Daniella Meehan

Daniella Meehan

Research Title

Moral Responsibility and the Vice of Ignorance

Research Summary

My primary research lies in the intersection between epistemology and ethics, specifically vice epistemology and epistemic responsibility. I am specifically interested in the analysis of intellectual vices such as ignorance, close-mindedness and epistemic injustice, and what it takes for people who possess these to be blameworthy. My aim is to form a novel account of intellectual vices which has blameworthiness as a constitute and central feature, where blameworthiness is understood as a distinct form of epistemic blame. My research aims to show why a blame-centred account of vice offers important theoretical advantages others have overlooked, offering the first in-depth study on the relationship between vice and blameworthiness.

Outside of my research on vice epistemology and blame, I am generally interested in applied epistemology, with regards to epistemic rights and epistemic injustice.


  • Meehan, D., 2019. [forthcoming]. Is Epistemic Blame Distinct from Moral Blame? Logos and Episteme.  
  • Meehan, D., 2017. Does Sarah Stroud's Account of Epistemic Partiality Conflict with Evidentialism? British Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy, 2(11), pp.18-25.  
  • Meehan, D., 2016. Are We Born Into Our Identity & Do We Have the Ability to Change It? VOXPolitics and Philosophy Journal (26), pp.4-8. 



  • McGlashan Charitable Trust Scholarship, 2018 
  • SUN Tuition Scholarship - Central European University Summer School in Philosophy, 2018



‘Is Epistemic Blame Distinct from Moral Blame?‘
Contemporary Issues Across Ethics and Epistemology Graduate Conference 
University of Pavia, June 2018 

'Does Sarah Stroud's Account of Epistemic Partiality Conflict with Evidentialism?'
British Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy Conference 
University of Cambridge, July 2017  

'Effective Altruism and Utilitarianism'
University of Sheffield, November 2016 

'An Introduction to Effective Altruism' 
University of York, October 2016  

'Intuitions about Moral Judgements: Experimental Philosophy'  
Open Minds XI Conference 
University of Manchester,  December 2015

Additional Information

Academic Positions:

  • Philosophy postgraduate research representative for the University of Glasgow
  • Research internship in Philosophy and Linguistics, University of East Anglia, (2015)  
  • Junior research assistant, Manchester Metropolitan University, (2014)


  • Member of University of Glasgow’s epistemology research group ‘COGITO’