Daniella Meehan

Research title: Moral Responsibility and the Vice of Ignorance

Research Summary

My primary research lies in the intersection between epistemology and ethics, specifically vice epistemology and epistemic responsibility. I am interested in the analysis of intellectual vices such as arrogance, closed-mindedness and dogmatism, and what it takes for people who possess these to be deemed blameworthy. My aim is to form a novel account of intellectual vice which argues that blame is a constitutive feature of vice, where blame is understood as a distinct form of epistemic blame. My research aims to show why a blame-centred account of vice offers important theoretical advantages others have overlooked, offering the first in-depth study on the relationship between vice and blame.

Outside of my research on vice epistemology, I am also interested in other areas of ‘non-ideal’ epistemology (epistemic injustice, epistemic rights and distrust), alongside political, applied and feminist epistemology. 


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Jump to: 2019
Number of items: 1.


Meehan, D. (2019) Is epistemic blame distinct from moral blame? Logos and Episteme, 10(2), pp. 183-194.

This list was generated on Sun Aug 1 00:01:09 2021 BST.
Jump to: Articles
Number of items: 1.


Meehan, D. (2019) Is epistemic blame distinct from moral blame? Logos and Episteme, 10(2), pp. 183-194.

This list was generated on Sun Aug 1 00:01:09 2021 BST.


  • Postgraduate Research Community Building & Public Engagement Funding, 2019 & 2020
  • University of Amsterdam Conference Grant,  2019
  • MIND, Analysis and SPA funding secured for conference 'Epistemic Norms, Functions and Virtues', University of Glasgow
  • Society Applied Philosophy Postgraduate Travel Award, 2019 
  • University of Glasgow Research Support Award, (February & June) 2019 
  • SIFA (Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy) Bursary - Urbino Summer School in Epistemology, 2019
  • McGlashan Charitable Trust Scholarship, 2018 
  • SUN Tuition Scholarship - Central European University Summer School in Philosophy, 2018 



  • Blameworthy Vices, University of Glasgow, March


  • Intellectual Vices and Epistemic Responsibility, University of Liverpool, Individual and Collective Vices, December (invited) 
  • Epistemic Nudging and Intellectual Vice, Political Philosophy Network II, Amsterdam, December
  • Epistemic Trust, Distrust and Vice, Virtues, Media and Democracy, University of Genoa, September
  • An Account of Epistemic Vice, University of Sheffield, July 
  • Public Philosophy, Coatbridge Library, April
  • Two Accounts of Epistemic Vice, University of Glasgow, May
  • Vices of the Mind (discussant-at-large) University of Nottingham, March (invited) 


  • Is Epistemic Blame Distinct from Moral Blame?, Contemporary Issues Across Ethics and Epistemology Graduate Conference, University of Pavia, June


  • Does Sarah Stroud’s Account of Epistemic Partiality Conflict with Evidentialism?, British Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy Conference, University of Cambridge, July 2017 


  • Effective Altruism and Utilitarianism, University of Sheffield, November 2016 (invited) 
  • An Introduction to Effective Altruism, University of York, October 2016


  • Intuitions about Moral Judgements: Experimental Philosophy, University of Manchester, December 2015 


Level 1 (SCQF Level 7)

  • Philosophy 1A: How Should I Think? 
  • Philosophy 1B: How Should I Live?

Additional Information

Other Positions:

  • Exam Invigilator, University of Glasgow (2019)
  • Co-founder of the Philosophy Cafe, Coatbridge Library (ongoing)
  • Philosophy postgraduate research representative, University of Glasgow (2019)
  • President of Effective Altruism York (2015-16)
  • Research intern in Philosophy and Linguistics, University of East Anglia, (2015)  
  • Junior research assistant, Manchester Metropolitan University, (2014)


  • Member of University of Glasgow’s epistemology research centre ‘COGITO’ 
  • Member of Glasgow Minorities and Philosophy