Re-creating ideological time-boundaries: EU expansion, the Baltic States and Kaliningrad.

Sergei Jakobson-Obolenski (Central & East European Studies: University of Glasgow)

Introduction

History did not end with the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union as Francis Fukuyama predicted in the early 1990s.[10] In particular, the history of Europe keeps unfolding in various forms through time-space as its borders continue to expand eastwards by way of its sixth enlargement. If one assumes that the contemporary world can no longer be understood as 'modern', but rather as a 'post-modern' phenomenon,[11] then a quite different understanding emerges of how the EU constitutes itself vis-à-vis the world. Europe's ever-changing forms, structures and multiple identities seem to spiral around the opposing visions of socio-economic and cultural realities. On the one hand, it is still represented by the modern but somewhat fading Hobbessian nation-state Leviathan in which 'monopolies of legitimate violence, rational bureaucracies and centralised policy-making authority correspond to territorially exclusive political orders' of nation-states.[12] On the other hand, the EU is seen as the post-modern de-centralised, fluctuating but omnipresent global "McWorld".[13] As the system of nation-states is fading under the pressures of globalisation and new forms of governance are emerging, including the EU's, these post-modern systems of sub- and supra-national governance appear to be beneficially fractured, decentred, pluralized and lacking clear spatial and functional lines of authority.

This oversimplification can lead to an ambiguous conclusion. Within the EU, the two most significant conceptual shifts that have occurred during the last decade are: a) from centralised 'government' to 'multi-level governance'; and b) from the homogenous and exclusive nation-state towards the integrating and interchangeable "Europe with the regions".[14] Such a statement appears to justify the evolutionary pursuit of the current policies of supranationalism in Europe. However, at the same time, it excludes the fact that next door to the EU, the application of neo-classical logic of transition from 'here' to 'there' along the unidirectional 'line' of history has largely failed during the 1990s in the post-socialist world.[15] From such a perspective, the application of the same logic toward the analysis of European 'de-nationalisation', prompted by the growing globalisation and regionalism, can be hardly justified. After all, according to Elshtain, it appears that the nation-state is a continuing phenomenon that "cannot be imagined or legalised out of existence".[16] Indeed, "the old interwar national state based on territory and political sovereignty looks to be a mere transitional development"[17] within the process of globalisation itself. Globalisation itself can be seen as a consecutive change of the world system, which depicts "the third great original expansion of capitalism around the globe (after the earlier expansions of the national market and the older imperialist system)".[18] Although represented as progressive and unidirectional, these expansions are merely evolutions of historically interdependent, 'nested', traditional institutions, such as state, borders and markets, which have taken a long time to form. This brings us, from the reductionist picture of a neo-classical and neo-liberal modernisation theory, to an historical-institutionalist approach, which argues that the abovementioned European transitions, or transformations, represent attempts to institute and develop new systems of coupling between resource and market accumulation regimes of capitalism and new regulatory processes embedded in the practices of the past.[19] This, in turn, helps to look at globalisation itself as a consecutive change of the world system, which is depicting "the third great original expansion of capitalism around the globe (after the earlier expansions of the national market and the older imperialist system)".[20]

From the above, it follows that post-modern governance in Europe is closely interrelated with the nation state and its modern attributes in the bifurcated process of transformation and change. Thus, while postmodern-like supranationalism and regionalisation are Europe's ways of adapting to the new de-centralised accumulation regimes of a post-industrial global economy, the EU's notorious nation-state features, such as borders, represent new European regulatory processes embedded in the practices of modernity. Indeed, if one pictures historical processes as cyclical, then the European order is simply 'falling back in time' to its own past, thus (de-) limiting alternative development paths in socio-economic space.

