View Specification DocumentGame Theory for Economists ECON4053
- Academic Session: 2026-27
- School: Adam Smith Business School
- Credits: 15
- Level: Level 4 (SCQF level 10)
- Typically Offered: Semester 2
- Available to Visiting Students: Yes
- Collaborative Online International Learning: No
- Curriculum For Life: No
Short Description
The course reviews the main concepts of Game Theory, both in the non-cooperative and cooperative models, and explains their importance in economics and other social sciences.
Timetable
Lectures: 10 x 2 hour lectures
Tutorials: 10 x 1 hour
Requirements of Entry
University of Glasgow students must have achieved Subject Honours entry requirements as detailed below to enrol on this course. Permission is required for non-Economics students to take this course as an outside option.
A GPA of 12 (average C3) in Economics 2A and 2B with no course grade below D3, attained at the first attempt. A minimum grade of D3 in both ECON1012, Introductory Mathematics for Economists and ECON1013, Introductory Statistics for Economists unless exemptions were agreed on the basis of other courses taken in year 1. Refer to course specifications for details. These grades may be achieved at the second attempt.
Co-requisites
None
Assessment
1. In-course exam: online; Individual; 45 minutes; 30%; ILOs 1-3.
2. Degree exam: in-person; Individual; 120 minutes; 70%; ILOs 1-2, 4-5.
Main Assessment In: April/May
Course Aims
The aims of the course are:
■ To show that most interactions of economic agents can be modelled as strategic games for instance, oligopolistic competition, face to face bargaining, multilateral exchange, auctions, and voting by majority.
■ To formalise such interactions by means of static or dynamic games, and the key concepts of Nash equilibria and core stability.
■ To explain when and if such equilibria can be found and how to compute them.
■ To interpret the light they cast on the economic question that motivates them in the first place.
Intended Learning Outcomes of Course
By the end of this course students will be able to:
1. engage in formal modelling of a range of economic problems;
2. develop deductive and inductive reasoning in the context of interdependent decision-making .
3. develop a critical view of the simplifying assumptions necessary to formal strategic analysis, and its ability to accurately predict individual behaviour;
4. be able to identify and compute the strategic equilibrium outcome of the most familiar "economic games";
5. be able to develop new applications of the game theoretic methodology to the behaviour of economic agents interacting in markets, elections, and other social contexts.