Honours Courses: An Overview
Honours Courses: An Overview
The Philosophy Honours programme is a two-year programme of studies, comprising the Junior Honours and Senior Honours years, and is part of our four-year MA (Honours) degree. Junior and Senior Honours have separate curricula, and the final exam for each course takes place at the end of the second semester ('split finals'). Each course last one term and is worth 20 credits. Single Honours students take six per year (120 credits), three per term; Joint Honours students take three per year (60 credits), distributed as convenient. Each module is assessed by an essay (30%) and final exam (70%). Fortnightly tutorials in groups of around six are held for Junior Honours modules; Senior Honours modules have larger group seminars. The dissertation is a fourth-year module that is compulsory for single honours students and for joint honours students not doing a dissertation in their other subject.
Honours students have the option to spend their third year studying abroad. See the Study Philosophy Abroad section for more information.
Descriptions of courses available can be found below. All Junior Honours courses are available every year; not all Senior Honours courses will be offered in every year.
Further details of individual courses, including information about which courses are running in the current academic session, can be found by using the list of Honours course pages.
Course ILOs can be found in the Specification Documents available through the Course Catalogue.
For further information, please contact Philosophy at the address below.
Junior Honours courses
JH1 History of Modern Philosophy
We consider the seminal 17th century philosophies of Locke and Berkeley. Both were strongly influenced by Descartes and by the emerging natural sciences. Along with David Hume (see SH2), they are the principal figures of classical British Empiricism, according to which all knowledge comes from experience. Within that constraint, Locke attempts to assess the limits of possible human knowledge on the assumption of Realism, i.e., that the material world is real and independent of our experience of it. This led to his celebrated attempt to distinguish those aspects of experience that correspond to real features of the world from those which do not, or which do so only in an indirect way. Berkeley famously argued that the whole idea of realism is incoherent, and that knowledge and indeed reality itself is confined to mind or 'spirit' as he called it. This module is recommended background for further modules in the history of philosophy such as Kant or Mind and Knowledge in the Scottish Enlightenment.
JH2 Philosophy of Language
In this course we start from the classic works in philosophy of language by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell in which they investigate of the nature of language, meaning, reference and related topics. We look next at some contemporary challenges to those views, especially due to Saul Kripke, then to the speech-act theory of Austin, and the pragmatics of Grice. We look also at the theory of Donald Davidson, a famous theory that tries to connect the theory of meaning with things we ascribe meaning to, namely linguistic behaviour. If time permits, we finish with a look at W. V. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein, each of which had their distinctive doubts about the idea of a theory of meaning.
This course introduces students to a number of major themes and debates in epistemology. In particular, we will focus on the nature of knowledge (Part 1), issues pertaining to epistemic justification (Part 2), epistemic values, goals and norms (Part 3), kinds of knowledge (Part 4) and social epistemology (Part 5). In Part 1 we will examine the nature of knowledge, including traditional justified true belief account of knowledge, the ‘Gettier problem’ that is widely thought to refute it, and look at some of the revised theories of knowledge that were proposed in its wake. Part 2 is about epistemic justification and, more specifically, focuses on the divides between (i) internalists and externalists and (ii) evidentialists and reliabilists, as well as the structure of justification. In Part 3, we will take a closer look at the value problem in epistemology, i.e the question whether it is better to know than to have a mere true belief, as well as normative issues, including questions concerning the goal of inquiry and the norm of assertion. Kinds of knowledge, including perceptual knowledge, a priori knowledge, inferential knowledge and self-knowledge take centre stage in Part 4. Finally, Part 5 focuses on epistemological issues arising from our relation to other agents, including testimonial knowledge and peer disagreement.
JH4 Political Philosophy
This course concentrates on some central and controversial values invoked in the appraisal of political life and on a range of theories that seek to ground them. In particular, we will discuss (1) the nature and scope of individual rights, (2) the value of liberty and how it can be measure, (3) different distributive principles such as equality, priority and sufficiency, and finally (4) nature and justification of democratic government.
Continues the study of logic started in the second year, proceeding in a somewhat more rigorous and formal manner. Rather than producing proofs in a formal system (e.g. tableaux) the emphasis is rather on proving results about such a system, for example soundness and completeness.
JH6 History of Moral Philosophy
The history of moral philosophy can be understood as a sustained attempt to provide a unified theory of the basis, content, and normativity of morality. That is, a theory which can answer the following questions: Is morality dependent upon human responses, or is it in some way independent of the human perspective? What actions are right/wrong, and why are they right/wrong? Why should we do what morality requires of us?
