis for these myths and symbols that causes divergence within the field as to the historical validity of the 'nation' in question. However, in many ways, the end result is the same - the elites are able to present a group with certain characteristics that separate it from other groups. This set of characteristics thus represents a national identity and the group is the nation.

One important point arises from the above - the need for an acceptance of the identity in question among those whom the elite aims their activity and attentions at - the masses.[4] Simply put, the nation needs a critical mass. Isolated individuals, let alone a small elite group, cannot claim a national identity without acceptance from the masses in the polity. Recognition within the system need not involve autonomy but some form of political legitimation is required. Even in multinational states, elites employ the symbols and myths of the past to provide a sense of identity for the masses of the territorial unit (or parts of it) in contemporary times and create the borders and boundaries of the nation.

Indeed, the issue of identity remains a central one for most individuals engaged in any polity. As individuals, we hold a multiplicity of identities that allow us to relate, in some way, to almost everything around socially, politically, economically, or even physically. Our various identities include age, gender, class, education, ethnicity and, of course, nationality. Not all of these identities are seamless and conflict can occur at political or social junctures. The sense of national identity may not always be primary, as political or social decisions require other individual aspects to also come into consideration. However, what is important to note is that while the elites may employ specific symbols and myths to promote their image of the nation to its members, the masses hold their own ideas of what the nation is and who is, or is not, a member. This paper will now turn to an analysis of elite and mass conceptions of national identity. This will be done by comparing the elite messages contained within the party manifestos prepared for the 1997 General Election and data drawn from the National Election Study undertaken during that period.

The Elite

The 1997 General Election represented the start of a sea change in Scottish Politics. As the various party manifestos clearly indicate, the expectations were that a Scottish parliament would be a reality within two years. A major theme running through all the manifestos was the future presence of a Scottish parliament. Nationalism theory would expect the political elites to employ images and ideas within their manifesto that serve a dual purpose: First to seek to present policies and ideas in keeping with their ideological perspectives, but also to engage with the myths and symbols that can motivate support from the national group in question. To these ends the parties produced distinct Scottish manifestos. Indeed, all the parties employed the term Scottish in their own party labels.

In many respects the manifesto messages are similar, while differing in important ways. The perspective placed on the national question presents different approaches. The Conservative manifesto is the document with the strongest emphasis on both history and tradition. Two possible explanations present themselves. First, the Party is seeking to maintain the status quo, and thus wishes to present the Union in the strongest possible light. Second, the Conservative Party was also aware of the nature of their support within Scotland. The results of the local elections undertaken in the preceding years had indicated that they could expect to lose support - and therefore seats at - the next Westminster election (Brown 1997). They consequently appealed to their core supporters, and there were even attempts to appeal to the traditional nature of the Scottish people outside of this core.

A direct contrast, when it comes to the use of history, is found in the New Labour manifesto. Overall, there is very little use of history or symbology. This may be explained by the need for New Labour to emphasise the new aspect of their identity. The 1997 election saw a party whose leadership clearly sought to distance themselves from the (old) Labour Party ideas and policies of the 1980s and even the early 1990s. Labour was operating from a position of strength in Scotland. The commitment to devolution was publicly acknowledged and a referendum had been promised. The manifesto could lay claim to a principle of self-determination and also one of recognising the distinctive nature and needs of the Scots. The party had little need to engage in strong rhetoric or to commit itself further than it had. Directly put, Labour expected to win the General Election of 1997, and gain a majority of the seats in Scotland.

Limited use of historical symbolism is also found in the Liberal Democrat manifesto. Although it could be legitimately claimed that they were a party with a "century-old commitment to the democratic renewal of Scotland and Britain" and the manifesto is very forward-looking. This is in keeping with a Party tradition of emphasising traditional Liberal concepts of change and progress. The ideological emphasis of the Party also allows it to present itself with a distinctive and strong egalitarian flavour. This could have little to do with appeals to 'traditional' Scottish values, but rather may simply reflect the party's core values and beliefs. However, as with Labour, the theme is modern rather than historical.

