Microtheory Seminar Series. Mediated Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Published: 5 March 2026
28 April 2026. Professor Christian Ewerhart, University of Zurich
Professor Christian Ewerhart, University of Zurich
Mediated Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Tuesday, 28 April 2026. 16:00
Room 386AB ASBS
Abstract
This paper studies mediation in infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring. In departure from the literature, we assume that all private messages and internal records are publicly revealed at the end of each stage. We call the resulting equilibrium concept mediated subgame perfect equilibrium (MSPE). It is shown that the revelation principle holds. We introduce an effective correlated minimax value, which can be conveniently determined as the solution of a linear program, and use it to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the implementability of payoffs under an MSPE. These conditions are standard for two-player games with a sufficient degree of patience but are, in general, strictly more permissive. Examples illustrate the impact of effective correlated minimax profiles and the subtle role of internal records.
Bio
Christian Ewerhart received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Bonn in 1997. After having worked as a management consultant for the Boston Consulting Group, he returned to academia as a post-doc at the University of Mannheim in 2000. In 2003, he became Professor in Information and Contract Economics at the University of Zurich. Professor Ewerhart specializes in game theory and information economics, with special emphasis on the analysis of conflict. His research has been published in journals such as the Review of Economic Studies, Rand Journal of Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, Mathematics of Operations Research, and the Journal of Banking and Finance, among others. At present, Professor Ewerhart is president of the Oligo Society and a member of the Steering Committee of the UZH Blockchain Center.
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First published: 5 March 2026