In this course we will look in detail at two historically and philosophically important attempts to answer these questions.
Firstly, we’ll look at the Sentimentalist moral philosophy of David Hume as presented in his Treatise on Human Nature and his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Hume famously thinks that morality is dependent upon human sentiments (roughly: emotional dispositions) and that plausible sentimentalist answers can be given to questions about the content and normativity of morality.
Second, we’ll look at the Rationalist moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant as presented in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason. Kant famously thinks that morality is dependent upon practical rationality (roughly: the capacity to act for reasons) and that the content and normativity of morality can (only) be explained by reference to this feature.
Along the way we’ll consider Hume and Kant’s views and arguments concerning the origin of moral concepts, the relationship between rationality and our desires/goals, motivation and action, and free will.
In considering these texts, one task will be to make sure that you understand what Hume and Kant are saying. But equally, your job is to consider whether their arguments are any good, and to begin forming your own reasoned conclusions about the deep and important philosophical questions they are attempting to grapple with.
JH7 Philosophy of Mind
Charts the attempts in philosophy, psychology and cognitive science since the beginning the of 20th century to develop an alternative conception of the mind to Cartesian Dualism: one that is naturalistic, scientifically tractable and philosophically satisfactory. After a brief introduction to Dualism, discussion proceeds with Behaviourism, early physicalist Identity Theories, forms of Functionalism, and consciousness. Along the way, such topics are explored as thought, perception, subjectivity, qualia, mental causation, the analogy between mind and computer, and the dependence of mental content on the environment.
This module covers selected topics in contemporary metaphysics, thereby illustrating its range of questions and its methods: (1) material objects (2) the nature of time; and (3) the nature of causation. Sample questions to be discussed are, respectively: Are material objects anything over and above their properties? Is time fundamentally analogous to space? Is causation merely a matter of exceptionless regularity?
JH9 Moral Philosophy
We refer to ethical properties all the time. Take, for example, a conversation you might overhear on a bus: ‘That’s a nasty way to treat any other human being, but the fact that it was his mother makes it even worse.’ ‘After all she’s done for him, it’s grossly unfair!’ ‘She’s such a kind person.’ ‘His disrespect and disloyalty is appalling.’ It seems to attribute a number of ethical properties to persons and their actions, including nastiness, worseness, fairness, kindness, disrespectfulness, appallingness, and disloyalty. But what kinds of properties are they? Are they like natural, physical properties? Are they non-natural, perhaps socially-constructed, properties? Or are we simply fooled into thinking there are ethical properties by our grammar or our feelings?
Answering these questions about the nature of ethical properties will invite us to think about a number of related questions having to do with ethical judgments: What exactly are we doing when we make judgments about ethical matters? Are we recognizing an ethical property? Are we reasoning to an ethical conclusion? Are we committing ourselves to a certain course of action or feeling motivated to act in this way rather than that?
These questions highlight three central issues in metaethics that will be the focus of our attention in this course: (i) the nature of ethical properties; (ii) the nature of ethical judgements; and (iii) the nature of reasons for action.
Senior Honours Courses
Please note that not all courses run every year.
Please consult the list of course pages for details of course availability.
SH2 Mind and Knowledge in the Scottish Enlightenment
This course will compare the works of the two major Scottish philosophers of the Enlightenment period, David Hume (1711-1776) and Thomas Reid (1710-1796).
We will begin by studying David Hume's influential views on central philosophical issues such as knowledge, causation, personal identity and free will, as found in his first great work, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739). In the Treatise, we find the core epistemological method of the British Empiricist tradition developing into a position that appears to combine serious sceptical challenges to our core pre-philosophical beliefs about the self, causal relations and our knowledge the external world with the development of a new, naturalist approach to epistemology that grants a central place to human nature.
Thomas Reid's common sense philosophy - a direct response to Hume and the empiricist tradition as a whole - seeks to develop an alternative metaphysical and epistemological framework that undermines the sceptical challenges found in Hume's writings by providing a notion of justification grounded in first principles based in human nature. In doing so, he gives us a theory that, while sharing an emphasis on human nature with Hume, involves a radically different account of the self and its epistemological relationship with the external world.
We will also explore the respective methodologies of the two philosophers and look at the influence of Enlightenment science, specifically Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton, on them.
Modern societies are characterized by profound and ineliminable disagreement about questions of religion, culture, value, and the good life. This course explores the attempts made by liberal political philosophers to discern what this diversity demands, and how we can construct a legitimate political order in its presence. We will explore foundational questions such as the nature of neutrality and its role in the foundations of liberal thinking; debates over how far it is permissible to base political policy on judgements about what is good or valuable; and questions concerning liberal theory's conception of the person. We will also bring this theoretical apparatus to bear on some applied questions concerning multiculturalism, community, and education.
