Philosophy Research

A

Abrahams, D. (2023) Signing on: a contractarian understanding of how public history is used for civic inclusion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, (doi: 10.1007/s10677-023-10386-0) (Early Online Publication)

B

Belkoniene, M. (2023) Confusion, understanding and success. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 13(1), pp. 44-60. (doi: 10.1163/22105700-bja10051)

Belkoniene, M. (2023) Reassessing lucky understanding. Episteme, 20(2), pp. 513-527. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2022.23)

Brady, M. and Jayawickreme, E. (2023) A philosophical approach to improving empirical research on posttraumatic growth. Philosophical Psychology, (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2023.2213251) (Early Online Publication)

Brennan, C. (2023) Weak transhumanism: moderate enhancement as a non-radical path to radical enhancement. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 44, pp. 229-248. (doi: 10.1007/s11017-023-09606-6) (PMID:36780070)

C

Carter, J. A. and Meehan, D. (2023) Trust, distrust, and testimonial injustice. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 55(3), pp. 290-300. (doi: 10.1080/00131857.2022.2037418)

Carter, J. A. (2023) Analysis of knowledge. In: Sylvan, K. (ed.) Blackwell Companion to Epistemology. 3rd Edition. Wiley. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2023) Simion and Kelp on trustworthy AI. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 2(1), 18. (doi: 10.1007/s44204-023-00067-1)

Carter, J. A. (2023) Understanding, vulnerability and risk. In: González-Castán, Ó.L. (ed.) Cognitive Vulnerability: An Epistemological Approach. Series: Berlin studies in knowledge research, 18. De Gruyter: Berlin. ISBN 9783110799163 (In Press)

Carter, J. A. and Ichikawa, J. J. (2023) Intuitions. In: Oxford Bibliographies Online. Oxford University Press. (In Press)

Carter, J. A. and Rupert, R. D. (2023) Epistemology in the Subpersonal Vale. Oxford University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. and Shepherd, J. (2023) Intentional action and knowledge-centred theories of control. Philosophical Studies, 180(3), pp. 957-977. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01904-4)

Carter, M. (2023) The imperative of professional dementia care. Bioethics, 37(3), pp. 292-302. (doi: 10.1111/bioe.13095) (PMID:36217987)

Colburn, B. (2023) The Self. In: Elsner, A. and Stern, T. (eds.) The Proustian Mind. Routledge: Abingdon, pp. 93-106. ISBN 9780367357627

Collin, J. H. (2023) Of marriage and mathematics: inferentialism and social ontology. Topoi, 42(1), pp. 247-257. (doi: 10.1007/s11245-022-09843-9)

Corns, J. (2023) A critical engagement with Ratcliffe’s phenomenological exploration of grief. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, (doi: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2214761)[Book Review] (Early Online Publication)

Corns, J. (2023) Scientific eliminativism for pain. In: McLaughlin, B. P. and Cohen, J. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Series: Contemporary debates in philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 519-535. ISBN 9781119637035

Cote, N. (2023) There is no such thing as expected moral choice-worthiness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, (Accepted for Publication)

Cowan, R. (2023) Dreams, morality and the waking world. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 104(1), pp. 2-29. (doi: 10.1111/papq.12397)

Cowan, R. (2023) Moral responsibility while dreaming. Ergo, (Accepted for Publication)

G

Gordon, E. C. (2023) Understanding of the norm of political discourse. Synthese, 201(6), 198. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-023-04183-6)

Gordon, E. C. and Dodds, C. (2023) High altitude, enhancement, and the ‘spirit of sport’. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 50(1), pp. 63-82. (doi: 10.1080/00948705.2023.2168679)

Gordon, E. C. and Willis, R. J. (2023) Pharmacological cognitive enhancement and the value of achievements: an intervention. Bioethics, 37(2), pp. 130-134. (doi: 10.1111/bioe.13107) (PMID:36399109)

K

Kelp, C. (2023) How to be a capacitist. Synthese, 201(5), 169. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-023-04143-0)

Kelp, C. (2023) The Nature and Normativity of Defeat. Series: Cambridge Elements. Cambridge University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2023) What is trustworthiness? Noûs, (doi: 10.1111/nous.12448) (Early Online Publication)

Kemp, G. (2023) Andrew Lugg. Wittgenstein's Remarks on Colour. London: Anthem Press, 2021. 206 pp. £80.00. ISBN 9781785276743. Philosophical Investigations, (doi: 10.1111/phin.12387)[Book Review] (Early Online Publication)

Kemp, G. (2023) Art and the life-world: The duck, the rabbit, and the madeleine. In: Stern, T. and Elsner, A. (eds.) The Proustian Mind. Routledge: London. ISBN 9780429341472 (doi: 10.4324/9780429341472-21)

Kemp, G. (2023) Carnap, Quine, and Williamson: metaphysics, semantics, and science. In: Morris, S. (ed.) The Philosophical Project of Carnap and Quine. Cambridge University Press, pp. 253-271. ISBN 9781108494243

Kemp, G. (2023) Quine's Philosophy: An Introduction. Bloomsbury: London. ISBN 9781350342033 (In Press)

M

McCardel, F., Holloway, C. M., Wasson, K., McDonnell, N. , Graydon, M., Pena, A. and Lehman, S. (2023) Towards a Coherent View of Evidence in Safety Assurance. Technical Report. NASA, Hampton, VA.