The Scottish National party (SNP) present a more mixed image in terms of history and future emphasis. Clearly the SNP can and do draw on a sense of history in their move to reconstitute (from their perspective) the Scottish parliament. As the other parties can be portrayed as being London - rather than Scotland - based, the sense of Scottish identity becomes a strong political tool. However, the presence and use of historical imagery and support is strongly balanced by the idea of a modern and forward-looking party and nation. The SNP are careful to present their vision of a future Scotland as a multicultural, multi-ethnic state, where birth (a link to the past) as well as residence (a connection to the present) would provide citizenship of Scotland. There are also strong themes linking independence to Scottish identity. Thus the SNP seek to create "an independent nation once again and the sensitive, compassionate and forward-looking governance of that nation which the SNP believe can be delivered". Such a statement clearly links history, nation and tradition and is a clear example of a specific political elite employing symbolism and mythology in an attempt to create political national boundaries.

Overall, the document employing the strongest sense of history and identity, the Conservative manifesto, is also the weakest in terms of mass expectations and ideological agreement. The manifesto employing history and identity least is that of the Labour Party, whose expectations were the highest. Both the smaller parties tend to employ ideas and images of history and identity that falls, to an extent, between the two extremes. While the SNP naturally employs a strong sense of identity and the Liberal Democrats do so to a lesser extent, both parties provide a more modern dimension in their manifestos - looking to the future as well as to the past.

The political elites presented their vision of the nation in an inclusive manner. Whilst employing the ideas of nation and a sense of Scottish identity, no firm definitions were provided, nor any borders drawn in a manner that had the potential to exclude certain individuals. Perhaps the only party to imply borders were the SNP. They clearly differentiated between parties that had the interest of the Scottish nation at heart (themselves) and parties that were "London" controlled - everyone else! At the same time the as SNP sought to define strong political boundaries, they were also very clear in providing a sense of Scottish nationhood that was very inclusive and civic minded. Historical symbolism may be present in most of the manifestos, but there were no clear definitions provided as to what the Scottish nation was, in terms of individual belonging. However, the SNP manifesto was also very clear on the nature of being Scottish. They were (and are) the only party to seek a radical restructuring of the relationship between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom, they were very careful in their document to highlight the fact that anyone born or living in Scotland at the time of independence would be considered to be a Scottish citizen. This theme is a reflection of the overall civic nature of Scottish political nationalism.

T.C. Smout has argued that Scotland is more about the territory than the person - "a sense of place" as compared to a "sense of tribe" (Smout 1994 p. 107). Indeed, the New Scots for Scotland is organised within SNP ranks and welcomes immigrants and ethnic minorities to join their fight for an independent Scotland. McCrone (1992, 1998) has also argued repeatedly that the nature of Scottish nationalism has more to do with an inclusive approach than any ethnic or even primordial aspect. These arguments from academia are reflected in the manifestos above. Where the concept of belonging is brushed upon it is made clear that all can belong. However, if national identity is defined as an 'us', separating one set of individuals from another, there must be a 'them', the others who are not of that group. If everyone in Scotland, according to this elite view, is part of the nation then the 'other' must be outwith Scotland.

Therefore, elite conception of national identity in Scotland is very much an inclusive one with the borders of belonging being drawn in a very wide ranging, and permeable manner. But does this view of the elite agree with the view from below? In order to examine this issue this work shall now consider the mass consideration of what makes one Scottish.

The Masses

Individual respondents to the 1997 National Election Survey (NES)[5] were asked three questions on how important specific attributes were to "being truly Scottish". The first question related to the sense of tribe, an idea rejected by elite consideration. In particular, it was asked whether an individual needed to have been born in Scotland in order to be Scottish. The second question was directly related to location, i.e. the definition of citizenship employed by the elite. The third question returned to the issue of tribe, adding a historical dimension, by asking if to truly be Scottish, an individual is required to have Scottish parents/grandparents. The results are presented in Table 1 below.

