The following volumes are planned or have arisen from events held under the auspices of the Centre.

  • Brady, M. S. and Fricker, M. (eds.) The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives, Oxford University Press
  • Brown, D. and Macpherson, F. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook to the Philosophy of Colour, Routledge
  • Dorsch, F. and Macpherson, F. (eds.) Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory, Oxford University Press
  • Dorsch, F., Macpherson, F. and Nida-Rumelin, M. (eds.) Phenomenal Presence, Oxford University Press
  • Macpherson, F. and Platchias, D. (eds.) Representationalism, MIT Press


Macpherson, F. and Platchias, D. (eds.) (2013) Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology, MIT Press

Listen to a Philosophy Bites Podcast about Hallucination featuring Fiona Macpherson

Read the introductory essay ‘The Philosophy and Psychology of Hallucination: An Introduction’ by Fiona Macpherson


“A vital addition to the literature on perception. Macpherson and Platchias have put together a lively, informative, and provocative collection of essays on hallucination. The scientific essays take us far beyond glib philosophical examples — Lady Macbeth’s dagger and so on. The philosophical sections relate to recent controversies: the much discussed doctrine of ‘naive realism’ and reflections on what hallucination teaches us about the nature of perceptual experience in general.” —Mohan Matthen, Canada Research Chair in Philosophy, University of Toronto

“Hallucination is the definitive collection on the philosophy and psychology of hallucination, offering a wide range of perspectives on this fascinating phenomenon. Macpherson provides a marvelous introduction, zeroing in with characteristic acuity on issues surrounding hallucination raised by experimental psychology, the metaphysics of perception, and epistemology.” —Susanna Siegel, Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University

Review in Metapsychology by Sascha Benjamin Fink

German newspaper Der Tagesspiegel has an article on the volume

Brady, M. S. (2013) Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience, Oxford University Press


“The author’s patient approach to criticism, unwavering clarity, and plain old philosophical good sense make the book an unparalleled entry to debates about emotions and knowledge.” —John M. Monteleone, Hobart and William Smith Colleges

Review in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Macpherson, F. (ed.) (2011) The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press

Download the introductory essay ‘Individuating the Senses’ by Macpherson.

Read the review of the book in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews by Peter W. Ross.

Read the review of the book in The Philosophical Quarterly by Louise Richardson.

The book was commented on by Mohan Matthen in the New APPS blog.

The Admissible Contents of Experience, Wiley-Blackwell

Download the introductory essay ‘The Admissible Contents of Experience’ by Macpherson.

Also appearing (without the introductory essay) as a special edition of The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 59, Issue 236, July 2009.

Brady, M. (ed.) (2010) New Waves in Metaethics, Palgrave

Metaethical questions have occupied some of the greatest philosophers: Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, Hume and Nietzsche, amongst many others, have all written on issues about the nature of moral thinking and moral practice. In the last 40 years, interest in metaethics has increased greatly, driven by developments in other areas of philosophy—principally, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics and philosophical psychology. This collection presents original and ground-breaking research on metaethical issues from some of the very best younger philosophers working in this field.

Further information

Haddock, A. and Macpherson, F. (eds.) (2008) Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford University Press

Reprinted in paperback in July 2011.

Download the introductory essay ‘Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism’ by Haddock and Macpherson.

The whole book is available online at Oxford Scholarship Online.

Read the review of the book in Mind by Kieran Setiya.

Read the review of the book in the Times Literary Supplement by Tim Crane.

Read the review of the book in the European Journal of Philosophy by Fabian Dorsch.

Brady, M. S. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) (2003) Moral and Epistemic Virtues, Wiley-Blackwell

A collection of cutting edge articles by leading figures in the field of virtue theory including Guy Axtell, Julia Driver, Antony Duff and Miranda Fricker, this volume brings together papers by some of the leading figures working on virtue-theoretic accounts in both ethics and epistemology.