McIntyre, K. , Stapleton, G. , Sherry, L. , Donald, C. , Milling, S. , Nibbs, R. , Douce, G. , Latkovskis, I. and McDonnell, N. (2023) ‘I felt as if I was there’ - Can Virtual Reality (VR) Enhance Students’ Learning Experience of Immunology Teaching? 16th Annual University of Glasgow Learning and Teaching Conference, 29 Mar 2023. (Unpublished)

P

Patrizio, R. F. (2023) Trust’s meno problem: can the doxastic view account for the value of trust? Philosophical Psychology, (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2023.2206837) (Early Online Publication)

Pettigrove, G. (2023) The virtue of forgiveness? In: Pettigrove, G. and Enright, R. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Forgiveness. Routledge. ISBN 9780367030728 (Accepted for Publication)

Pettigrove, G. and Enright, R. (2023) Introduction. In: Pettigrove, G. and Enright, R. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Forgiveness. Routledge. ISBN 9780367030728 (Accepted for Publication)

Pickel, B. (2023) Against second-order primitivism. In: Fritz, P. and Jones, N. (eds.) Higher-Order Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Pickel, B. and Ball, D. (2023) Conceptual engineering as inquiry. In: Isaac, M.G., Koch, S. and Scharp, K. (eds.) Conceptual Engineering. Series: Synthese Library. Springer. (Accepted for Publication)

R

Rennick, S. , Clinton, M., Ioannidou, E., Oh, L., Clooney, C., T., E., Healy, E. and Roberts, S. G. (2023) Gender bias in video game dialogue. Royal Society Open Science, 10(5), 221095. (doi: 10.1098/rsos.221095)

Rennick, S. and Roberts, S. G. (2023) The Video Game Dialogue Corpus. Corpora, (Accepted for Publication)

S

Simion, M. (2023) Knowledge and disinformation. Episteme, (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2023) Resistance to Evidence. Cambridge University Press. (In Press)

Simion, M. (2023) Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12964) (Early Online Publication)

Simion, M. (2023) Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12964) (Early Online Publication)

Simion, M. (2023) Tanesini on truth and epistemic vice. Inquiry, (doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2023.2167233) (Early Online Publication)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2023) Trustworthy artificial intelligence. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 2(1), 8. (doi: 10.1007/s44204-023-00063-5)

Slater, J. (2023) Just judge: the jury on trial. American Philosophical Quarterly, 60(2), pp. 169-186. (doi: 10.5406/21521123.60.2.05)

Slater, J. (2023) Satisficers still get away with murder. Ergo, (Accepted for Publication)

Slater, J. (2023) The SIA can’t just go with the FLO. HEC Forum, (Accepted for Publication)

T

Titus, L. M. and Carter, J. A. (2023) What the tortoise should do: a knowledge‐first virtue approach to the basing relation. Noûs, (doi: 10.1111/nous.12460) (Early Online Publication)

V

van Elswyk, P. and Willard-Kyle, C. (2023) Hedging and the norm of belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, (Accepted for Publication)

W

Willard-Kyle, C. (2023) Valuable ignorance: delayed epistemic gratification. Philosophical Studies, 180(1), pp. 363-384. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01902-6)

Z

Zheng, R. (2023) Reconceptualizing solidarity as power from below. Philosophical Studies, 180(3), pp. 893-917. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01845-y)

Ó

Ólafsson, Í. A. (2023) Unwanted knowledge transmission. Synthese, 201(5), 162. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-023-04140-3)

A

Abrahams, D. and Kemp, G. (2022) Trust and the appreciation of art. Ratio, 35(2), pp. 133-145. (doi: 10.1111/rati.12326)

Aird, R. (2022) A puzzle of epistemic paternalism. Philosophical Psychology, (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2146490) (Early Online Publication)

Alcaraz-Sanchez, A., Demšar, E., Campillo-Ferrer, T. and Torres-Platas, S. G. (2022) Nothingness is all there is: an exploration of objectless awareness during sleep. Frontiers in Psychology, 13, 901031. (doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.901031) (PMID:35756253) (PMCID:PMC9226678)

B

Belkoniene, M. (2022) The rational dimension of understanding. Synthese, 200, 349. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-022-03839-z)

Brady, M. S. (2022) Suffering and meaning in life. In: Landau, I. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Meaning in Life. Oxford University Press: New York, NY, pp. 461-474. ISBN 9780190063504 (doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190063504.013.33)

Brady, M. S. (2022) Suffering as experiential – a response to Jennifer Corns. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12863) (Early Online Publication)

Brown, D. H. (2022) Colour variation without objective colour. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 3, 17.

C

Carter, J. A. (2022) Bi-Level Virtue Epistemology: A Defence. Series: Epistemology Elements. Cambridge University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2022) On some intracranialist dogmas in epistemology. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 1(2), 44. (doi: 10.1007/s44204-022-00045-z)

Carter, J. A. (2022) Autonomous Knowledge: Radical Enhancement, Autonomy, and the Future of Knowing. Oxford University Press: Oxford ; New York. ISBN 9780192846921 (doi: 10.1093/oso/9780192846921.001.0001)

Carter, J. A. (2022) Epistemic normativity is not independent of our goals. In: Sosa, E., Steup, M., Turri, J. and Roeber, B. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd Edition. Wiley-Blackwell. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2022) Epistemic Values: Collected Papers in Epistemology. Philosophical Review, 131(2), pp. 235-240. (doi: 10.1215/00318108-9554769)[Book Review]

Carter, J. A. (2022) A Telic Theory of Trust. Oxford University Press: Oxford. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2022) Therapeutic trust. Philosophical Psychology, (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2058925) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2022) Trust and trustworthiness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12918) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2022) Trust as performance. Philosophical Issues, 32(1), pp. 120-147. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12214)

Carter, J. A. and Sosa, E. (2022) Metaepistemology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