SH4 Distributive Justice
Suppose you were asked to design a just society. What would it look like? Would you ensure that everyone had the same or that everyone had enough? How would you weigh liberty against equality? What role would the market have in achieving justice? In this course you will examine the ideal of distributive justice. You will explore different distributive principles, their implications and their justification. Most importantly, you will critically engage with the leading theories of domestic and global distributive justice, including those offered by Rawls, Nozick, Dworkin and Nagel.
Some regard Wittgenstein as the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century. His early work - the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus - is fascinating and brilliant in many ways, but his later work - the Philosophical Investigations - involves a completely new and radical approach to philosophical questions. There will be a brief exposition of his earlier work, but only to set the context for a study of the most famous parts of the Investigations; these include Wittgenstein's way with questions in the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and the question of what philosophy is, what it achieves. Despite his fame, the impact of the later Wittgenstein on contemporary philosophy is at best moot, and students will be invited to ponder the question of why this is; are the messages too radical, or too vague, or too hard to map on to more conventional philosophy, or ultimately confused, or what?
SH6 Moral Epistemology
Moral epistemology is the philosophical study of the existence and nature of moral knowledge. Questions in this area include: Do we have moral knowledge? What are the sources of moral knowledge? Is there anything distinctive about moral as opposed to non-moral knowledge? What might this tell us about the nature of morality? In this course we will consider some central topics in moral epistemology: reflective equilibrium, the epistemic role of moral intuitions, empirical challenges to intuitions, defeaters for moral knowledge, moral testimony, moral expertise, and moral forgetting.
SH7 Philosophy of Pain and Pleasure
Many experiences feel bad or good, unpleasant or pleasant. Pain often feels bad. Tasting chocolate is often pleasant. Our course concerns this “affective” dimension of experience—experience’s “valence”, as it’s also put—focusing particularly but not exclusively on pain and unpleasantness. A topic of increasing philosophical and scientific interest, affect raises numerous questions across disparate areas of philosophy and beyond, including philosophy of mind and psychology, epistemology, philosophy of science, and value theory. Questions include: What is the nature of unpleasantness and pleasantness? What is the relationship between pain and perception? In what senses is it really bad or good to be in states that feel bad or feel good? Is the folk concept of pain coherent? Does the concept of pain pick out a scientific kind?
SH8 Philosophy of Art
This course is an introduction to philosophical aesthetics. What is Art? How, if at all, can Art be defined? What kinds of things are Artworks? What is beauty? What is aesthetic experience? What is artistic and especially pictorial representation or depiction? What is expression, and how important is it? Historical and contemporary sources will be used to investigate these questions
SH10 Philosophy of Perception
A philosophical theory of perception should explain the nature of the mental states that occur during perception, what it is that we perceive, and account for perception's role in knowledge or justified belief. This course will look at philosophical theories of perception such as sense-datum, doxastic, representationalist, causal and disjunctivist theories. Emphasis will often be placed on perceptual experience (/conscious perception). Various phenomena that make fashioning a philosophy of perception challenging will be studied, including illusions and hallucinations, different forms of perceptual variation, perceptual constancy, the role of particulars in perception, and attention, Modern philosophy of mind is also informed by scientific studies of the brain and behaviour, and therefore this course will introduce students to relevant empirical results and ideas.
SH11 Externalism and Reference
Until the 1970s, it was accepted that your thoughts are in your head—or, more precisely, that what you are thinking is entirely a matter of what intrinsic properties you or your brain is in. On the neural version of this view, your thoughts are determined by your brain states: any brain in the states yours is now in would be thinking the thoughts you are now thinking, even if the world beyond that brain were very different from the world beyond yours, indeed even if there were no world beyond it, and the brain were floating in an otherwise empty universe. This idea is one route to the sceptical worry that there could be a complete mismatch between thought and the world. Recently, however, many philosophers have begun to resist this “internalist” view, arguing that our thoughts are not merely caused by the world out there, but essentially depend on it. This course exams the debate between internalists and externalists, and its fascinating ramifications: for what it is to be a thinking subject, for the nature of action, and for our knowledge of the world and our own minds.
