Lunchtime: Bayesian Equilibrium: From Local to Global
Published: 20 April 2022
27 April. Yehuda "John" Levy, Ph.D., Senior Lecturer, Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow
Yehuda "John" Levy, Ph.D., Senior Lecturer, Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow
'Bayesian Equilibrium: From Local to Global'
Wednesday 27 April 2022, 1.00-2.00pm
Online, Zoom
Register at business-events@glasgow.ac.uk
Abstract
We study games of incomplete information in which the players observe a public signal in addition to their private information. We show that if a measurable Bayesian equilibrium exists conditional on each public signal, then a measurable Bayesian equilibrium exists for the entire game. The proof involves transitioning back-and-forth between behavioural strategies and the distributional strategies and demonstrating that appropriate measurable selection theorems apply. We further examine to what extent assumptions on the game, in particular the continuity of payoffs in actions, are needed.
Biography
John is a senior lecturer (associate professor) at the Adam Smith Business School at the University of Glasgow. His research is in game theory and mathematical economics. John completed his PhD in Mathematics at the Center for the Study of Rationality of Hebrew University under Prof. Abraham Neyman in 2013, and then held a postdoctoral research fellowship at Nuffield College and the Department of Economics at the University of Oxford, 2013-2016.
Further information: business-events@glasgow.ac.uk
First published: 20 April 2022
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