Carter, M. (2022) Minority minds: mental disability and the presumption of value-neutrality. Journal of Applied Philosophy, (doi: 10.1111/japp.12636) (Early Online Publication)

Colburn, B. (2022) Disability-based arguments against assisted dying laws. Bioethics, 36(6), pp. 680-686. (doi: 10.1111/bioe.13036) (PMID:35389513) (PMCID:PMC9322678)

Collin, J. H. (2022) Isaac Qatraya and the logical problem of evil. Religions, 13(12), 1171. (doi: 10.3390/rel13121171)

Collin, J. H. (2022) The reverse ontological argument. Analysis, 82(3), pp. 410-416. (doi: 10.1093/analys/anab077)

Corns, J. (2022) Pain, the body, and awareness. In: Alsmith, A. J.T. and Longo, M. R. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Bodily Awareness. Routledge, pp. 355-365. ISBN 9780367337315 (doi: 10.4324/9780429321542-31)

Corns, J. (2022) Suffering as significantly disrupted agency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 105(3), pp. 706-729. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12841)

Côté, N. (2022) The diagnostic value of freedom. Journal of Value Inquiry, (doi: 10.1007/s10790-022-09891-9) (Early Online Publication)

Côté, N. (2022) Measuring republican freedom. Synthese, 200(6), 486. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-022-03964-9)

Cote, N. and Steuwer, B. (2022) Better vaguely right than precisely wrong in effective altruism: the problem of marginalism. Economics and Philosophy, (doi: 10.1017/S0266267122000062)

F

Fearnley, L. (2022) Moral worth, right reasons and counterfactual motives. Philosophical Studies, 179(9), pp. 2869-2890. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01805-6)

G

Gordon, E. C. (2022) Cognitive enhancement and authenticity: moving beyond the impasse. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 25(2), pp. 281-288. (doi: 10.1007/s11019-022-10075-2) (PMID:35471685) (PMCID:PMC9135843)

Gordon, E. C. (2022) The ethics of cognitive enhancement. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Accepted for Publication)

Gordon, E. C. (2022) Gender, race, and moral enhancement. In: Palermos, O. and Edwards, M. (eds.) Feminist Philosophy and Emerging Technologies. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Gordon, E. C. (2022) Human Enhancement and Well-Being: A Case for Optimism. Series: Routledge research in applied ethics. Routledge. ISBN 9780367702205 (doi: 10.4324/9781003147992)

Gordon, E. C. (2022) Trust and psychedelic moral enhancement. Neuroethics, 15(2), 19. (doi: 10.1007/s12152-022-09497-9)

Gordon, E. C. (2022) Virtual reality and technologically mediated love. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, (Accepted for Publication)

Gordon, E. C. (2022) When monitoring facilitates trust. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 25(4), pp. 557-571. (doi: 10.1007/s10677-022-10286-9)

Gordon, E. C. and Ragonese, V. (2022) Cognitive and moral enhancement: a practical proposal. Journal of Applied Philosophy, (doi: 10.1111/japp.12619) (Early Online Publication)

H

Humphries, J. (2022) The Habermas-Rawls Debate. Philosophical Quarterly, 72(1), pp. 249-251. (doi: 10.1093/pq/pqab006)[Book Review]

J

Jenkins, K. (2022) How To Be A Pluralist About Gender Categories. In: Halwani, R., Held, J. M., McKeever, N. and Soble, A. (eds.) The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings. 8th Edition. Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, Maryland, pp. 233-259. ISBN 9781538155363

K

Kearl, T. (2022) Manuscript title: a plea for exemptions. Erkenntnis, (doi: 10.1007/s10670-022-00615-w) (Early Online Publication)

Kelp, C. (2022) Defeat and proficiencies. Philosophical Issues, 32(1), pp. 82-103. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12223)

Kelp, C. , Carter, A. and Simion, M. (2022) How to be an infallibilist. Philosophical Studies, 179(8), pp. 2675-2682. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01785-7)

Kemp, G. (2022) Observation sentences revisited. Mind, 131(523), pp. 805-825. (doi: 10.1093/mind/fzaa103)

Kemp, G. (2022) Propositions as made of words. Erkenntnis, (doi: 10.1007/s10670-022-00546-6) (Early Online Publication)

L

Lyons, J. C. (2022) Cognitive diversity and the contingency of evidence. Synthese, 200(3), 202. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-022-03660-8)

Lyons, J. C. (2022) Three grades of iconicity in perception. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 1(2), 50. (doi: 10.1007/s44204-022-00039-x)

M

MacKisack, M., Aldworth, S., Macpherson, F. , Onians, J., Winlove, C. and Zeman, A. (2022) Plural imagination: diversity in mind and making. Art Journal, 81(3), pp. 70-87. (doi: 10.1080/00043249.2022.2110444)

Méndez, M. P. (2022) An epistemic problem for epistocracy. Social Epistemology, 36(2), pp. 153-166. (doi: 10.1080/02691728.2021.1992531)

Miracchi, L. and Carter, J. A. (2022) Refitting the mirrors: on structural analogies in epistemology and action theory. Synthese, 200, pp. 1-28. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-022-03462-y)

Monzel, M., Mitchell, D., Macpherson, F. , Pearson, J. and Zeman, A. (2022) Aphantasia, dysikonesia, anauralia: call for a single term for the lack of mental imagery – Commentary on Dance et al. (2021) and Hinwar and Lambert (2021). Cortex, 150, pp. 149-152. (doi: 10.1016/j.cortex.2022.02.002)

Monzel, M., Mitchell, D., Macpherson, F. , Pearson, J. and Zeman, A. (2022) Proposal for a consistent definition of aphantasia and hyperphantasia: a response to Lambert and Sibley (2022). Cortex, 152, pp. 74-76. (doi: 10.1016/j.cortex.2022.04.003)

