

## Programme

### *11th April*

8.30 – 9.30 Registration & Coffee

9.00 – 10.30 Professor Sophie-Grace Chappell (The Open University): Le bon Dieu n'est pas comme ça: transgender in theory and in experience

15' Break

10.45 – 12.00 Sara Chan (University of Oxford): The Minority Mind: Cognitive and Psychological Disability as Mere Difference

12.00 – 13.00 Lunch

13.00 – 14.15. Dr Paul Morrow (Utrecht): Categorization, Persecution, Denial: Legal Norms and the Etiology of Mass Atrocities

10' Break

14.25 – 15.40 Robert Pal-Wallin (Lund University): The Victim's Dilemma: To Blame or Not to Blame?

15.40 – 16.00 Coffee Break

16.00 – 17.30 Professor Alessandra Tanesini (Cardiff University): Arrogance, Ignorance, and Privilege

19.30 Dinner @ the Left Bank

### *12th April*

9.00 – 10.30 Dr Jade Fletcher (University of Edinburgh): TBA

15' Coffee Break

10.45 – 12.00 Lysette Chaproniere (University of Glasgow): Disability and Enhancement: A Salient Limitations Model

12.00 – 13.00 Lunch

13.00 – 14.15. Ravit Dotan (UC Berkeley): The Sexual Eligibility Criterion for Marriage

10' Break

14.25 – 15.40 Lee Wilson (University of Edinburgh): Voluntary Servitude and the Explanatory Problem of False Consciousness

15.40 – 16.00 Coffee Break

16.00 – 17.30 Dr Mona Simion (University of Glasgow): Victim Testimony

## Speakers and Abstracts

### *Keynote Speakers:*

Professor Sophie-Grace Chappell (The Open University)

Dr Jade Fletcher (University of Edinburgh)

Professor Alessandra Tanesini (Cardiff University)

Dr Mona Simion (University of Glasgow)

### *Confirmed Speakers:*

**Sara Chan** (University of Oxford)

Short Bio: "I am reading for a masters in philosophy at the University of Oxford. I am also junior dean of Blackfriars Hall, a small graduate students college specializing in philosophy and theology. I currently work in the philosophy of psychology, moral philosophy and bioethics, and am particularly interested in issues surrounding the vulnerable and the marginalized. In addition, however, I am also interested in Ancient and Medieval philosophy."

Title: **The Minority Mind: Cognitive and Psychological Disability as Mere Difference**

Abstract: Disability is normally portrayed as a tragedy and this is reflected in the most dominant philosophical account of disability, for example, conceives of it as a defective departure from the normal functioning of a species, in a way that restricts one's opportunities. Against this dominant narrative, however, disability pride movements argue that that being disabled is not inherently a tragedy, that they value their disability and that they would not choose to become non-disabled if given the opportunity to do so. Taking her cue from such disability-positive testimony, the philosopher Elizabeth Barnes has recently argued for what she calls a "mere difference view" of physical disability, that is, the view that absent a context of able-ism, so-called disabilities may not be intrinsically bad (or good) for well-being. Notably, the mere difference view does not imply (implausibly) that there is nothing intrinsically bad about a disability, it merely insists that the condition as a whole is not intrinsically bad because the condition is more than just the defective functioning.

In light of similar testimony in the neurodiversity movement, this paper explores whether it is possible to extend the mere difference view to cognitive and psychological disabilities. One main concern for my project is the fact that mental disorders are typically characterized by impaired evaluative abilities, either because of impaired cognition or emotional duress, thus calling into question reliability of the disability-positive testimony, upon which Barnes's account is based. I begin, therefore, by discussing some issues with testimony and proposing

a shift away from over-reliance on testimony as the basis of the mere-difference view of disability. Disability-positive testimony, I argue, gives reason to seriously consider the mere-difference view but must be supplemented with an account of how disability does not preclude full flourishing. Moreover, I argue, this account will then become the foundation of the mere-difference view of disability in general, which allows side-stepping the issues surrounding the reliability of testimony when it comes to the cognitively and psychologically disabled.