SH13 Philosophy of Mathematics
Mathematics is a fascinating subject to contemplate philosophically. On the face of it, mathematics seems rife with philosophically contentious commitments. Statements like ‘There is an even number between 2 and 6’ seem to commit is to the existence of abstract mathematical objects like the number 4. Not only that, but mathematics seems to commit us to an infinity of such objects. Infinity, and the existence of abstract objects, have, throughout the history of philosophy, been topics of great controversy. Matters are all the more difficult because of the apparent centrality of mathematics to most of the ways we have of finding out about the world, especially science. So, it would seem, if mathematics is committed to an infinity of abstract objects, we are too.
Mathematics also seems to have a special epistemic status. Statements like ‘2+2 = 4’ seem not just to be true, but certain. This might be thought to stem from the special methodology of mathematics: proof. These issues give rise to a number of problems studied by philosophers of mathematics: what is the subject matter of mathematics? If that subject matter is a realm of abstract objects, existing outside of space and time, how is it that we obtain mathematical knowledge? What is mathematical truth? Can all mathematical truths be known? What logic should we use to reason about mathematics? What is a proof? Do proofs provide absolute certainty?
SH16 Contemporary Ethics
This course will survey a range of topics in contemporary normative ethics. By "normative" is here meant that part of ethics concerned with substantive questions about what is right or wrong, as opposed to, for example, questions about what it means to say that something is right or wrong (the latter belonging instead to "metaethics"). Though some of the topics covered will be connected in some important ways, most will be largely free-standing, and there will be no substantial overarching theme. We will discuss, among others, the following questions:
- Is there a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die, harming and failing to help?
- When, if ever, is it permissible to kill another person in self defence?
- What is trust? What is wrong with violating trust?
- What is trustworthiness?
- Can groups (as well as individuals) be trustworthy?
SH18 Senior Honours Reading Seminar (first semester) - Virtue Ethics
How should we live? What is worth doing (or avoiding)? What kind of people should we aim to become? These are the defining questions of ethics and one approach to answering them focuses on the traits of character that contribute to a well-lived life. These traits, known as ‘virtues’, include qualities like courage, wisdom, generosity, and perseverance. Theories that focus on such qualities are known as ‘virtue theories’. This course will look at important developments in virtue theory.
This option enables the student to study some philosophical topic of his or her choosing, and to engage in an individual research project under the guidance of a supervisor. Further details here.
SH20 Philosophy of Religion
Philosophy of Religion is concerned with questions and issues that have been of perennial interest throughout the global history of philosophy. This course examines the conceptual structure of four major religious worldviews: Semitic monotheism, Theravada Buddhism, Jainism and Advaita Vedanta Hinduism. It probes some of the big religious ideas - such as the existence of God, the nature of the self and its post-mortem fate - that occupy a central place within these worldviews. Students will be encouraged to examine the apparently competing claims of different religious traditions, and to consider the philosophical problems - concerning truth, knowledge, faith and belief - that arise from religious diversity. Through lectures, seminars, debate and discussion, students will gain a deeper understanding of the philosophical structures underlying some of the world's most ancient systems of belief and practice.
SH25 The Philosophy of David Lewis
The work of David Lewis (1941-2001) has set the agenda for many current philosophical debates. In his elegant writings, Lewis offered sophisticated contributions to topics in a number of subdisciplines, while taking care to make his theories on various subject-matters consistent with each other, and also with his materialist world-view. In its ambition, rigour, and detail, his system has few rivals in contemporary philosophy.
In this course, we will critically examine that system. Is it coherent, comprehensive, and plausible? Moreover, we will also assess his theories on various subject-matters in their own right, independently of their systematic embedding.
The course consists of three parts. Part 1 is devoted to Lewis' defence of his reductionist version of materialism, which he labelled “Humean Supervenience” (in honour of a certain Scottish philosopher). We will examine how Lewis proposes to analyse various features of our world in terms of the distribution of microphysical properties in space-time (laws of nature, counterfactuals, dispositions). In part 2, we will study Lewis’ account of language – about what makes certain sound patterns meaningful. Finally, in part 3, we will discuss Lewis’ most famous (or most notorious) thesis: that there infinitely many concrete worlds that are spatiotemporally isolated from ours.
SH26 Virtue Epistemology
This course will survey and critically engage with a range of topics in contemporary virtue epistemology. Virtue epistemology is an approach to epistemology (roughly: the theory of knowledge) that gives intellectual virtues an important theoretical role. But what is an intellectual virtue? The question is itself controversial within virtue epistemology.
Emotions occupy a central place in our lives, and are increasingly the object of philosophical attention. But what are emotions? What role do emotions play in our lives? Are emotions irrational responses, or might they be essential to theoretical and practical reasoning? In this course we will consider these and other questions of central importance in the philosophy of emotion.