Professor Michael Brady

  • Professor of Philosophy (Philosophy)

telephone: 0141 330 3706
email: Michael.Brady@glasgow.ac.uk

Research interests

My main research is in the philosophy of emotion. One strand of this concerns the epistemic value of emotion; here I am interested in how we should understand the common-sense idea that emotions can tell us about value, and the conditions in which emotions can play a positive epistemic role. My monograph on these themes, Emotional Insight, was published by Oxford University Press in 2013.

The other strand concerns the nature and value of suffering. I am currently drafting another monograph on this topic. This research is part of the interdisciplinary project The Value of Suffering, funded by the John Templeton Foundation; I am Principal Investigator on the project, along with my colleague David Bain. This project is a three-year investigation by a team of philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, and clinicians into the nature and role of suffering and affective experience in general.

Grants

2013-16

£362,000. John Templeton Foundation. The Value of Suffering Project (Principal Investigator). The VOS project is a large, international, and interdisciplinary research project investigating the nature, role, and value of pain, suffering, and affective experience more generally. Its core team comprises philosophers, neuroscientists, psychologists, and clinicians, based in Scotland, France, Norway, and the United States. It includes a postdoctoral fellow and an international PhD student. Running from 2013 - 2016, the project will involve numerous workshops and conferences and will result in articles, a monograph, edited collections, and various outreach activities. 

2012-13

£107,000. John Templeton Foundation. The Pain Project (Principal Investigator). 

 

Supervision

My current PhD students are Catherine Robb (Nature of Talent), and Abraham Sapien-Cordoba (Theories of Pain).

I have been supervisor (first or second) for the following students:

  • Robert Cowan
  • Ioanna-Maria Patsalidou
  • Carole Baillie
  • James Humphries
  • Ross Heatherington

I have also managed Dr Jennifer Corns, who is the postdoctoral researcher on two projects: The Pain Project, and The Value of Suffering.

Teaching

I usually teach the following courses:

  • Philosophy MSc
  • Philosophy Conversion (MLitt)
  • Senior Honours: The Emotions (SH27)
  • Junior Honours: Moral Philosophy (JH9)
  • Junior Honours : Epistemology (JH3, tutorials)
  • Level 2: Morality, Politics and Religion (2M, Metaethics component)
  • Level 1: Right and Wrong (1M, Applied Ethics component)

 

Additional information

I joined the Department at Glasgow in 2005, having previously taught at the University of Stirling. I received by PhD from the University of California at Santa Barbara, after having studied for a Masters in Philosophy at King's College, University of London, and a BA (Hons) in Philosophy at the University of Liverpool.

I was Director of the British Philosophical Association from 2011 until 2014, and Secretary of the Scots Philosophical Association from 2009 until 2012. I am on the Board of The Philosophical Quarterly, and subject editor responsible for Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Aesthetics, and Philosophy of Religion for Oxford Bibliographies Online

Outside of academic philosophy, I have worked as a philosophical advisor for Quarantine theatre company on two productions: Make-Believe in 2009, and Entitled in 2011, and will be working with the on the three-year project Summer. Autumn. Winter. Spring. will be made in four separate parts then played as a marathon event from 2016. 

Publications

List by: Type | Date

Jump to: 2015 | 2014 | 2013 | 2011 | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 | 2007 | 2006 | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2000 | 1998
Number of items: 24.

2015

Brady, M. S. (2015) Seeing bad and feeling bad. Dialectica, 69(3), pp. 403-416. (doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12110)

2014

Bain, D., and Brady, M. (2014) Pain, pleasure, and unpleasure. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 5(1), pp. 1-14. (doi:10.1007/s13164-014-0176-5)

Bain, D., and Brady, M. (2014) Pain and Pleasure [Special Issue]. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 5(1),

2013

Brady, M.S. (2013) Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199685523

2011

Brady, M.S. (2011) Emotions, perceptions and reasons. In: Bagnoli, C. (ed.) Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, pp. 135-149. ISBN 9780199577507 (doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577507.003.0007)

2010

Brady, M.S., (Ed.) (2010) New Waves in Metaethics. Series: New Waves in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire. ISBN 9780230251618

Brady, M.S. (2010) Disappointment. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 84(1), pp. 179-198. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2010.00191.x)

Brady, M.S. (2010) Virtue, emotion and attention. Metaphilosophy, 41(1-2), pp. 115-131. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01620.x)

2009

Brady, M.S. (2009) The irrationality of recalcitrant emotions. Philosophical Studies, 145(3), pp. 413-430. (doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9241-1)

Brady, M.S. (2009) Curiosity and the value of truth. In: Haddock, A., Millar, A. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, pp. 265-283. ISBN 9780199231188 (doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.003.0013)

2008

Brady, M.S. (2008) Value and fitting emotions. Journal of Value Inquiry, 42(4), pp. 465-475. (doi:10.1007/s10790-008-9134-8)

2007

Brady, M.S. (2007) Recalcitrant emotions and visual illusions. American Philosophical Quarterly, 44(3), pp. 273-284.

2006

Brady, M.S. (2006) Appropriate attitudes and the value problem. American Philosophical Quarterly, 43(1), pp. 91-99.

Brady, M.S., and Pritchard, D. (2006) Epistemic Virtue and Virtue Epistemology [Special issue]. Philosophical Studies, 130, pp. 1-152.