Finally, I attempt to develop just such an account of the flourishing of the disabled from the ground up, that is, from the individual instantiations of disability to disability in general: First, I introduce the idea of extrinsic essential properties to capture the features that depend on environmental factors to actualize, but are still determined by the nature of the disability, and so should rightly be included in the evaluation of the normativity of that disability. Second, I differentiate between properties of a disability that are actualised, and those that are potential (that is, that do not obtain because of factors lacking in the environment). Third, I differentiate between different contexts in which one should focus on disabilities as instantiated in individuals as opposed to disabilities in general, and argue that whereas in the former case only actualised essential properties matter, in the latter case all the ways in which a disability may interact with different environment matters, weighted, perhaps, by the likelihood of each environment obtaining.

**Lysette Chaproniere** (University of Glasgow)

Short Bio: I am a first year PhD student at the University of Glasgow. Broadly speaking, I am interested in normative ethics, political philosophy, and social and applied epistemology. More specifically, in addition to the work I am presenting on disability and enhancement, I am starting to think about education and talent. I have previously worked on adaptive preferences, aiming to answer the question: if most people think a life circumstance such as being disabled is bad, but some disabled people say they don't mind or even like it, what sources of evidence should we use to decide whether those people have adapted to their circumstances to cope with a bad situation, or if their testimony really does show that disability isn't necessarily bad? I remain fascinated by the ways our desires and preferences can change, potentially lessening our ability to know what it would be like to live a different sort of life. Prior to taking Glasgow's Philosophy MLitt, I studied for a BA in Creative Writing at Manchester Metropolitan University.

Title: **Disability and Enhancement: A Salient Limitations Model**

Abstract: In this paper, I aim to create a practical framework to help us think about disability and human enhancement technologies in relation to each other. I do this by proposing a

model in which the lack of an enhancement can sometimes count as a disability. I begin by outlining three models of disability: the normal functioning account, the social model, and Kahane and Savulescu's welfarist account, considering what can be learned from these views but showing why each is inadequate. I then describe my own model, under which a disability is a limitation of the body or mind made salient by the social context. I argue that introducing enhancements into a society changes the social context; as more people take up enhancements, characteristics we currently think of as normal human limitations will become disabilities. This, in turn, means that the distinction between treatment and enhancement needs to be drawn differently. Finally, I briefly indicate some potential directions for further research, both philosophical and empirical, into the relationship between disability and enhancement. Given the model I propose, failure to meet our obligations to the unenhanced is not merely analogous to ableism, but is actually an instance of it.

**Ravit Dotan** (UC Berkeley)

Short Bio: "I am a philosophy graduate student at UC Berkeley. I mainly work in epistemology, philosophy of science, and philosophy of machine learning. Mostly, I think about the concept of evidence, the role of values in reasoning, and theory choice. For example, what makes a piece of information evidence for a certain hypothesis rather than another? How do values influence our evaluations of hypotheses? I consider these questions in the context of science, machine learning, day-to-day life, and religion. My secondary area of interest is social philosophy. I am especially interested in analyzing the institution of legal marriage and its influence on marginalized communities, and in understanding what "race" and "gender" are."

Title: **The Sexual Eligibility Criterion for Marriage**

Abstract: Legal marriage confers numerous benefits, advantages, and privileges to those who marry. However, not every relationship is eligible for marriage, or for alternatives such as civil unions and domestic partnerships. Some argue that those who cannot or do not marry are disadvantaged, given that the vast benefits that come with marriage are inaccessible to them. I agree. Any eligibility criterion will cause some disadvantage because it would exclude some groups of people. This paper asks two questions. First, what are the criteria for eligibility for legal marriage in western countries today? Second, which populations are disadvantaged by them?

I argue that in order to be eligible for legal marriage or its alternatives, a relationship must pass as a sexual relationship. By this, I don't mean that only people in sexual relationships can legally marry. Rather, I mean to draw attention to the fact one characteristic of relationships that cannot get the "marriage" status are relationships which are explicitly based on non-

sexual relations. As an example, I discuss sibling relationships. In some cases, siblings choose to spend their lives together, care for each other, share emotional intimacy and commitment, run a joint household, share finances, raise children together, and generally live the kind of lifestyle that couples live. In recent years, siblings who have this kind of relationship and are of the same sex started appealing to courts to get marriage-like statuses, such as domestic or civil partners. Their argument is that the non-sexual nature of their relationship is not a relevant difference between them and sexual couples. However, their appeals are consistently rejected. In reading the judgments, we can see that legal authorities do think that the non-sexual nature of their relationship is a relevant difference. Marriage and its alternatives are legally meant only for those who can pass as having a sexual relationship with each other.

