Raúl Ros Morales


Research Summary

My research revolves around the question whether hallucinations have the same phenomenal character as perceptual experiences, and what implications do answers to that question have for theories of perception. In my research, I examine different theories of perception to investigate which provides the best account of the phenomenal nature of hallucination. This requires me to explore and resolve important questions in the philosophy of mind:

(1) how cognition and sensation are related;
(2) how introspection functions to determine whether a particular mental state is sensory or cognitive in nature;
(3) whether people are reliable about their own experiences. This third question is particularly significant. While the traditional view of hallucination has led some people to a sceptical position, questioning whether perception gives us knowledge of the world, non-traditional—disjunctivist views—raise a new radical sceptical possibility that we lack knowledge of our own minds. Recently, I have challenged different approaches to naïve realism (including disjunctivism)—the view that the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences is constituted by the worldly objects and properties that one is perceiving—by posing problems concerning the phenomenal nature of hallucinations.


  • Reviewed Work: John R. Searle, Seeing things as they are, New York, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 235. Journal: Teorema. (May 2017).


I have been awarded grants of £735 from College of Arts University of Glasgow, £1000 from Mind Philosophy Association, £1000 from Scots Philosophical Association and £500 from Analysis to fund a conference: Dreams, Hallucinations and Imagination (2018).


  • “The no phenomenology view and the screening-off problem” (Talk), University of Murcia (11th January 2019).
  • “Late naïve conjunctivism and the argument from hallucination” (talk) for the Postgraduate Seminar at The University of Glasgow on (23rd November 2018).
  • “The Screening-off Problem: The fall of the no phenomenology view” (talk) for the Postgraduate Seminar at The University of Glasgow on 11/05/2018.
  • Presentation of my thesis “The Phenomenal Nature of Hallucination” for the association Glasgow Skeptics “Three researchers and a flipchart” (12th February 2018).
  • Poster presentation for the conference Forms of Knowledge at The University of Edinburgh. Tittle: The Phenomenal Nature of Hallucination (8th November 2017).
  • College of Arts Excellence Postgraduate Scholarship (2017-2020). The University of Glasgow: Collage of Arts
  • Award for the best academic record (2014-2015) from University of Murcia.


  • Philosophy 1A: How should I think?
  • Philosophy 1B: How should I live?