Microtheory: Auctions with multi-member bidders
Published: 8 February 2022
1 March. Professor Shiran Rachmilevitch, University of Haifa
Professor Shiran Rachmilevitch, University of Haifa
'Auctions with multi-member bidders'
Tuesday 1 March, 1pm - 2.15pm
Zoom online seminar
Abstract
This paper considers an auction in which one of the bidders is a team consisting of several individuals. These individuals need to agree on a bid, and on splitting the payment to the auctioneer if they win the item. Under some conditions, a unique equilibrium is obtained under either a first-price or a second-price format. Under more permissive conditions the equilibrium need not be unique, but the symmetric equilibria of the first-price model are isomorphic to the symmetric equilibria of the second-price model. The free-riding problem which stems from collective bidding is studied in detail.
Biography
Shiran Rachmilevitch is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Haifa, where he serves as Department Chair. He has worked at the University of Haifa since obtaining his PhD in Economics from Northwestern University in 2011. Professor Rachmilevitch’s research portfolio includes works on bargaining, auctions, games with countably many players, and semi-cooperative games. His works are published in outlets such as the Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, Mathematics of Operations Research, and the International Journal of Game Theory.
Further information: business-events@glasgow.ac.uk
First published: 8 February 2022
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