Second, I argue that the sexual eligibility criterion disadvantages those who are already disadvantaged. I discuss three categories of people for whom this sexual criterion is a barrier: those who are not interested in sexual relationships of the “right” kind, those who have less access to sexual relationships of the “right” kind, and those who feel alienated from the marriage institution due to its sexual undertone. I argue that members of marginalized communities, such as women and African-Americans in the US, have special reasons to fall into these categories.

The result is that the sexual eligibility criterion disproportionately disadvantages those who are already disadvantaged. In making the marriage status less available to those who are already disadvantaged, the sexual eligibility criterion makes the vast benefits that come with marriage less accessible to them too. While marriage is often associated with tax benefits, it the benefits that come with marriage are include much more. For example, in the US, there are 1138 federal statutory provisions in which marital status is a factor in eligibility for benefits, rights, and privilege. Among others, these provisions pertain to major health and welfare programs such as social security and food stamps; employment benefits; immigration, naturalization, and aliens’ rights; and loans and guarantees benefits. These benefits are not accessible to those whose significant relationships do not satisfy the sexual eligibility criterion.

### **Paul Morrow (Utrecht)**

Short bio: Paul Morrow is a visiting researcher in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Utrecht University. He received his Ph.D. from Vanderbilt University in 2014. From 2014-2017, he taught in the Program in Political Philosophy, Policy and Law at the University of Virginia, focusing particularly on issues in the philosophy and politics of memory and mass violence. Paul’s work on social norms, propaganda, and Holocaust museums has appeared in *Philosophy, Social Theory and Practice*, and elsewhere. He has recently completed a book manuscript titled “Unconscionable Crimes: How Norms Explain and Constrain Genocide and

Mass Atrocity. For his next project, he plans to look at ethical and epistemological questions related to visual representations of genocide and other mass atrocities.

Title: **Categorization, Persecution, Denial: Legal Norms and the Etiology of Mass Atrocities**

Abstract: This paper analyses the contributions made by legal norms to the etiology of mass atrocity. It focuses on explaining how legal norms help create social categories, legitimate the persecution of marginalized groups, and facilitate denials of discriminatory violence. The paper first identifies two key features of legal norms, namely, (1) their grounding in real or perceived social practices, and (2) the existence of standing procedural rules governing their creation, modification, or elimination. These features help distinguish legal norms from moral norms and from social norms. They also help make sense of the several roles played by legal norms before and during mass atrocities.

Next, the paper turns to the etiology of mass atrocities. After explaining how mass atrocities differ from other group-based harms, I introduce political scientist Deborah Mayersen's eight-stage model of the etiology of genocide. This model, I suggest, can be used to make sense of a broader range of atrocities, including mass killing, mass rape, and forced relocation. What is missing from Mayersen's account is an analysis of the specific contributions made by legal norms to such crimes.

Section Three examines how legal norms help create social outgroups. While law likely could not function without employing categories, many forms of legal categorization are invidious. Political leaders regularly use such categorizations to marginalize members of specific social or political groups. Examples of colonial-era categorizations included in the Hague Conventions, as well as various cases of categorization during the Holocaust, the Khmer Rouge period in Cambodia, and Apartheid-era South Africa, illustrate this dynamic.

Section Four explains how legal norms help state leaders maintain external legitimacy despite widespread internal persecution of minorities. Building on the notion of "sufficient legitimacy" developed by political theorist Alex Bellamy, I show that the mere presence laws prescribing some discriminatory policy can lead to confusion among outsiders about the moral status of that policy. At the same time, the bare existence of laws forbidding certain forms of discriminatory violence can mask the prevalence of abuses. I conclude by considering the case of laws that prompt members of persecuted minorities to participate in their own harming.

Section Five considers in further detail how legal norms aid political leaders seeking to deny discriminatory, group-based violence. Here I distinguish legal norms relating to denials issued while atrocities are ongoing, immediately after they have ended, and in the *longue durée* of the transitions that follow. Laws mandating censorship, or prohibiting the spread of “atrocities stories,” can inhibit reporting on large-scale violence against minorities while it is ongoing. Laws against reporting on past crimes, or instituting amnesties for perpetrators, encourage continued denial after atrocities end.

Legal norms do not illuminate all cases of discriminatory violence against members of marginalized groups. As Claudia Card, Iris Marion Young, and others have shown, there are important forms of structural violence that are not well explained by reference to legal norms. Nevertheless, as this paper shows, some of the most consequential forms of group-based, discriminatory violence against minorities are made possible by legal norms.