Mortini, D. (2022) The explanationist and the modalist. Episteme, (doi: 10.1017/epi.2021.57) (Early Online Publication)

Mortini, D. (2022) Knowledge, individualised evidence and luck. Philosophical Studies, 179(12), pp. 3791-3815. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01861-y)

Mortini, D. (2022) A new solution to the safety dilemma. Synthese, 200(2), 137. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-022-03626-w)

N

Newey, C. and Rennick, S. (2022) The Use and Usefulness of Peer Feedback. [Website]

P

Pettigrove, G. (2022) Cheerfulness. In: Pettigrove, G. and Swanton, C. (eds.) Neglected Virtues. Routledge: London, pp. 138-160. ISBN 9780429435201 (doi: 10.4324/9780429435201-7)

Pettigrove, G. and Swanton, C. (2022) Introduction. In: Pettigrove, G. and Swanton, C. (eds.) Neglected Virtues. Routledge: London, pp. 1-12. ISBN 9780429435201 (doi: 10.4324/9780429435201)

Pickel, B. (2022) Susan Stebbing’s intellectualism. Journal for the History of Analytic Philosophy, 10(4),

Pickel, B. and Rabern, B. (2022) Scorekeeping in a chess game. Semantics and Pragmatics, 15, 12. (doi: 10.3765/sp.15.12) (Early Online Publication)

S

Savickaite, S., McNaughton, K., Gaillard, E., Amaya, J., McDonnell, N. , Millington, E. and Simmons, D. R. (2022) Exploratory study on the use of HMD virtual reality to investigate individual differences in visual processing styles. Journal of Enabling Technologies, 16(1), pp. 48-69. (doi: 10.1108/JET-06-2021-0028)

Simion, M. (2022) Being Rational and Being Right, By Juan Comesaña. Mind, 131(523), pp. 1005-1015. (doi: 10.1093/mind/fzab010)[Book Review]

Simion, M. (2022) Conceptual engineering. In: Damböck, C. and Schiemer, G. (eds.) Carnap Handbuch. Metzler Verlag. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Conceptual engineering for epistemic norms. Inquiry, (doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562373) (Early Online Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Defeat. In: Sylvan, K. (ed.) Blackwell Companion to Epistemology. Wiley-Blackwell. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Engineering evidence. In: Isaac, M. G. and Scharp, K. (eds.) New Perspectives on Conceptual Engineering. Springer. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) The epistemic normativity of conjecture. Philosophical Studies, 179(11), pp. 3447-3471. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01829-y)

Simion, M. (2022) The Epistemology of Groups. Philosophical Review, 131(4), pp. 537-541. (doi: 10.1215/00318108-10136960)[Book Review]

Simion, M. (2022) Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, [Book Review]

Simion, M. (2022) Knowledge comes first. In: Steup, M., Roeber, B., Turri, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3. Wiley-Blackwell. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Knowledge still comes first. In: Steup, M., Roeber, B., Turri, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3. Wiley-Blackwell. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Sosa on permissible suspension and the proper remit of the theory of knowledge. Res Philosophica, 99(4), pp. 453-466. (doi: 10.11612/resphil.2138)

Simion, M. (2022) Talking to social robots, trusting diagnostic AI: explainability vs. trustworthiness. In: Cappelen, H. and Sterken, R. (eds.) Communication with AI: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2022) Two dilemmas for value sensitive technological design. In: Edwards, M. and Palermos, O. (eds.) Feminist Philosophy and Emerging Technologies. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

W

Willard Kyle, C. (2022) The knowledge norm for enquiry. Journal of Philosophy, (Accepted for Publication)

Willard-Kyle, C. (2022) Abraham, Isaac, and the toxin: A Kavkan reading of the binding of Isaac. Religious Studies, (doi: 10.1017/S0034412522000439) (Early Online Publication)

Z

Zheng, R. (2022) Theorizing social change. Philosophy Compass, 17(4), e12815. (doi: 10.1111/phc3.12815)

Zheng, R. and Stear, N.-H. (2022) Imagining in oppressive contexts, or, what’s wrong with blackface? Ethics, (Accepted for Publication)

A

Alfano, M., Fard, A. E., Carter, J. A. , Clutton, P. and Klein, C. (2021) Technologically scaffolded atypical cognition: the case of YouTube’s recommender system. Synthese, 199(1-2), pp. 835-858. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02724-x)

B

Brady, M. (2021) Precis of suffering and virtue. Journal of Value Inquiry, 55, pp. 567-569. (doi: 10.1007/s10790-021-09862-6)

Brady, M. (2021) Response to commentators on Suffering and Virtue. Journal of Value Inquiry, 55, pp. 611-623. (doi: 10.1007/s10790-021-09863-5)

Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (2021) The Philosophy of Group Polarization: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Psychology. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge: New York, NY ; Abingdon, Oxon. ISBN 9780367901011 (doi: 10.4324/9781003023654)

Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Simion, M. (2021) Disagreement and epistemic improvement. Synthese, 199, pp. 14641-14665. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03437-5)

Brown, D. H. (2021) Colour constancy. In: Brown, D. H. and Macpherson, F. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour. Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy. Routledge: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY, pp. 269-284. ISBN 9780415743037 (doi: 10.4324/9781351048521-20)

Brown, D. H. and Macpherson, F. (2021) Introduction to the philosophy of colour. In: Brown, D. H. and Macpherson, F. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour. Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy. Routledge: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY, pp. 1-21. ISBN 9780415743037 (doi: 10.4324/9781351048521-1)