The adaptation of European Communities to globalising markets, which have been redistributing production and wealth outside the territories of the national economies since the 1960s, has led to an introduction of new, 'non-territorial', 'spatial' and 're-scaled' kind of 'thinking' to the economic policy-making of those "developed [European] states" which "put aside military, political and territorial ambitions as they struggle not for a cultural dominance but for a greater share of the world output".[21] Such new, de-territorialised "jumping of scales" and "spatial fixes"[22] for the sake of economic effectiveness - from national and regional to local and global - has inevitably led to the opening up, as well as to the fragmentation, of national economies and political and social spheres. As a consequence, fragmentation and the introduction of a new range of actors operating outside the regulatory framework of traditional state institutional forms was followed by shifts in the forms and policies of public presentation and representation. Thus, one of the main points of the European multi-level governance project is confined to an attempt to create 'multiple loyalties' within a public sphere of disparate European communities, rather than to recreate the modern idea of a 'European fatherland'. Being a European today means managing some amalgam of different scales of identity: local, regional, national and supra-national.[23]

However, a negative side of European structural transformation is its institutional path-dependency[24]: being institutionalised through and repeating the practices of the past. This has developed through several phenomena and, although sometimes attributed to the failures of supranationalism, in fact, they are mere signs of continuity from the already existent institutional structures. For example, there are some problems of a classical realpolitik nature with the intergovernmental negotiations on main issues and policies of the Union. According to Wincott and Moravcsik European states are motivated by their contradictory national interests, which tend to stall or dilute supranational efforts towards the cohesiveness and implementation of Common Agricultural Policy and European Monetary Union.[25] Other intergovernmental problems include the Common Foreign and Security Policy and recent controversies over the European Constitution. Secondly, the failures of legitimacy in traditional, modern-type democracy across the new structure of the European governance,[26] as well as bureaucracies of the member states seem to hamper regional economic development and co-operation.[27] Thirdly, the process of the EU's integration and enlargement itself is becoming reminiscent of the development of the nation-state, whereby this 'European State' aims to protect its order, citizens and territory within its boundaries against outsiders.[28]

According to Harvey, the capacity of social groups is better in "commanding place rather than space".[29] If this is the case, the ever-expanding EU lacks enough institutional power to both secure its place in the globalised world and ensure the development of common European space. Such an institutional 'vacuum' causes it to 'fall back' into what is already there: the still-existing nation-state (in its regulatory function), national bureaucracies and territorial boundaries. Thus, for example, while the Cold War created a rigid geopolitical boundary around the EC which prevented close co-operation with the central and eastern European states in the first place,[30] subsequent EU's enlargements, including the most recent one, have expanded European systemic boundaries beyond the direct/substantial reach of the institutions of multi-level governance. Despite arguments to the contrary,[31] today the EU attempts to reconstitute strict borders to secure its own loose sovereign space. Two different cases, clearly showing European path-dependency - exemplified by the EU's current, sixth enlargement - will now be considered. They are: a) the three Baltic States (incorporated by this enlargement); and b) the Kaliningrad region (excluded by the same).

Modern Baltic States in post-modern Europe

The EU's consideration of the applicant Baltic States, prior to their accession, was based primarily on the principles of functional stability and developmental progress, which succinctly constitute the modernity discourse. As Friis and Murphy have argued, "the EU exports models of governance" either through "voluntary imitation by other states or by the conditional nature of EU external action which requires acceptance of certain norms and procedures by outsiders".[32] They have also noted that "the overall [modernist] character of the Union is such that core elements of the institutional/legal boundary are non-negotiable with outsiders" and that these concern "bargains on structures, goals, policies and methods and represent a costly investment on the part of existing members".[33] Thus, since the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, the EU's accession is open only to those nation-states who fulfil the set of rational criteria, which guarantee systemic compatibility with European ideo-political, economic and social space. The requirements include a well functioning and developed economy and the acceptance of the EU's aquis communautaire - laws and regulations of main policy instruments. The latter also include the Schengen agreements, which allow the Union to extend its system of governance beyond its membership, as the maintenance, strengthening, blurring or movement of the EU boundaries - geographical, cultural, transactional and institutional/legal - is intended to produce an overall positive effect for the 'outsiders'. This implies that the EU not only expects the new entrants to be fully sovereign, homogenised and functional international states prior to the accession, but also wants them to share and maintain the Union's own attributes of international sovereignty, most importantly its political, economic and geographic territory. For the Baltic States to be accepted to the EU, they had to normalise and stabilise their economies, laws and governmental institutions in accordance with the aquis. They also had to resolve their territorial and ethnic-based conflicts both among themselves and also with neighbouring Russia and Poland. National homogeneity had to be accomplished through new citizenship laws, which were regarded by neighbouring Russia as highly antagonistic. Finally, the Baltic States had to promote and disseminate their appraisal of 'Europeanness'. Thus, it appears, the Baltic States have had to be upgraded to their modern nation-state subjectivity twice during the twentieth century, and with joining the EU they are undergoing this process yet again.