2005

Brady, M.S. (2005) The value of the virtues. Philosophical Studies, 125(1), pp. 85-113. (doi:10.1007/s11098-005-7788-7)

Brady, M.S., and Pritchard, D. (2005) Epistemological contextualism: problems and prospects. Philosophical Quarterly, 55(219), pp. 161-171. (doi:10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00393.x)

2004

Brady, M.S. (2004) Against agent-based virtue ethics. Philosophical Papers, 33(1), pp. 1-10.

2003

Brady, M.S. (2003) Valuing, desiring and normative priority. Philosophical Quarterly, 53(211), pp. 231-242. (doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00308)

Brady, M.S. (2003) Some worries about normative and metaethical sentimentalism. Metaphilosophy, 34(1-2), pp. 144-153. (doi:10.1111/1467-9973.00265)

Brady, M.S. and Pritchard, D., (Eds.) (2003) Moral and Epistemic Virtues. Series: Metaphilosophy series in philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell: Oxford, UK. ISBN 9781405108782

2002

Brady, M.S. (2002) Skepticism, normativity, and practical identity. Journal of Value Inquiry, 36(4), pp. 403-412. (doi:10.1023/A:1021998028195)

2000

Brady, M.S. (2000) How to understand internalism. Philosophical Quarterly, 50(198), pp. 91-97. (doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00172)

1998

Brady, M.S. (1998) Reasons and rational motivational access. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 79(2), pp. 99-114. (doi:10.1111/1468-0114.00052)

Brady, M.S. (1998) Can epistemic contextualism avoid the regress problem? Southern Journal of Philosophy, 36(3), pp. 317-328. (doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1998.tb01758.x)

This list was generated on Mon Sep 26 04:48:29 2016 BST.
Number of items: 24.

Articles

Brady, M. S. (2015) Seeing bad and feeling bad. Dialectica, 69(3), pp. 403-416. (doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12110)

Bain, D., and Brady, M. (2014) Pain, pleasure, and unpleasure. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 5(1), pp. 1-14. (doi:10.1007/s13164-014-0176-5)

Bain, D., and Brady, M. (2014) Pain and Pleasure [Special Issue]. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 5(1),

Brady, M.S. (2010) Disappointment. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 84(1), pp. 179-198. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2010.00191.x)

Brady, M.S. (2010) Virtue, emotion and attention. Metaphilosophy, 41(1-2), pp. 115-131. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01620.x)

Brady, M.S. (2009) The irrationality of recalcitrant emotions. Philosophical Studies, 145(3), pp. 413-430. (doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9241-1)

Brady, M.S. (2008) Value and fitting emotions. Journal of Value Inquiry, 42(4), pp. 465-475. (doi:10.1007/s10790-008-9134-8)

Brady, M.S. (2007) Recalcitrant emotions and visual illusions. American Philosophical Quarterly, 44(3), pp. 273-284.

Brady, M.S. (2006) Appropriate attitudes and the value problem. American Philosophical Quarterly, 43(1), pp. 91-99.

Brady, M.S., and Pritchard, D. (2006) Epistemic Virtue and Virtue Epistemology [Special issue]. Philosophical Studies, 130, pp. 1-152.

Brady, M.S. (2005) The value of the virtues. Philosophical Studies, 125(1), pp. 85-113. (doi:10.1007/s11098-005-7788-7)

Brady, M.S., and Pritchard, D. (2005) Epistemological contextualism: problems and prospects. Philosophical Quarterly, 55(219), pp. 161-171. (doi:10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00393.x)

Brady, M.S. (2004) Against agent-based virtue ethics. Philosophical Papers, 33(1), pp. 1-10.

Brady, M.S. (2003) Valuing, desiring and normative priority. Philosophical Quarterly, 53(211), pp. 231-242. (doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00308)

Brady, M.S. (2003) Some worries about normative and metaethical sentimentalism. Metaphilosophy, 34(1-2), pp. 144-153. (doi:10.1111/1467-9973.00265)

Brady, M.S. (2002) Skepticism, normativity, and practical identity. Journal of Value Inquiry, 36(4), pp. 403-412. (doi:10.1023/A:1021998028195)

Brady, M.S. (2000) How to understand internalism. Philosophical Quarterly, 50(198), pp. 91-97. (doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00172)

Brady, M.S. (1998) Reasons and rational motivational access. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 79(2), pp. 99-114. (doi:10.1111/1468-0114.00052)

Brady, M.S. (1998) Can epistemic contextualism avoid the regress problem? Southern Journal of Philosophy, 36(3), pp. 317-328. (doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1998.tb01758.x)

Books

Brady, M.S. (2013) Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199685523

Book Sections

Brady, M.S. (2011) Emotions, perceptions and reasons. In: Bagnoli, C. (ed.) Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, pp. 135-149. ISBN 9780199577507 (doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577507.003.0007)

Brady, M.S. (2009) Curiosity and the value of truth. In: Haddock, A., Millar, A. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, pp. 265-283. ISBN 9780199231188 (doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.003.0013)

Edited Books

Brady, M.S., (Ed.) (2010) New Waves in Metaethics. Series: New Waves in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire. ISBN 9780230251618

Brady, M.S. and Pritchard, D., (Eds.) (2003) Moral and Epistemic Virtues. Series: Metaphilosophy series in philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell: Oxford, UK. ISBN 9781405108782

This list was generated on Mon Sep 26 04:48:29 2016 BST.