Brown, J. and Simion, M. (2021) Introduction. In: Brown, J. and Simion, M. (eds.) Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 1-17. ISBN 9780198847205 (doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198847205.003.0001)

C

Carter, J. A. (2021) De Minimis Normativism: a new theory of full aptness. Philosophical Quarterly, 71(1), pp. 16-36. (doi: 10.1093/pq/pqaa017)

Carter, J. A. (2021) Trust and its significance in social epistemology. In: Lackey, J. and McGlynn, A. (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press. (In Press)

Carter, J. A. (2021) Archimedean metanorms. Topoi, 40(5), pp. 1075-1085. (doi: 10.1007/s11245-018-9586-9)

Carter, J. A. (2021) Collateral conflicts and epistemic norms. In: McCain, K., Stapleford, S. and Steup, M. (eds.) Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2021) Digital Knowledge. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2021) Exercising abilities. Synthese, 198(3), pp. 2495-2509. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02227-4)

Carter, J. A. (2021) Politics, deep disagreement, and relativism. In: Hannon, M. and de Ridder, J. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9780367345907

Carter, J. A. (2021) Reply to critics: collective (telic) virtue epistemology. In: Alfano, M., de Ridder, J. and Klein, C. (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2021) Reply to Gardiner on virtues of attention. In: Alfano, M., de Ridder, J. and Klein, C. (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2021) Reply to Watson on the social virtue of questioning. In: Alfano, M., de Ridder, J. and Klein, C. (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. , Dechauffour, G. and Lefftz, G. (2021) Introduction to Special Issue: Scepticism and Epistemic Angst. Synthese, 198(15), pp. 3517-3519. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03241-1)

Carter, J. A. , Gordon, E. and Grodniewicz, J.P. (2021) Understanding a communicated thought. Synthese, 198(12), pp. 12137-12151. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02854-2)

Carter, J. A. and McKenna, R. (2021) Absolutism, relativism and metaepistemology. Erkenntnis, 86(5), pp. 1139-1159. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-019-00147-w)

Carter, J. A. and Rupert, R. D. (2021) Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale. Synthese, 198(10), pp. 9243-9272. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02631-1)

Corns, J. and Cowan, R. (2021) Moral motivation and the affective appeal. Philosophical Studies, 178(1), pp. 71-94. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-020-01421-2)

Côté, N. (2021) A diachronic consistency argument for minimizing one’s own rights violations. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 24(5), pp. 1109-1121. (doi: 10.1007/s10677-021-10253-w)

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Donald, C. , Veitch, N. , Edmond, A., Marks, L., Kirkwood, N., Carman, C. , McDonnell, N. and Macpherson, F. (2021) The Impact of Using Virtual Reality Lessons to Teach Online. Evolving Molecular Bioscience Education, 27-28 May 2021.

Donaldson, J. (2021) Vertical versus horizontal: what is really at issue in the exclusion problem? Synthese, 198(2), pp. 1381-1396. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02126-8)

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Gordon, E. C. (2021) Elgin on understanding: How does it involve know-how, endorsement and factivity? Synthese, 198(6), pp. 4955-4972. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02381-9)

Gordon, E. C. and Dunn, L. (2021) Pharmacological cognitive enhancement and cheapened achievement: a new dilemma. Neuroethics, 14(3), pp. 409-421. (doi: 10.1007/s12152-021-09477-5)

Graham, P. J. and Lyons, J. C. (2021) The structure of defeat. In: Brown, J. and Simion, M. (eds.) Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press, pp. 39-68. ISBN 9780198847205 (doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198847205.003.0003)

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Humphries, J. (2021) Domination, the state and anarchism. In: Mathis, K. and Langensand, L. (eds.) Dignity, Diversity, Anarchy: Human Dignity in Europe / The Anarchist Critique of the State, the Law and Authority. Series: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie. Beiheft (168). Franz Steiner Verlag: Stuttgart, pp. 143-168. ISBN 9783515129534

Humphries, J. (2021) The social-relational view of recognition respect. Bibliotecca della Liberta, LVI(231), pp. 5-30.

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Jenkins, K. and Webster, A. (2021) Disability, impairment, and marginalised functioning. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 99(4), pp. 730-747. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2020.1799048)

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Kelp, C. (2021) Inquiry, knowledge and understanding. Synthese, 198(7), pp. 1583-1593. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1803-y)

Kelp, C. (2021) Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780192896094

Kelp, C. (2021) Theory of inquiry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 103(2), pp. 359-384. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12719)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2021) Sharing Knowledge: a Functionalist Account of Assertion. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781009036818 (doi: 10.1017/9781009036818)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2021) Sharing Knowledge: a Functionalist Account of Assertion. Series: Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge ; New York. ISBN 9781316517130 (doi: 10.1017/9781009036818)

Kemp, G. (2021) The artistic expression of feeling. Philosophia, 49(1), pp. 315-332. (doi: 10.1007/s11406-020-00252-z)

Kemp, G. (2021) The logic of aspect-perception and perceived resemblance. Acta Analytica, 36, pp. 49-53. (doi: 10.1007/s12136-020-00434-0)

Kotzee, B., Carter, J. A. and Siegel, H. (2021) Educating for intellectual virtue: a critique from action guidance. Episteme, 18(2), pp. 177-199. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2019.10)

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Leuenberger, S. and Smith, M. (2021) Epistemic logic without closure. Synthese, 198(5), pp. 4751-4774. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02368-6)

Littlejohn, C. and Carter, J. A. (2021) This is Epistemology: An Introduction. Series: This is philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell: Hoboken, NJ. ISBN 9781118336823