In describing the Baltic States' break away from the late Soviet colonial system into the world of 'free nations' Marko Lehti notes that the process of state- and nation-building was "not only a question of a declaration of independence but it was a long process of defining the borders of sovereignty and assuring one's own sovereignty".[34] In both cases, sovereignty had to be assumed and defined by the new entities themselves, but, at the same time, the existing powers set the final criteria in each case. They accepted whether newcomers were eligible for the 'club' of sovereign states. This mechanism seems to have functioned well twice during the twentieth century: first, with the collapse of the Russian Tsarist empire and the summoning of victorious European powers at Versailles, and, second, after the collapse of the Soviet empire, as witnessed by the United States, Russia and the EC. Joining the EU today, however, does not automatically guarantee the Baltic States a secure place in the (post-)modern world defined by Europe alone, in absentia of a single global hegemonic power. Instead, the EU itself is only a transforming part of a larger global system, which is also in flux. While the Baltic States are merely importing the product of European integration with its quality label of modern eligibility (in terms of the aquis communautaire), they are also simultaneously accepting an unpredictable jigsaw puzzle of post-modern globalisation. The above tendency can be described as nested path dependence, whereby EU's path-dependence, defined in terms of modernity, will now also comprise the path-dependence of the post-Soviet transition state(s), which are striving towards intensified modernisation after decades of backward command economy. One inevitable outcome of such overlapping time boundaries is widening spatial and socio-political divisions. Another outcome is the problem of dealing with the post-colonial legacy.

Kaliningrad's post-colonial economy of space-time

In the past East Prussia (present day Kaliningrad), Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were all Russian peripheral imperial colonies; today deep structural and systemic differences separate Kaliningrad from Europe and the three Baltic States.[35] The divide is visible both throughout qualitative factors: existence of national (or regional) sovereignty, functional civil society and higher standards of living, as well as through quantitative factors, such as levels of foreign direct investment[36] and the structure of the local economy (see Tables 1 and 2).
Some researchers have argued that, on the one hand, after becoming a Russian enclave within the EU, the region could potentially benefit from the Union's 'post-modern' features by becoming a borderless 'bridge' between East and West.[37] On the other hand, it has been recognised that Kaliningrad can also be detrimentally held back by the EU's and Russia's distinctively 'modern' features, such as tight national border regimes and protectionist economic policies combined with the construction of a powerful, centralised geopolitical identity. According to current research, these could potentially turn it into an isolated 'black hole', by diverting the international investment, trade and transit flows, also by undermining the formation of social capital, local initiative and sustainable development in this peripheral region.[38]

The alternative argument is that, as long as Kaliningrad remains either a peripheral Russian borderline or a special region 'in-between' Europe, trying to achieve positive international subjectivity (effective government and prosperous economy) within the global world's system, it will remain a point of economic antagonisms. In this way, it will continue to manifest itself in different forms of radical split, a fissure that is based on unresolved issues of its predominantly colonial past. Since the twelfth century, the Kaliningrad region (formerly East Prussia) has been a colony of: the Teutonic knights, Prussian Empire (1688-1871), Russian Empire (1757-62), German Empire (1871-1919) and the Third Reich (1920-1944) and finally, Soviet empire (1945 to present). Such a history has left this peripheral region a legacy of dependency on the centre and international power politics, underdeveloped economy and low levels of social capital and social mobilisation.

Swain and Hardy argue that the post-socialist transition process also has its own dynamics, directly related to the processes of globalisation.[39] Indeed, in an open global economy "competition between places is stimulated so that an improved relative position of place is not assured or guaranteed as a result of systemic transformation".[40] This is because the emergence of varieties of post-socialist capitalism and divergent regional economies has been said to be path-dependent,[41] while processes of globalisation are said to selectively connect and disconnect people as well as locate and dislocate places.[42] In the context of Eastern Europe, the Baltic States and Russia, according to Grabher and Stark, far from displacing all of the socio-economic properties of locations, globalisation actually makes some of them all the more salient.[43] A clear example of this is Kaliningrad which, despite being designated as an export-oriented zone during the 1990s, became 60-80 per cent dependent on European imports, compared to Russia's average 50 per cent.[44] Another well-known feature of post-socialist fragmented space-economy is the enduring weakness of national states to project visions of economic development. However, these projections of economic development are not realised. In particular, the absence of stable configurations of political and economic agents to adopt restructuring goals as well as the presence of 'thick' informal institutions (black market, shadow economy and illegal trans-border trade) have constrained possibilities for regional endogenous development.[45]

