Microtheory: Persuasion with correlation neglect

Professor Ines Moreno de Barreda, University of Oxford

'Persuasion with Correlation Neglect: A Full Manipulation Result' (co-authored by G. Levy and R. Razin)
Tuesday 28 September, 1.00pm-2.30pm
Zoom online seminar

Register now


We consider an information design problem in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver that has "correlation neglect", i.e. fails to understand that signals might be correlated. We show that a sender with unlimited number of signals can fully manipulate the receiver. Specifically, the sender can induce the receiver to hold any state-dependent posterior she wishes to. If the sender only wishes to induce a state-independent posterior, she can use fully correlated signals, but generally she needs to design more involved correlation structures.


Ines Moreno de Barreda is an Associate Professor at the Economics Department of the University of Oxford. Her research focuses on Information Economics, in particular the transmission of information, information design, and signalling games. She has also worked on the design of contests and voting rules.

Further information: business-events@glasgow.ac.uk 

First published: 16 September 2021