Daniella Meehan

  • Email: Daniella.Meehan@glasgow.ac.uk
  • Address: University of Glasgow, Philosophy, 67 Oakfield Avenue, Glasgow, G12 8QQ
  • https://www.daniellameehan.com/

Research title: Intellectual Vices and Epistemic Responsibility

Research Summary

My primary research lies in the intersection between epistemology and ethics, specifically vice epistemology and epistemic responsibility. I am interested in the analysis of intellectual vices such as arrogance, closed-mindedness and dogmatism, and what it takes for people who possess these to be deemed blameworthy. My aim is to form a novel account of intellectual vice which argues that blame is a constitutive feature of vice, where blame is understood as a distinct form of epistemic blame. My research aims to show why a blame-centred account of vice offers important theoretical advantages others have overlooked, offering the first in-depth study on the relationship between vice and blame.

Outside of my research on vice epistemology, I am also interested in other areas of ‘non-ideal’ epistemology (epistemic injustice, epistemic corruption and distrust), alongside political, applied and feminist epistemology, and the philosophy of language (silencing, testimony and assertion). 

Publications

List by: Type | Date

Jump to: 2020 | 2019
Number of items: 4.

2020

Meehan, D. (2020) Responsibilities of the Media: Are Journalist’s Responsible for Publishing the Truth? [Website]

Meehan, D. (2020) Epistemic vice and epistemic nudging: a solution? In: Axtell, G. and Bernal, A. (eds.) Epistemic Paternalism: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications. Series: Collective studies in knowledge and society. Rowman & Littlefield: London ; New York. ISBN 9781786615732

2019

Carter, J. A. and Meehan, D. (2019) Vices of distrust. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 8(10), pp. 25-32.

Meehan, D. (2019) Is epistemic blame distinct from moral blame? Logos and Episteme, 10(2), pp. 183-194.

This list was generated on Mon Oct 25 11:12:12 2021 BST.
Number of items: 4.

Articles

Carter, J. A. and Meehan, D. (2019) Vices of distrust. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 8(10), pp. 25-32.

Meehan, D. (2019) Is epistemic blame distinct from moral blame? Logos and Episteme, 10(2), pp. 183-194.

Book Sections

Meehan, D. (2020) Epistemic vice and epistemic nudging: a solution? In: Axtell, G. and Bernal, A. (eds.) Epistemic Paternalism: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications. Series: Collective studies in knowledge and society. Rowman & Littlefield: London ; New York. ISBN 9781786615732

Website

Meehan, D. (2020) Responsibilities of the Media: Are Journalist’s Responsible for Publishing the Truth? [Website]

This list was generated on Mon Oct 25 11:12:12 2021 BST.

Grants

  • Society of Applied Philosophy Doctoral Scholarship, (2020-21)
  • Royal Institute of Philosophy Bursary, (2020-21)
  • Conference Grant, University of Madrid (2020) 
  • Postgraduate Research Community Building & Public Engagement Funding, (2019 & 2020)
  • Conference Grant, University of Amsterdam (2019)
  • MIND, Analysis and SPA funding secured for conference 'Epistemic Norms, Functions and Virtues', University of Glasgow (postponed
  • Society Applied Philosophy Postgraduate Travel Award, (2019)
  • University of Glasgow Research Support Award, (February & June 2019)
  • SIFA (Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy) Bursary, Urbino Summer School in Epistemology, (2019)
  • McGlashan Charitable Trust Scholarship, (2018-19)
  • SUN Tuition Scholarship - Central European University Summer School in Philosophy, (2018)

Conference

2021

  • TBA University of Glasgow Philosophy Society, October (invited) 
  • Epistemology of the Internet, University of Johannesburg, November 
  • Public Vices: Individual and Collective Vice, University of Genoa, September 
  • Vice and Corruption, SOPhiA 2021 - Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy, University of Salzburg, September 
  • Responsibility for Epistemic Vice: Harms, Intentions and Responsibility, University of Zagreb, September 
  • Trust and Institutional Vice, Institutional Trustworthiness, MANCEPT Workshop in Political Theory, September 
  • Epistemic Blame and Vice, Munich Centre for Ethics, 2nd Munich Graduate Conference in Ethics, September 
  • Epistemic Corruption and the Media, Postgraduate Seminar, University of Glasgow, June 
  • Interventions for Perfection, University of Kansai, February ​(invited)

2020

  • Blameworthy Vices, University of Glasgow, COGITO workshop, July 
  • Epistemic Corruption and the Media, University of Glasgow, Postgraduate Seminar, June
  • A Normative Account of Epistemic Vice, University of Madrid (postponed)

2019

  • Intellectual Vices and Epistemic Responsibility, University of Liverpool, Individual and Collective Vices, December (invited) 
  • Epistemic Nudging and Intellectual Vice, Political Philosophy Network II, Amsterdam, December
  • Epistemic Trust, Distrust and Vice, Virtues, Media and Democracy, University of Genoa, September
  • An Account of Epistemic Vice, University of Sheffield, July 
  • Public Philosophy, Coatbridge Library, April
  • Two Accounts of Epistemic Vice, University of Glasgow, May
  • Vices of the Mind (discussant-at-large) University of Nottingham, March (invited) 

2018

  • Is Epistemic Blame Distinct from Moral Blame?, Contemporary Issues Across Ethics and Epistemology Graduate Conference, University of Pavia, June

2017

  • Does Sarah Stroud’s Account of Epistemic Partiality Conflict with Evidentialism?, British Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy Conference, University of Cambridge, July 2017 

2016

  • Effective Altruism and Utilitarianism, University of Sheffield, November 2016 (invited) 
  • An Introduction to Effective Altruism, University of York, October 2016

2015 

  • Intuitions about Moral Judgements: Experimental Philosophy, University of Manchester, December 2015 

Teaching

University of Glasgow Level 1 (SCQF Level 7) 

  • Philosophy 1A: How Should I Think? 

  • Philosophy 1B: How Should I Live?

University of Glasgow Level 2 (SCQF Level 8)

  • Philosophy 2A: What Am I?

  • Philosophy 2B: What is There?

I also recently completed training for the Associate Fellowship of Recognizing Excellence in Teaching award (April, 2021). This award is a professional recognition of expertise in teaching and supporting learning. 

 

Additional Information

Other Positions:

  • Co-director of MAP (Minorities in Philosophy) (2020-) 
  • Women in Philosophy Mentor (2020-)
  • Researcher for Stop Funding Hate (2020-)
  • Exam Invigilator, University of Glasgow (2019)
  • COGITO Impact and Engagement Officer (2019-)
  • Co-founder of the Philosophy Cafe, Coatbridge Library (2019-)
  • Philosophy postgraduate research representative, University of Glasgow (2019)
  • President of Effective Altruism York (2015-16)
  • Research intern in Philosophy and Linguistics, University of East Anglia, (2015)  
  • Junior research assistant, Manchester Metropolitan University, (2014)

Affiliation:

  • Member of University of Glasgow’s epistemology research centre COGITO 
  • Member of Glasgow's MAP Chapter