In the case of peripheries, such as Kaliningrad, regional economies have been trapped in a vicious circle of decline, which passively absorb reverberations from the national and international economy. Kaliningrad's dysfunctional 'rent-seeking' economy is based on price and tax differences, created and perpetuated by its artificial border regime.[46] Thus in Kaliningrad's case, path-dependency becomes - applying Altvater - a "process of placing a given country into the spatio-temporal structure of global markets and power relations".[47] The "embeddedness" of foreign inward investments[48] in such peripheral regions, which can be sometimes understood as "sites" of local-global governance,[49] has been also interpreted as a "Kuwaitisation" process,[50] in which transnational capital tries to establish colonial-style 'strongholds' separate from the favoured territories (e.g., Baltic states and Poland), thereby producing fragmented space-economies which a mobile capitalism and flexible accumulation can feed upon.

In general, due to a higher level of investment in development during the Soviet era, the Baltic States are experiencing post-colonial path-dependency to a lesser extent than Kaliningrad, which was 'russified' only by the end of the WWII. However strong is the desire to forget the colonial past through historical self-invention and boost of self-potentiality, the newly emergent postcolonial entities are "often deluded and unsuccessful in their attempts ... of ... emancipation from the ... realities of the colonial encounter".[51] As Altvater posits, the artificially constructed social, economic and political space of New Europe "cannot be realised in the course of the transformation process by means of a simple exchange of existing maps of place and space".[52] According to him, "there already exists a social, economic and political map inherited from the past, and this map has to be erased in the course of designing a new map". The colonial map, however, "will only decompose if, and when we are willing to acknowledge the reciprocal behaviour of the two colonial parties".[53] In this sense, a critical assessment of the often simplified, modernist visions of a borderless Europe with disappearing nation-states, becomes crucial to an understanding of boundaries - not simply as dividing lines, but as "dynamic sets of discourses and practices that exist everywhere in societies, not only where social systems (or 'power containers') meet each other".[54] According to Paasi, it is "important to consider the meanings of boundaries as part of the production of territory/territoriality that occurs concomitantly at all spatial scales and indeed brings various social and cultural processes together..."[55]

Thus, while now the Baltic States finally possess the necessary sovereign subjectivity to master their own maps and borders Kaliningrad's 'transitional' path-dependency persists and cannot be completely 'erased'. This is due to Russia's inability to negotiate its post-imperialist 'syndrome' - founded in the crisis of subjectivity and control, which imparts the restless expansionism of civilization. Perceived throughout history as an external representation of threat-imposing, deconstructive forces (either as 'over-militaristic' East Prussia during WWII, or as 'over-liberalised' Free Economic Zone after the collapse of the USSR), Kaliningrad has been perpetually internalised and consumed by Russia's geopolitically dominating space. Singling out and recognising Kaliningrad's potential either as an external borderland and outpost, or as a 'gateway' and 'pilot-region', in fact, perpetuates the centrality of borders and control in the wider discourse, whose aim is to exclude peripheral and deviant places from the global space of nations' well-being. "The Kaliningrad's puzzle" thus can be solved, not through attempts to transcend its disputed regime of territoriality with post-modern clichés, but by re-negotiating its colonial past, where this territoriality and the problems that come with it are rooted. In other words, there is nothing wrong or ominous with the absence of the Kaliningrad region from the map of 'New Europe'.

Conclusion

Evidently, the 'falling back' into European 'modern' path-dependency, since the period of accession negotiations, has already produced the fixation of the modernity period and political discourse of sovereignty within the Baltic States. This has happened at the expense of the erasure of other possible outcomes of the transitional path-dependence such as post-colonialism or authoritarianism. Although EU membership offers the three Baltic States an opportunity to 'forget' and ignore the legacies of their development under colonial imperialism, socialism and free-market 'arbitrage capitalism', this is likely to persist, perhaps in a latent form. For example, the peripheral position of these states vis-à-vis the European 'core' members could be further exacerbated through: a) the peripheral positioning within international division of labour and production markets which occurred during the post-socialist transition; and b) the low level of resourcefulness and socio-political mobilisation, in attempting to break the competition from the other EU countries.