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Macpherson, F. (2021) Novel colour experiences and their implications. In: Brown, D. and Macpherson, F. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour. Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy. Routledge: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY, pp. 175-209. ISBN 9780415743037 (doi: 10.4324/9781351048521-15)

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Pettigrove, G. (2021) Fitting attitudes and forgiveness. In: McKenna, M., Nelkin, D. and Warmke, B. (eds.) Forgiveness and Its Moral Dimensions. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 57-82. ISBN 9780190602147 (doi: 10.1093/oso/9780190602147.001.0001)

Pettigrove, G. (2021) What virtue adds to value. Australasian Philosophical Review, (Accepted for Publication)

Pickel, B. (2021) The functional composition of sense. Synthese, 199(3), pp. 6917-6942. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03099-3)

Pickel, B. and Rabern, B. (2021) Against Fregean quantification. Ergo, (Accepted for Publication)

Pickel, B. and Rabern, B. (2021) Frege and saving substitution. Philosophical Studies, 178(8), pp. 2687-2697. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-020-01576-y)

Pickel, B. and Rabern, B. (2021) The myth of occurrence-based semantics. Linguistics and Philosophy, 44(4), pp. 813-837. (doi: 10.1007/s10988-020-09302-x)

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Rennick, S. (2021) Self-fulfilling prophecies. Philosophies, 6(3), 78. (doi: 10.3390/philosophies6030078)

Rennick, S. (2021) Trope analysis and folk intuitions. Synthese, 199(1-2), pp. 5025-5043. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-03013-3)

Rennick, S. and Roberts, S. G. (2021) Improving video game conversations with trope-informed design. Game Studies, 21(3),

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Shepherd, J. and Carter, J. A. (2021) Knowledge, practical knowledge, and intentional action. Ergo, (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2021) Blame as performance. Synthese, 199(3), pp. 7595-7614. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03130-7)

Simion, M. (2021) Conversational Pressure: Normativity in Speech Exchanges. Philosophical Quarterly, 71(4), pqaa075. (doi: 10.1093/pq/pqaa075)[Book Review]

Simion, M. (2021) Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny. Philosophical Quarterly, 71(3), pp. 681-684. (doi: 10.1093/pq/pqaa048)[Book Review]

Simion, M. (2021) Epistemology. In: Rossberg, M. (ed.) The Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2021) Knowledge and reasoning. Synthese, 199(3), pp. 10371-10388. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03251-z)

Simion, M. (2021) Scepticism about epistemic dilemmas. In: McCain, K., Stapleford, S. and Steup, M. (eds.) Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2021) Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780192895288

Simion, M. (2021) Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780192895288 (doi: 10.1093/oso/9780192895288.001.0001)

Simion, M. (2021) Testimonial contractarianism: a knowledge-first social epistemology. Noûs, 55(4), pp. 891-916. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12337)

Simion, M. (2021) Testimonial contractarianism: a knowledge-first social epistemology. Noûs, 55(4), pp. 891-916. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12337)

Simion, M. and Broncano-Berrocal, F. (2021) Knowledge and disagreement. In: Baghramian, M., Carter, J. A. and Rowland, R. (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Disagreement. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. I. , Schnurr, J. and Gordon, E. C. (2021) Epistemic norms, closure, and no-Belief hinge epistemology. Synthese, 198(15), pp. 3553-3564. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02165-1)

Slater, J. (2021) Miller's tale: why the sympathy principle is inadequate. Kriterion, 35(1), pp. 97-111. (doi: 10.1515/krt-2021-0006)

Slater, J. (2021) Nepotism on The Orville. In: Johnson, D. K. and Berry, M. R. (eds.) Exploring The Orville: Essays on Seth MacFarlane's Space Adventure. McFarland and Company, Inc.: Jefferson, North Carolina, pp. 209-225. ISBN 9781476681924

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Willard-Kyle, C. (2021) Against the doctrine of infallibility. Philosophical Quarterly, 71(4), pp. 758-779. (doi: 10.1093/pq/pqaa082)

Willard-Kyle, C. (2021) P, but you don't know that p. Synthese, 199, pp. 14667-14690. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03438-4)

Willard-Kyle, C. (2021) P, but you don’t know that P. Synthese, 199(5), pp. 14667-14690. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03438-4)

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Boult, C., Kelp, C. , Schnurr, J. and Simion, M. (2020) Epistemic virtues and virtues with epistemic content. In: Kelp, C. and Greco, J. (eds.) Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, pp. 42-57. ISBN 9781108481212 (doi: 10.1017/9781108666404.003)

Brady, M. S. (2020) Pride and humility. In: Alfano, M., Lynch, M. P. and Tanesini, A. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility. Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy. Routledge: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY, pp. 106-116. ISBN 9780815364115 (doi: 10.4324/9781351107532-12)

Brady, M. S. (2020) Suffering and punishment. In: Amaya, A. and Del Mar, M. (eds.) Virtue, Emotion and Imagination in Law and Legal Reasoning. Hart Publishing: Oxford ; London, pp. 139-156. ISBN 9781509925131

Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (2020) The epistemology of group disagreement: an introduction. In: Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge: New York, NY, pp. 1-8. ISBN 9780367077426 (doi: 10.4324/9780429022500-1)

Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (2020) Deliberation and group disagreement. In: Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge: New York, NY, pp. 9-45. ISBN 9780367077426 (doi: 10.4324/9780429022500-2)

Brown, D. H. (2020) The steady pace of philosophy of colour. Itinera, 19, pp. 11-25. (doi: 10.13130/2039-9251/13877)

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Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. (2020) Is searching the internet making us intellectually arrogant? In: Tanesini, A. and Lynch, M. P. (eds.) Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. Routledge, pp. 88-103. ISBN 9780367260859 (doi: 10.4324/9780429291395-9)

