This course introduces how economists study situations in which different people or firms hold different information. Using simple strategic and market examples, it examines how hidden information can affect pricing, trade, bidding, and communication, and how these problems can be addressed through disclosure, signalling, screening, and market design. Examples are drawn from business, markets, and corporate governance.

Lectures: 10 x 2-hours, and a 1-hour revision lecture in teaching week 11

Tutorials: 5 x 1-hour

1. Portfolio of simulation exercises: in-person; Individual; 60 minutes total; 30%; ILOs 2.

2. Degree exam: in-person; individual; 120 minutes; 70%; ILOs 1-3.

This course aims to introduce students to economic analysis of decision-making when information is unevenly distributed. It develops understanding of how markets and organisations respond to information problems through disclosure, signalling, screening, auction design, and strategic communication, and shows how these ideas can be applied to business and corporate governance settings.

By the end of this course students will be able to:

1. Explain how asymmetric information shapes decisions and outcomes in markets and organisations, using relevant course examples.

2. Evaluate how alternative strategies or institutional rules affect outcomes in stylised settings with asymmetric information.

3. Interpret applied cases and construct evidence-based arguments about how asymmetric information problems can be addressed.