Further information


Cowan, R. (2015) Clarifying ethical intuitionism. European Journal of Philosophy, 23(4), pp. 1097-1116. (doi: 10.1111/ejop.12031)

Corns, J. (2012) When is a reason properly pragmatic? Consciousness and Cognition, 21(2), pp. 613-614. (doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.03.011)

Bain, D.T. (2011) The imperative view of pain. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18(9-10), pp. 164-185.

Macpherson, F. (2010) Impossible figures. In: Goldstein, E.B. (ed.) Encyclopedia of Perception. SAGE Publications, Inc. ISBN 9781412940818

Macpherson, F. (2011) Cross-modal experiences. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 111(3), pp. 429-468. (doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00317.x)

Bain, D.T. (2007) Color, externalism and switch cases. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 45(3), pp. 335-362. (doi: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2007.tb00055.x)

Brady, M.S. and Pritchard, D. (2005) Epistemological contextualism: problems and prospects. Philosophical Quarterly, 55(219), pp. 161-171. (doi: 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00393.x)

Macpherson, F. (2013) Can science tell us that we smell? Comments on Richardson's "Favour, Taste, and Smell" (Mind & Language, 28(3): 322-341). Brains Blog,

Macpherson, F. (2014) The space of sensory modalities. In: Stokes, D., Matthen, M. and Biggs, S. (eds.) Perception and its Modalities. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199832798

Macpherson, F. (2005) Colour inversion problems for representationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70(1), pp. 127-152.

Macpherson, F. and Haddock, A. (2008) Introduction: varieties of disjunctivism. In: Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199231546 (doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0001)

Brady, M.S. (2008) Value and fitting emotions. Journal of Value Inquiry, 42(4), pp. 465-475. (doi: 10.1007/s10790-008-9134-8)

Macpherson, F. (2010) A disjunctive theory of introspection: a reflection on zombies and Anton's syndrome. Philosophical Issues, 20(1), pp. 226-265. (doi: 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2010.00187.x)

Cowan, R. (2015) Perceptual intuitionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 90(1), pp. 164-193. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12023)

Wilson, K. (2014) Review of: Charles Travis, Perception: Essays after Frege. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2014, [Book Review]

Brady, M.S. and Pritchard, D. (2006) Epistemic Virtue and Virtue Epistemology [Special issue]. Philosophical Studies, 130, pp. 1-152.

Macpherson, F. (2014) Is the sense-data theory a representationalist theory? Ratio, 27(4), pp. 369-392. (doi: 10.1111/rati.12085)

Cowan, R. (2014) Review of: Moral Perception by Robert Audi. Mind, 123(492), pp. 1167-1171. (doi: 10.1093/mind/fzu155)[Book Review]

Wilson, K. A. (2013) Reid's direct realism and visible figure. Philosophy Quarterly, 63(253), pp. 783-803. (doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2013.02002.x)

Bain, D.T. (2004) Private languages and private theorists. Philosophical Quarterly, 54(216), pp. 427-434. (doi: 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00362.x)

Brady, M.S. (2009) The irrationality of recalcitrant emotions. Philosophical Studies, 145(3), pp. 413-430. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-008-9241-1)

Brady, M.S. (2004) Against agent-based virtue ethics. Philosophical Papers, 33(1), pp. 1-10.

Brady, M.S. (2005) The value of the virtues. Philosophical Studies, 125(1), pp. 85-113. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-005-7788-7)

Macpherson, F. (2006) Ambiguous figures and the content of experience. Noûs, 40(1), pp. 82-117. (doi: 10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00602.x)

Bain, D. (2013) Pains that don't hurt. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92(2), pp. 305-320. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2013.822399)

Wilson, K. (2013) Perception and reality. New Philosopher, 1(2), pp. 104-107.

Brady, M.S. (2006) Appropriate attitudes and the value problem. American Philosophical Quarterly, 43(1), pp. 91-99.