Carter, J. A. and Koch, A.-K. (2020) Epistemic pluralism. In: Harris, P., Bitoni, A., Fleisher, C.S. and Skorkjær Binderkrantz, A. (eds.) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Interest Groups, Lobbying and Public Affairs. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9783030445553 (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2020) Cognitive goods, open futures and the epistemology of education. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 54(2), 449-466-449-466. (doi: 10.1111/1467-9752.12420)

Carter, J. A. (2020) Collective (telic) virtue epistemology. In: Alfano, M., de Ridder, J. and Klein, C. (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge: London. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2020) Epistemic autonomy and externalism. In: Lougheed, K. and Matheson, J. (eds.) Epistemic Autonomy. Routledge: London, UK. (Accepted for Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2020) Epistemic perceptualism, skill and the regress problem. Philosophical Studies, 177(5), pp. 1229-1254. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01243-x)

Carter, J. A. (2020) Intellectual autonomy, epistemic dependence and cognitive enhancement. Synthese, 197(7), pp. 2937-2961. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-1549-y)

Carter, J. A. (2020) On behalf of a bi-level account of trust. Philosophical Studies, 177, pp. 2299-2322. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01311-2)

Carter, J. A. (2020) Sosa on knowledge, judgment and guessing. Synthese, 197(12), pp. 5117-5136. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1181-2)

Carter, J. A. (2020) Varieties of (extended) thought manipulation. In: Blitz, M. and Bublitz, C. (eds.) The Future of Freedom of Thought: Liberty, Technology, and Neuroscience. Palgrave Macmillan. (In Press)

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2020) Intellectual humility and assertion. In: Alfano, M., Lynch, M. P. and Tanesini, A. (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility. Series: Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. Routledge: Oxon, UK, pp. 335-345. ISBN 9780815364115

Carter, J. A. and Kallestrup, J. (2020) Varieties of cognitive integration. Noûs, 54(4), pp. 867-890. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12288)

Carter, J. A. and McKenna, R. (2020) Skepticism motivated: on the skeptical import of motivated reasoning. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 50(6), pp. 702-718. (doi: 10.1017/can.2020.16)

Carter, J. A. , Mi, C., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (2020) Introduction to special issue: knowledge, virtue and action—eastern and western perspectives. Synthese, 197(6), pp. 2291-2294. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02662-8)

Carter, J. A. and Mortini, D. (2020) Higher-order defeat in collective moral epistemology. In: Klenk, M. (ed.) Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge: New York. ISBN 9780367343200

Carter, J. A. and Simion, M. (2020) The ethics and epistemology of trust. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

Colburn, B. (2020) Autonomy, voluntariness, and assisted dying. Journal of Medical Ethics, 46(5), pp. 316-319. (doi: 10.1136/medethics-2019-105720) (PMID:31719156)

Corns, J. (2020) The Complex Reality of Pain. Series: Routledge studies in contemporary philosophy. Routledge. ISBN 9780367353698 (doi: 10.4324/9780429342981)

Corns, J. and Cowan, R. (2020) Lessons for ethics from the science of pain. In: Holtzman, G. S. and Hildt, E. (eds.) Does Neuroscience Have Normative Implications? Series: The international library of ethics, law and technology (22). Springer: Cham, pp. 39-57. ISBN 9783030561338 (doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-56134-5_3)

Côté, N. (2020) Weakness of will and the measurement of freedom. Ethics, 130(3), pp. 384-414. (doi: 10.1086/707214)

Cowan, R. (2020) The puzzle of moral memory. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 17(2), pp. 202-228. (doi: 10.1163/17455243-20192914)

Cowan, R. and Simion, M. (2020) Editorial. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 23(1), pp. 1-3. (doi: 10.1007/s10677-020-10072-5)

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Edwards, J. (2020) Logicism and logical consequence. In: Miller, A. (ed.) Language, Logic and Mathematics: Essays on Themes from Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199278343

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Harrison, V. S. and Tonner, P. (2020) Philosophy of museums. In: Jackson, J. (ed.) Oxford Bibliographies in Anthropology. Oxford University Press: New York, USA. ISBN 9780199766567 (doi: 10.1093/OBO/9780199766567-0241)

Heersmink, R. and Carter, J. A. (2020) The philosophy of memory technologies: metaphysics, knowledge, and values. Memory Studies, 13(4), pp. 416-433. (doi: 10.1177/1750698017703810)

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Jenkins, K. (2020) Ontic injustice. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 6(2), pp. 188-205. (doi: 10.1017/apa.2019.27)

Jenkins, K. (2020) Pornography, social ontology, and feminist philosophy. APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy, 20(1), pp. 18-22.

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Kelp, C. (2020) The epistemology of Ernest Sosa: an introduction. Synthese, 197(12), pp. 5093-5100. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02897-5)

Kelp, C. (2020) Internalism, phenomenal conservatism, and defeat. Philosophical Issues, 30(1), pp. 192-204. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12180)

Kelp, C. (2020) Introduction: virtue theoretic epistemology. In: Kelp, C. and Greco, J. (eds.) Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, pp. 1-14. ISBN 9781108481212 (doi: 10.1017/9781108666404.001)

Kelp, C. (2020) Moral assertion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 23(3), pp. 639-649. (doi: 10.1007/s10677-020-10107-x)

Kelp, C. (2020) Utopie und Funktion. In: Zamp Kelp, G. and Engel, L. (eds.) Luftschlosser. Spector: Leipzig. ISBN 9783959053273