For Kaliningrad, the path of transition is not simply a product of the free choice of rational autonomous political and economic actors. Instead it depends, not only on the historical factors from the pre-modern period, but also on the options available in a given spatio-temporal location of the process of transformation, within the development trajectory of the global economic system.

To sum up: as new supranational regimes and regulatory processes, such as the EU, appear to be increasingly embedded in the political practices of the past, the phenomena of continuity and path-dependence constitute a common political denominator for the socio-economic outcomes along the Eastern coast of the Baltic Sea. To escape the divisive politics of this global post-colonial expansion would mean two things for the regions concerned: first, bringing to a halt the evolutionary pursuit of politics of national identity and space and, second, re-negotiating their post-colonial legacy in terms of dialectics of place and space.

Map 1. Kaliningrad Oblast and the Baltic Sea Region.

issue3oblenski1

Table 1. Kaliningrad Oblast, Foreign Direct Investment inflow compared with the new EU entrants, 1995-2001.

Sources: N. Smorodinskaya and S. Zhukov, The Kaliningrad Exclave in Europe: Swimming Against the Tide. Diagnostics of the State and Potential of Economic Development. East-West Institute, Regional and Trans-frontier Cooperation Program, Moscow, 2003.

Table 2. Kaliningrad Region as Compared to Russia and Baltic States in Transition: Industrial Structure and Structure of Employment by Sectors, 2000.

Note: I - agriculture; II - industry; III - construction; IV - tertiary sector (total of V, VI, VII); V - transportation and communication; VI - trade; VII - other services. Calculated at relative PPP and at relative 2000 prices (the technique of IMEMO).

Notes:

[1] See, e.g.: Arendt, H., The Human Condition: A Study of the Central Dilemma Facing Modern Man. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958); Williams, M.C., 'Modernity, Postmodernity and the New World Order', in The New World Order: Contrasting Theories. by B. Hansen and B. Heurlin, eds. (London, Macmillan Press, 2000).

[2] For more see: Jurgaitiene, K. and Järve, P., 'The Baltic States: Re-Nationalisation of Political Space', in Neo-Nationalism or Regionality. The Restructuring of Political Space around the Baltic Rim. by P. Joenniemi, ed. (Stockholm: NordREFO, 1997); Lehti, M., 'Non-reciprocal region-building. Baltoscandia as a national coordinate for the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians', NOREUROPA Forum, 2, 1998, pp. 19-47; and Berg, E., 'Local resistance, national identity and global swings', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 54, no. 1, 2002, pp. 109-22.

[3] The largest of the communities is in Latvia, with some 1 million Russian speakers making up the country's 2.4 million residents. Estonia is second, with 400,000 out of the 1.4 million population, and in Lithuania, with 3.5 million residents, there are some 300,000 (See: http://europa.eu.int/comm./enlargement; and Julius Strauss, 'Latvia and Estonia bring million Russians into EU', www.news.telegraph.co.uk, 16 September 2003).

[4] Heuser, B., 'Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Security: New World Orders in the Twentieth Century', in State Sovereignty, Change and Persistence in International Relations. S.H. Hashmi (ed.) (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).

[5] Samson, I., (ed.), Kaliningrad Region 2010: Potential, concepts and prospects. (Kaliningrad: TACIS, 1999); Joenniemi, P., Dewar, S. and Fairlie, L.D., The Kaliningrad Puzzle - A Russian Region within the European Union. The Baltic Institute of Sweden and The Åland Islands Peace Institute, (Karlskrona, February 2000).

[6] In September 1999 the then Russian Prime Minister Putin announced, during his visit to the EU Helsinki Summit, that Kaliningrad could become a 'pilot region' for Russia's closer co-operation with the EU (See: Medium-term Strategy for Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000-2010), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, October 1999).

[7] Paasi, A., 'Regional Transformation in the European Context: Notes on Regions, Boundaries and Identity', Space and Polity, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 197-201, pp. 197-198.