Brady, M.S. (2010) Disappointment. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 84(1), pp. 179-198. (doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2010.00191.x)

Macpherson, F. (2004) Review of A.D. Smith 'The Problem of Perception' (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). Philosophical Books, 45(3), pp. 256-257. [Book Review]

Macpherson, F. (2007) Synaesthesia, Functionalism and Phenomenology. In: De Caro, M., Ferretti, F. and Marraffa, M. (eds.) Cartographies of the Mind. Philsophy and Psychology in Intersection. Series: Studies in brain and mind, 4. Springer Verlag. ISBN 9781402054433

Macpherson, F. (2013) The philosophy and psychology of hallucination: an introduction. In: Macpherson, F. and Platchais, D. (eds.) Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, pp. 1-38. ISBN 9780262019200

Bain, D.T. (2007) The location of pains. Philosophical Papers, 36(2), pp. 171-205.

Corns, J. (2014) Unpleasantness, motivational oomph, and painfulness. Mind and Language, 29(2), pp. 238-254. (doi: 10.1111/mila.12048)

Bain, D. (2005) Daniel Dennett: Reconciling Science and Our Self-Conception by Matthew Elton. Philosophical Quarterly, 55(219), pp. 353-380. (doi: 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00405.x)[Book Review]

Bain, D. and Brady, M. (Eds.) (2014) Pain and Pleasure [Special Issue of Review of Philosophy and Psychology]. Springer.

Macpherson, F. (2012) Cognitive penetration of colour experience: rethinking the issue in light of an indirect mechanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(1), pp. 24-62. (doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00481.x)

Macpherson, F. (2015) The structure of experience, the nature of the visual, and type 2 blindsight. Consciousness and Cognition, 32, pp. 104-128. (doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2014.10.011) (PMID:25481513)

Bain, D.T. (2012) What makes pains unpleasant? Philosophical Studies, (doi: 10.1007/s11098-012-0049-7)

Macpherson, F. (2006) Property dualism and the merits of solutions to the mind-body problem: a reply to Strawson. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(10-11), pp. 72-89.

Macpherson, F. (2009) Perception, Philosophical Perspectives. In: Bayne, T., Cleeremans, A. and Wilken, P. (eds.) Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198569510

Locatelli, R. and Wilson, K. A. (2017) Introduction: perception without representation. Topoi, 36(2), pp. 197-212. (doi: 10.1007/s11245-017-9460-1)

Corns, J. (2014) The inadequacy of unitary characterizations of pain. Philosophical Studies, 169(3), pp. 355-378. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-013-0186-7)

Wilson, K. A. (2018) Are the senses silent? Travis’s argument from Looks. In: Collins, J. and Dobler, T. (eds.) The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Language, Thought, and Perception. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 199-221. ISBN 9780198783916 (doi:10.1093/oso/9780198783916.003.0010)

Brady, M.S. (2007) Recalcitrant emotions and visual illusions. American Philosophical Quarterly, 44(3), pp. 273-284.

Cowan, R. (2014) Cognitive penetrability and ethical perception. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 6(4), pp. 665-682. (doi: 10.1007/s13164-014-0185-4)

Brady, M.S. (2010) Virtue, emotion and attention. Metaphilosophy, 41(1-2), pp. 115-131. (doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01620.x)

Bain, D. (2010) Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study, edited by Murat Aydede. Mind, 119(474), pp. 451-456. (doi: 10.1093/mind/fzq018)[Book Review]

Bain, D.T. (2009) McDowell and the presentation of pains. Philosophical Topics, 37(1), pp. 1-24. (doi: 10.5840/philtopics200937113)

Bain, D. and Brady, M. (2014) Pain, pleasure, and unpleasure. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 5(1), pp. 1-14. (doi: 10.1007/s13164-014-0176-5)

Macpherson, F. (2011) Taxonomising the senses. Philosophical Studies, 153(1), pp. 123-142. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-010-9643-8)