### **Robert Pal-Wallin (Lund University)**

bio: Robert Pál-Wallin is a MA student at Lund University in Sweden. He is currently writing his Master’s Thesis titled ‘What is this thing called anger’, in which he explores the nature of anger and defends his positive account called Hedonic Functionalism. Robert’s main areas of research interests include philosophy of emotions, value theory, meta-ethics, moral psychology and feminist theory. His future aspiration is to become a PhD-student and work on the emotions. Apart from his limitless love of philosophy, he’s also greatly passionate about music and always enjoys a nice cup of coffee.

### **Title: The Victim’s Dilemma: To Blame or Not to Blame?**

Abstract: Does it make sense to blame anyone for structural oppression like sexism and racism? The fact that victims of oppression are subjected to abominable harms on a daily basis seems to suggest that they have good reasons to do something that could lead to its eradication. However, if blame is the appropriate means to that end is very much a matter of dispute. In the contemporary philosophical literature on blame, it is commonly taken as a conceptual truth that blameworthiness entails moral responsibility, which makes the issue regarding to whom we should attribute moral responsibility for oppression significantly pressing on behalf of the victims of oppression.

In turn, it is often presupposed that moral responsibility requires that certain objective conditions for moral agency are satisfied. In other words, in order to be a fitting target of moral blame, one needs to be morally responsible for the action or omission that the blame is about, and – by extension – one can only be deemed morally responsible if one fulfils the

objective conditions that are constitutive of moral agency. This renders the unsatisfactory result that it is never appropriate for victims of oppression to blame anyone if it turns out that there is no appropriate agent – either individual or collective – to whom we can assign moral responsibility for oppression.

According to many theorists, structural oppression is not well explained in terms of moral shortcomings of individual agents. Rather, structural oppression must be analysed in terms of social and institutional norms and practises supported by social structures. Thus, it is commonly argued that individual agents cannot be responsible for structural oppression. On the other hand, those unstructured large-scale collectives that are implicated in the upholding of the social structures and practises that enable the persistence of structural oppression commonly fail to satisfy the objective conditions for collective agency, rendering those collectives unfit to be held responsible for structural oppression.

In this paper, I will initially propose a way to circumvent this ‘agency requirement’ for moral responsibility and blameworthiness within the context of structural oppression. Furthermore, I will argue that philosophers working on blame have focused all too much attention on the objective conditions that must be satisfied in order for someone to be deemed a fitting target of blame and that they subsequently have ignored to consider the reasons for blaming from the point of view of the victims. In virtue of this consideration, I will argue that victims of structural oppression actually have both moral and epistemic reasons to blame, independently of whether or not the target of their blame is an actual moral agent and regardless of whether or not the target de facto is morally responsible for having brought the oppression into existence in the first place.

**Lee Wilson** (University of Edinburgh)

Bio: Lee Wilson is a PhD Candidate at the University of Edinburgh, whose research concerns on the relationship between oppression and moral responsibility. Specifically, Lee focuses on the difficulties of certain conceptions of moral responsibility in accounting for blameworthy actions performed under false consciousness. Lee’s secondary interests are largely comparative, involving dialogues across not only various contemporary philosophical traditions but also those traditions of Classical China and Colonial India.

Title: **Voluntary Servitude and the Explanatory Problem of False Consciousness**

Abstract: Actions ranging from discriminating against women in the sciences to police violence against compliant and law-abiding people of colour, are performed not only by members of oppressing social groups, but also sometimes by members of oppressed groups.

The latter are systematically conferred with ranges of unjust constraints that are salient for decision-making, according to which they participate in everyday practices that take either institutional or communal forms. But it seems they are not only constrained in ranges of actions available to them but also in the reasons for such actions, many of which are constituted by false beliefs (e.g. female scientists are less competent and unproductive; or Black Americans committing crime out of character while White Americans do so out of circumstance).

Responding to this apparent 'voluntary servitude', social philosophers often see false consciousness as explanatory: a set of values and attitudes that resist revision in face of counter-evidence, systematically occurring in virtue of, and motivating individuals to perpetuate, structures of oppression. But false consciousness is also often denigrated as explanatorily bankrupt, lacking an adequate philosophical account for an all-too-convenient appeal; as imposing epistemically inaccessible or outright foreign moral standards; or, as implicitly supporting, if not amounting to, victim-blaming. These concerns must be addressed if the concept of false consciousness is to perform its supposed explanatory and critical work. Each problem builds on the previous understanding how agents have pernicious beliefs formed and maintained is crucial to

understanding their epistemic and moral standings, and this subsequently is crucial for understanding how moral agency is affected.