[8] The European Commission Communication on Kaliningrad of 19 January 2001, Brussels (COM (2001)26-2001/2046(COS)).

[9] The division of the Russian Federation into administrative regions or 'oblasts' dates back to the Soviet Union. In addition, Russia also has 21 ethnically-dominated republics, which, although constitutionally have the same status as oblasts, usually possess richer resources and have better institutional infrastructure.

[10] Fukuyama, F., The End of History and the Last Man, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992).

[11] Harvey, D., The Condition of Postmodernity. An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989); Jameson, F., 'Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism', New Left Review, vol. 146, July/August, 1984, pp. 53-92.

[12] Caporaso, J.A., 'The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-Modern?' Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 34, no. 1, 1996, pp. 29-52., p. 30; and Ruggie, J.G., 'Territoriality and Beyond: problematising modernity in international relations', International Organisation, vol. 47, no. 1, 1993, pp.139-174.

[13] Barber, B. R., 'Jihad vs. McWorld', The Atlantic Monthly, March 1992, pp. 53-63; see also Caporaso, 'The European Union...', 1996.

[14] Hooghe, L., 'Subnational Mobilisation in the European Union', West European Politics, vol. 18, no. 3, 1995, pp. 175-198; and Newhouse, J., 'Europe's Rising Regionalism', Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 1, 1997, pp. 67-84.

[15] Stark provides a good account of this from an institutionalist perspective, which prefers the use of the term 'transformation' instead of 'transition' in explaining the complex process of institutional change in post-communist societies which, although having already achieved modern levels of development through industrialisation and international trade, have largely failed to establish a strong state, functioning democracy and diverse civil society (See: Stark, D., 'Recombinant property in east European capitalism', Discussion paper FSI 93-103, (Wissenshaftzentrum, Berlin, 1993)).

[16] Elshtain, Jean B., 'Sovereignty, Identity, Sacrifice', in V. S. Paterson, Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 141-54.

[17] Barber, B., 'Jihad vs. McWorld', p. 53, (emphasis mine).

[18] Jameson, F., 'Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism', New Left Review, 146, July/August 1984, pp. 53-92, p. 53.

[19] In the institutionalist vein it can be argued that the introduction of the new structural shortcut (from nationalism, to regionalism and globalism) will not lead to the changes unless it is backed up by institutional transformation, which requires longer periods of time and higher socio-political efforts (see: A. Smith and A. Swain, 'Regulating and institutionalising capitalisms: the micro-foundations of transformation in eastern and central Europe', in Theorising Transition. J. Pickles & A. Smith, eds., (Routledge: London, 1998)).

[20] Jameson, F., 'Postmodernism...', p. 53.

[21] Rosencrance, R., 'The Virtual State'. Foreign Affairs, no. 75, July/August, 1996, pp. 45-61, p. 45.

[22] Kramsch, O.T., 'Reimagining the Scalar Topologies of Cross-Border Governance: Eu(ro)regions in the Post-colonial Present', Space and Polity, vol. 6(2), 2002, pp. 169-196.

[23] Morley, D. and Robins, K., Spaces of Identity. Global media, electronic landscapes and cultural boundaries. (London: Routledge, 1995), p.20.

[24] Pierson, P., 'The Path to Euroean Integration: A Historical-institutionalist Analysis', in European Integration and Supranational Governance . W. Sandholtz and A. Stone Sweet, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 27-58; Mahoney, J., 'Path Dependence in Historical Sociology', Theory and Society, vol. 29, 2000, pp. 507-548.

[25] Wincott, D., 'Institutional Interaction and European Integration: Towards an Everyday Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism', Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 33, no. 4, 1995, pp. 597-609, p. 602; Moravcsik, A., 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Integration: A Rejoinder', Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 33, no. 4, 1995, pp. 611-828, pp. 616-20.

[26] Weiler, J.H., Haltern, U.R. and Mayer, F.C., 'European Democracy and Its Critique', West European Politics, vol. 18, no. 3, July, 1995, pp. 4-39; Wallace, W. and Smith, J., 'Democracy or Technocracy? European Integration and the Problem of Popular Consent', West European Politics, vol. 18, no. 3, July 1995, pp. 135-157.

