Daniella Meehan
- Email: d.meehan.1[at]research.gla.ac.uk
- Address: University of Glasgow, Philosophy, 67 Oakfield Avenue, Glasgow, G12 8QQ
- https://glasgow.academia.edu/DaniellaMeehan
Research title: Moral Responsibility and the Vice of Ignorance
Research Summary
My primary research lies in the intersection between epistemology and ethics, specifically vice epistemology and epistemic responsibility. I am interested in the analysis of intellectual vices such as arrogance, closed-mindedness and dogmatism, and what it takes for people who possess these to be deemed blameworthy. My aim is to form a novel account of intellectual vice which argues that blame is a constitutive feature of vice, where blame is understood as a distinct form of epistemic blame. My research aims to show why a blame-centred account of vice offers important theoretical advantages others have overlooked, offering the first in-depth study on the relationship between vice and blame.
Outside of my research on vice epistemology, I am also interested in other areas of ‘non-ideal’ epistemology (epistemic injustice, epistemic rights and distrust), alongside political, applied and feminist epistemology.
Supervisors
Grants
- Postgraduate Research Community Building & Public Engagement Funding, 2019 & 2020
- University of Amsterdam Conference Grant, 2019
- MIND, Analysis and SPA funding secured for conference 'Epistemic Norms, Functions and Virtues', University of Glasgow
- Society Applied Philosophy Postgraduate Travel Award, 2019
- University of Glasgow Research Support Award, (February & June) 2019
- SIFA (Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy) Bursary - Urbino Summer School in Epistemology, 2019
- McGlashan Charitable Trust Scholarship, 2018
- SUN Tuition Scholarship - Central European University Summer School in Philosophy, 2018
Conference
2020
- Blameworthy Vices, University of Glasgow, March
2019
- Intellectual Vices and Epistemic Responsibility, University of Liverpool, Individual and Collective Vices, December (invited)
- Epistemic Nudging and Intellectual Vice, Political Philosophy Network II, Amsterdam, December
- Epistemic Trust, Distrust and Vice, Virtues, Media and Democracy, University of Genoa, September
- An Account of Epistemic Vice, University of Sheffield, July
- Public Philosophy, Coatbridge Library, April
- Two Accounts of Epistemic Vice, University of Glasgow, May
- Vices of the Mind (discussant-at-large) University of Nottingham, March (invited)
2018
- Is Epistemic Blame Distinct from Moral Blame?, Contemporary Issues Across Ethics and Epistemology Graduate Conference, University of Pavia, June
2017
- Does Sarah Stroud’s Account of Epistemic Partiality Conflict with Evidentialism?, British Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy Conference, University of Cambridge, July 2017
2016
- Effective Altruism and Utilitarianism, University of Sheffield, November 2016 (invited)
- An Introduction to Effective Altruism, University of York, October 2016
2015
- Intuitions about Moral Judgements: Experimental Philosophy, University of Manchester, December 2015
Teaching
Level 1 (SCQF Level 7)
- Philosophy 1A: How Should I Think?
- Philosophy 1B: How Should I Live?
Additional Information
Other Positions:
- Exam Invigilator, University of Glasgow (2019)
- Co-founder of the Philosophy Cafe, Coatbridge Library (ongoing)
- Philosophy postgraduate research representative, University of Glasgow (2019)
- President of Effective Altruism York (2015-16)
- Research intern in Philosophy and Linguistics, University of East Anglia, (2015)
- Junior research assistant, Manchester Metropolitan University, (2014)
Affiliation:
- Member of University of Glasgow’s epistemology research centre ‘COGITO’
- Member of Glasgow Minorities and Philosophy