Here, I focus on the explanatory problem, concerning doxastic attitudes constituting motivating reasons for oppressed individuals to act in ways that contribute to their own oppression. A satisfactory solution for this problem must explain:

- i) how such oppressed individuals themselves come to form and maintain certain beliefs as normative;
- (ii) how the beliefs themselves are formed and maintained in the structures within which such individuals are embedded; and
- (iii) how similarly oppressed individuals may nevertheless resist the formation or maintenance of such beliefs.

I argue that a social constructionist explanation satisfies all three: false consciousness' development and persistence is largely explained by the stable (though socio-historical) nature of the relevant objects of those attitudes. Members of oppressed social groups mistake a certain objectified understanding of themselves as natural self-understanding, due to the looping effect and historical stabilisation of pre-existing structures of oppression. That

an individual may have multiplicities of group memberships, acquiring varying modes and complexes of selfunderstandings, accounts for the possibility of resistance.

In doing so, I will also find three previous approaches to the explanatory problem lacking: functionalism, psychologism, and epistemic oppression, arguing that they do not adequately resolve the explanatory problem, failing to satisfy all three conditions. Still, I hope to show that the socialconstructionist approach not only provides the best solution for the explanatory problem but also a more comprehensive and robust framework for the other existing approaches

### **Registration and Important Info**

The MAP Workshop 2019 is generously sponsored by The Mind Association and the Scots Philosophical Association.

We are able to offer a 2-night hotel stay for all keynote and contributed speakers, and reimburse travel cost up to £46.60 for all postgraduate speakers.

Attendance is free, but registration is required. In order to register to the workshop, please email us at [glasgowmap@gmail.com](mailto:glasgowmap@gmail.com), including “Registration MAP workshop” in the email subject. Unfortunately, we are not able to provide funding opportunities to non-speakers for attending the workshop.

### **Dates and Workshop Venue**

Workshop Dates: April 11th – 12th 2019

Conference Venue: The workshop will be held in the lecture theatre of the Charles Wilson Building located on main University campus at 3 Kelvin Way, Glasgow G12 8NN. The workshop will be held here over both days. We also have access to seminar room 101AB located on the ground floor of the Charles Wilson Building. Coffee breaks and lunches will be served in this room. Attendees can also use 101AB as a quiet space since there should be no one else using this room.

Here is map of the campus (the Charles Wilson Building is E15)

[https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media\\_335384\\_en.pdf](https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_335384_en.pdf)

Here is an online accessibility guide to the building <https://www.accessable.co.uk/venues/sir-charles-wilson-building>

As a chapter of Minorities and Philosophy, we are committed to its general principles and guidelines. Therefore:

We guarantee that the workshop venue will be accessible to all speakers and members of the audience. For accessibility information about the venue and personalised accommodation/accessibility requests, please contact Joaquim Giannotti (j.giannotti.1@research.gla.ac.uk)

We are committed to inclusivity related to the event and the reviewing process.-We are committed to accommodating the needs of all speakers selected, including childcare. Please communicate your needs to glasgowmap@gmail.com

We are committed to extending the deadline for those that need extra time for medical and/or accessibility reason.

### **About Minorities and Philosophy (MAP)**

Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) is a network of students from different philosophy departments that seek to address issues related to minorities and their involvement in academic philosophy. Accordingly, each department establishes a chapter, which is usually led by graduate students but also encourages the participation of undergraduate students and every person who is interested in these topics. Currently, there are 121 chapters around the world.

The aim of the University of Glasgow's MAP chapter is two-fold: (i) to foster discussion concerning minority issues within the profession and theoretical approaches to them, and (ii) to promote innovative philosophical analysis of such issues from a minority perspective.

In order to accomplish these goals, we organise a variety of activities that run throughout the academic year.

For more information about MAP and relevant resource, please visit:  
<http://www.mapforthe-gap.com/>

The University of Glasgow Minorities and Philosophy Chapter,

(Daniel Abrahams, Laura Fearnley, Joaquim Giannotti, Eilidh Harrison, María Pía Méndez Mateluna)

<https://www.facebook.com/mapglasgowuni>

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