John Divers: ‘Metaphysical Modality and Objective Probability’*
In recent work** I have: (a) argued that a neo-Quinean pragmatic scepticism about metaphysical modality is a perfectly reasonable position to maintain and (b) illustrated the difficulties and limitations associated with some strategies for overcoming such scepticism. One such strategy is to forge an appropriate association between metaphysical modality and objective probability. This paper is an attempt to develop an account of the difficulties and limitations associated with this particular strategy.

* Work in Progress, co-author Shyane Siriwardena (University of Cambridge)

Alan Weir: ‘A Mereological Theory of Properties and Relations’
Some physically inclined philosophers such as Quine and Armstrong have, whilst expressing sympathy for a mereological account of properties, pointed out an apparently fatal flaw. Whilst a property such as being red (if there be such) can be thought of as an aggregate whose instances are its proper parts, no such idea works for being human: my fist is not a human being for example.

In this talk, I expound a revisionary, weaker mereology taking the notion of being an (immediate) constituent of as basic, defining proper part as its transitive closure and introducing a notion of fusion distinct from the two main characterisations of sum/aggregate. I argue that this enables us to explain the distinction between properties and bodily particulars. I also explore the idea that additional explanatory power results from combining this conception with a plenitude postulate roughly to the effect that the universe consists of structurally unique (under the constituent relation) miniverses, maximally many thereof. I finish by sketching how relations can brought under the theory as themselves mereological fusions.

Elia Zardini: ‘Against the World’
In previous works, I’ve developed a theory of transparent truth (LW) and a theory of tolerant baldness (NLs) which validate the law of excluded middle (LEM) and the law of non-contradiction (LNC), and which solve the semantic paradoxes and the paradoxes of vagueness by restricting instead the structural properties of contraction and transitivity respectively. Moreover, the principle of distributivity of conjunction over disjunction (D) fails in the systems – in fact, even the weaker principles of modularity (M) and orthomodularity (O) fail. However, since neither kind of paradox seems to involve D, M or O in the first place, it might seem that the solutions I’ve proposed feature logics that are unnecessarily weak. I’ll first argue that these appearances are deceiving: if a non-contractive or non-transitive theory of anything making certain natural assumptions (which crucially include LEM and LNC and which are shared by both LW and NLs) is to work at all, D, M and O just have to fail. I’ll then offer a philosophical explanation of the failures of these principles in LW and NLs, which will require to bring out a common, hitherto unnoticed metaphysical consequence of these systems, and which will thus have the upshot of bringing for the first time together two systems that might up to now have seemed very remote from one another. More in detail, I'll show that both LW and NLs assert the non-existence of the world, and that such assertion in turn implies the relevant instances of LEM; I'll then argue that these circumstances explain the failure of D, M
and O, since these principles allow one to go from the disjunctions of incomplete ways things are licenced by LEM to a disjunction of complete ways things are, with the latter contradicting the non-existence of the world.

https://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/humanities/research/philosophyresearch/newsandevents/headline_596651_en.html