Table One
Being Scottish
(1997 NES)

	Born in Scotland	Living in Scotland	Scottis G/Parent
Very Important	52.4	30.2	38.9
Fairly Important	30.6	36.8	36.6
Not Very Important	12.2	23.4	18.6
Not at all Important	3.5	8.3	4.6
Don't Know/NA	1.3	1.4	1.3

The data analysis shows clearly that a large majority of individuals living in Scotland consider the idea of being Scottish to be closely linked to birth/family - 83 per cent of those asked stated that it was important to some degree that an individual be born in Scotland to be considered Scottish. This clearly does not coincide with the elite view discussed above.

Regarding residency, a significant proportion of respondents believe an individual must live in Scotland to be considered Scottish. While 31.7 per cent do not see residency within Scotland as being important, 67 per cent disagree and consider it somewhat important. This figure could be considered support for the elite conception of belonging, but there are problems with such an interpretation. These questions were asked alongside each other and the subjective nature of the criteria employed is impossible to consider. What is needed (in relation to such questions) is greater depth and analysis of whether the idea of living in Scotland is linked in some way to the other questions. It may well be that many individuals assume that someone (or the vast majority of individuals) living in Scotland were born there. This is, of course, supposition and only indicates the limited information supplied by the data.

The third question also contributes to the problem of how elite and mass conceptions of Scottish national identity differ. While 83 per cent think it important or very important that an individual is born in Scotland to be considered Scottish, 75.5 per cent think it is important that an individual has Scottish parents or grandparents to be "truly Scottish". Less than a quarter of respondents think that an individual can be considered Scottish if they do not have Scottish parents. This clearly does not overlap/coincide with the elite conception of nationalism, and certainly raises questions that require further investigation and analysis.

However, as has been mentioned, interpretation of this particular data is difficult. The questions on ancestry and residence are methodologically confusing due to the simplistic and isolated nature of the responses that may be given. Analysers of the data set used above can not be certain as to whether respondents are considering the need for parents or for grandparents to be Scottish! The data is important as it shows three quarters of respondents requiring more than one generation to be linked to Scotland for a Scottish identity to be present. This provides a starting point for analysis, but a firmer delineation would have been helpful. At the same time, previous concerns regarding national self-identification and the specific nature of national identity remain unanswered. The problem is not so much how individuals measure their national identity, but how they measure the group national identity. Moreover, how much importance is attached to this identity (individual or accumulated) in the political realm? If Henderson (1999) is correct and the political spectrum has indeed become more polarised along national lines, then the importance of national identity as a politically loaded concept increases. If this is the case, then the inclusion and exclusion of individuals from the national group, (based on the elite or mass perception of what membership requires) also becomes more relevant. However, the importance attached to particular attributes by the group remains unclear. Clearly additional, more detailed, research on this point is required.

In conclusion it can be stated that, when considering the nature of Scottish national identity within the political realm, problems arise when elite and mass notions are compared. Although the survey results of the 1997 NES can be interpreted in different ways, clear differences between elite perceptions and projections, and mass views, on Scottish national identity and the boundaries of the Scottish nation appear to exist. More detailed analysis into the exact nature of such differences may shed further light on the exact nature of Scottish identity. Such insights may well be necessary given the changing nature of the political relationship between Scotland and the United Kingdom, the arguments for which are often based as much on identity issues as not.

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[1] This paper employs the term elite as meaning those individuals occupying or seeking positions of authority and legitimacy within a given polity. For a wider consideration of the term elite, and the issues raised, C Wright Mills Classic text The Power Elite first published in 1956 is recommended.

[2] See, for example, Anderson 1983, Brown 2000, Castells 1997, Kedourie 1985, Kellas 1998, Ozkirimli 2000, or Smith 1991.

[3] Please note that this work is not equating the two groups, although there are similarities in the individual approaches employed in these schools of thought.

[4]The term masses is used in this paper both conceptually and specifically. Specifically, the masses discussed here are the respondents to the 1997 NES.

[5]Specific survey, methodological information and numbers from the 1997 National Election Survey can be consulted at the UK Data Archive and in McCrone et al (1999).

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Elite and Mass Conceptions of the Scottish Nation in 1997

Murray Stewart Leith (Politics: University of Glasgow)