Kelp, C. , Boult, C., Broncano-Berrocal, F., Dimmock, P., Ghijsen, H. and Simion, M. (2020) Hoops and Barns: a new dilemma for Sosa. Synthese, 197(12), pp. 5187-5202. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-1461-5)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2020) The C account of assertion: a negative result. Synthese, 197(1), pp. 125-137. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1760-5)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2020) A social epistemology of assertion. In: Lackey, J. and McGlynn, A. (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Kemp, G. (2020) In favour of the classical Quine on ontology. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 50(2), pp. 223-237. (doi: 10.1017/can.2019.16)

Kemp, G. (2020) Review of Art and Form: From Roger Fry to Global Modernism, by Sam Rose. Burlington Magazine, 162(1403), pp. 164-165. [Book Review]

Kemp, G. (2020) The Significance of the New Logic, by W. V. Quine. Edited and translated by Walter Carnielli, Frederique Janssen-Lauret, and William Pickering. Mind, 129(516), pp. 1320-1327. (doi: 10.1093/mind/fzz057)[Book Review]

Kemp, G. (2020) A unified account: pictorial, photographic and sculptural seeing as spectral seeing. Theoria, 86(3), pp. 341-358. (doi: 10.1111/theo.12242)

Kemp, G. and Lugg, A. (2020) Quine on ontology. Chapter 7 of Word and Object. In: Janssen-Lauret, F. (ed.) Quine on Ontology and Structure. Series: Mind association occasional series. Oxford Scholarship Online. ISBN 9780198864288 (doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198864288.003.0009)

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Leuenberger, S. (2020) Emergence. In: Raven, M. J. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding. Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy. Routledge: New York, NY ; Abingdon, Oxon, pp. 312-323. ISBN 9780815366492 (doi: 10.4324/9781351258845-30)

Leuenberger, S. (2020) The fundamental: Ungrounded or all-grounding? Philosophical Studies, 177, pp. 2647-2669. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01332-x) (PMID:32713965) (PMCID:PMC7370665)

Leuenberger, S. (2020) Structural problems for reductionism. Philosophical Studies, 177, pp. 3571-3593. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01383-0)

Lyons, J. (2020) Two dogmas of empirical justification. Philosophical Issues, 30(1), pp. 221-237. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12182)

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Macpherson, F. (2020) Is Virtual Reality Experience Veridical, Illusory or Hallucinatory? A Complex Answer Based on a New Theory of Illusion and Hallucination and the Nature of the Technology Used to Create Virtual Reality. Working Paper. University of Glasgow.

Meehan, D. (2020) Epistemic vice and epistemic nudging: a solution? In: Axtell, G. and Bernal, A. (eds.) Epistemic Paternalism: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications. Series: Collective studies in knowledge and society. Rowman & Littlefield: London ; New York. ISBN 9781786615732

Meehan, D. (2020) Responsibilities of the Media: Are Journalist’s Responsible for Publishing the Truth? [Website]

Miragoli, M. and Simion, M. (2020) Gender, race, and group disagreement. In: Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge: New York, NY, pp. 125-138. ISBN 9780367077426 (doi: 10.4324/9780429022500-7)

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Pettigrove, G. (2020) Ambition, love, and happiness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 120(1), pp. 21-45. (doi: 10.1093/arisoc/aoaa002)

Pettigrove, G. (2020) Punishment and protest. In: Radzik, L. (ed.) The Ethics of Social Punishment. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, pp. 113-134. ISBN 9781108836067 (doi: 10.1017/9781108870665.009)

Pickel, B. (2020) Structured propositions and trivial composition. Synthese, 197(7), pp. 2991-3006. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1853-1)

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Simion, M. (2020) Assertion compatibilism. In: Kyriacou, C. and Wallbridge, K. (eds.) Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. (2020) A priori perceptual entitlement, knowledge-first. Philosophical Issues, 30(1), pp. 311-323. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12187)

Simion, M. (2020) Social epistemology of education. In: Peters, M. A. (ed.) Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory. Springer. ISBN 9789812875327 (doi: 10.1007/978-981-287-532-7_696-1)

Simion, M. (2020) Warrant transmission and psychological defeat. In: Pritchard, D. and Jope, M. (eds.) Epistemic Closure and Transmission. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. , Carter, J. A. and Kelp, C. (2020) On behalf of knowledge-first collective epistemology. In: Silva, P. and Oliveira, L. (eds.) Doxastic and Propositional Warrant. Routledge. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2020) Conceptual innovation, function first. Noûs, 54(4), pp. 985-1002. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12302)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2020) How to be an anti-reductionist. Synthese, 197(7), pp. 2849-2866. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1722-y)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2020) Assertion: the constitutive norms view. In: Goldberg, S. C. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780190675233 (doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.2)

Slater, J. (2020) Paul Woodruff (ed.), The Ethics of Giving: Philosophers’ Perspectives on Philanthropy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 240 pages. ISBN: 9780190648879. Hardback: $34.95. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 17(4), pp. 464-467. (doi: 10.1163/17455243-01704007)[Book Review]

Slater, J. (2020) Satisficing consequentialism still doesn't satisfy. Utilitas, 32(1), pp. 108-117. (doi: 10.1017/S0953820819000402)

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Wildman, N. and McDonnell, N. (2020) The puzzle of virtual theft. Analysis, 80(3), pp. 493-499. (doi: 10.1093/analys/anaa005)

Willard-Kyle, C. (2020) Being in a position to know is the norm of assertion. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 101(2), pp. 328-352. (doi: 10.1111/papq.12305)

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Bain, D. (2019) Why take painkillers? Noûs, 53(2), pp. 462-490. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12228)

Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (2019) The superstitious lawyer's inference. In: Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9781138503755

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