[27] Nilson, H.R., 'Nordic Regionalisation: On How Transborder Regions Work and Why They Don't Work', Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 34, no. 4, (1997), pp. 399-426; Lange, N., 'Business Interests in Regional Conflicts: Changing Opportunity Structures through European Integration', Regional and Federal Studies, vol. 8, no. 3, 1998, pp. 1-30; Lovering, J., 'The Coming Regional Crisis (And How To Avoid It)', Regional Studies, vol. 35, no. 4, 2001, pp. 349-354.

[28] Caporaso, J.A., 'The European Union and Forms of State...', p. 33, see also Smith, M., 'The European Union and Changing Europe: Establishing the Boundaries of Order', Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 43, no. 1, 1996, pp. 5-28; Agnew, J., 'How Many Europes? The European Union, eastward enlargement and uneven development', European Urban and Regional Studies, vol. 8, no. 1, 2001, pp. 29-38.

[29] Harvey, D., The Condition of Postmodernity. pp. 302-3.

[30] Smith, M., 'The European Union and Changing Europe...', pp. 13-18.

[31] O'Dowd, L., and Wilson, T., 'Frontiers of sovereignty in the New Europe', in Borders, Nations and States, ed. by O'Dowd & Wilson (Ashgate: Aldershot, 1996), pp. 1-17. 1996; Walters, W., 'Mapping Shengenland: denaturalising the border', Environment and Planning D: Society and Space. vol. 20, 2002, pp. 561-80.

[32] Friis, L. and Murphy, A., 'The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries', Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 37, no. 2, 1999, pp. 211-32, p. 214.

[33] Friis and Murphy, p. 216.

[34] Lehti, M., 'Sovereignty Redefined: Baltic Co-operation and the Limits of National Self-determination', COPRI Working Paper, 12, 1999.

[35] The region of Kaliningrad was established after the Soviet Union took over the northern part of German East Prussia in 1945. Throughout the Soviet times the region remained a restrictive military zone with some fishing, metalwork and construction industries. Twice, during the decade following Russia's independence in 1991, Kaliningrad has made unsuccessful bids to promote itself under various free economic/customs regimes in an attempt to compete with its much stronger neighbours: Poland and Lithuania. After the accession of the Baltic States and Poland into the EU in May 2004, the Kaliningrad region became a Russian enclave inside the EU.

[36] In terms of absorption capacity the gap between Kaliningrad and its neighbours ranges from 6-times, as compared with Poland, to 82-times lower as compared with Estonia (see: Smorodinskaya, N., and Zhukov, S., 'The Kaliningrad Enclave in Europe: Swimming against the tide. Diagnostics of the State and Potential of Economic Development', (Regional and Transfrontier Cooperation Program, EastWest Institute, Moscow, 2003).

[37] Samson, I., Kaliningrad Region 2010..., 1999; Joenniemi, P., 'Kaliningrad as a Discursive Battlefield', COPRI Working Paper, no. 15, Copenhagen, 1999; and 'Kaliningrad: A Pilot Region in the Russia-EU Relations?', draft paper presented at the Research Seminar on the Northern Dimension, Helsinki, 24-26 August 2000.

[38] Baxendale, J., Dewar, S., and Gowan D. (eds.), The EU and Kaliningrad: Kaliningrad and the Impact of EU Enlargement. (London: Federal Trust, 2000); Joenniemi, P., Dewar, S. and Fairlie, L.D., The Kaliningrad Puzzle - A Russian Region within the European Union. The Baltic Institute of Sweden and The Åland Islands Peace Institute, (Karlskrona, February 2000); Smorodinskaya, N., Kaliningrad Exclave: Prospects for Transformation into a Pilot Region. (Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 2001).

[39] Swain, A. and Hardy, J., 'Globalisation, Institutions, Foreign Investment and the Reintegration of East and Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union with the World Economy', Regional Studies, vol. 32, no. 7, (1998), pp. 587-590.

[40] Altvater, E., 'Theoretical Deliberations on Time and Space in Post-socialist Transformation', Regional Studies, vol. 32(7), 1998, pp. 591-605, p. 598.

[41] Hausner, J., Jessop, B. and Nielsen, K. (eds.), Strategic Choice and Path-Dependency in Post-socialism. (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995).

[42] Burbach, R., Nunez, O., and Kagarlitsky, B., Globalisation and its Discontents: The Rise of Postmodern Socialisms, (London: Pluto, 1997).

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