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Phenomenal Presence
An Introduction to the Debate

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The topic of this volume is the different ways in which things can be phenomenally present in perceptual experience. If something is phenomenally present in experience, then it features consciously in our experience—that is to say that it makes a subjective difference to our experience. When we look at a building, for example, we are visually presented with the colours, shapes, and textures of the parts of the building that face us. Moreover, these features figure in our conscious experience in such a way that they affect what this experience is like for us. It would make a difference for us to experience the walls as white rather than grey, say. In fact, it would be strange if what is in plain view would not take up such a prominent place in conscious visual perception.

But the features of the building that are salient in our perceptual experience do not seem to be limited to the colours, shapes, or textures of its front. For instance, we also appear to have the visual impression of a voluminous edifice, rather than of just a flat façade; of an unbroken front, despite the fact that our view is partially blocked by trees or parked cars; and perhaps even of a building with a certain function, and not merely of a mass of stones. Moreover, there is a sense in which we are perceptually aware of shadows that may vary with our point of view on the building; and possibly also of the absence of a window where architectural symmetry would demand one to be. Lastly, it seems that the building strikes us in perception as part of our external environment, rather than as internal to our mind or as a figment of our imagination. Indeed, if this impression were lacking, we might not be moved—nor take ourselves to be entitled—to come to believe that there actually is before us a building with a certain visual appearance.

What these examples reveal is that one reason why the topic of perceptual phenomenal presence is so interesting is that there seem to be many different ways in which things can be phenomenally present in experience, some of which are still not very well understood. As illustrated, the range of cases that arguably involve perceptual
phenomenal presence includes experiences of perceptual constancies and variations, of volumes and backsides, of natural and artefactual kinds, of absences, of the existence and externality of objects, and of the presence of perceptual reasons. This volume aims to shed more light on the extent to which perceptual experience is imbued with phenomenal presence, and on what kinds of phenomenal presence are involved.

Engaging with these issues will also help us to better understand the nature of perception and consciousness, and to progress with other important debates in contemporary philosophy of mind. In particular, in showing that a large variety of features of objects are phenomenally present in experience, we may get additional support for certain positions in the debates about intrinsic qualia, cognitive phenomenology, and admissible contents. For the richer and more diverse object-related phenomenal presence is, the more likely it is that the phenomenal character of experiences is primarily non-intrinsic and by no means exhausted by sensory aspects, and also that perception is as much concerned with higher-level properties as with lower-level ones.

The contributions to this collection explore the main issues surrounding phenomenal presence not only by asking which objects and features can be phenomenally present in experience, but also—and primarily—by studying which different kinds of phenomenal presence are involved in experience, and how they resemble, or differ from, each other. The chapters fall into four groups, depending on which kind of phenomenal presence they are concerned with. These different kinds can be characterized by reference to several crucial distinctions among the features that are phenomenally present, which we therefore need to consider first.

1. The Main Distinctions

1.1 Object- versus experience-directed presence

It is standard to assume that experiences—such as perceptions, hallucinations, episodic memories, imaginings, after-images, or emotional feelings—possess a phenomenal character.\(^1\) What this means is that there is something that they are like from the perspective of the subject who has them. This ‘something’—what the experiences are like for the subject—is their phenomenal character. It is made up of those properties or aspects linked to the experiences that are accessible to the subjective perspective of the conscious subject from the inside. An experience’s property of being realized by neural stimulation in certain areas of the brain, for instance, is not part of its phenomenal character, given that the instantiation of this property is not available to the subjective perspective of the conscious subject.

\(^1\) See, for instance, Crane (2001: 22f.). Experiences are here contrasted with (propositional) thoughts. Note that it is also possible to employ a narrower notion of ‘experience’, according to which it applies only to (veridical) perception.
concerned (but only to the objective perspective of the brain sciences, say). By contrast, whether a given visual experience involves blur, say, is accessible from the inside and contributes to the experience's phenomenal character (even if the subject in question may fail to notice the blur under certain circumstances).

There is equally wide agreement that one of the main contributors to the phenomenal character of experiences—if not the only one—is the presentation of features that (appear to) pertain to the objects experienced, which are (given as) distinct from the experiences. It is accessible to us from the inside, and makes a phenomenal difference, whether we see something red or something green, whether we visualize a circular or a square surface, whether we feel a straight or a curved edge, whether we hear a high or a low tone, whether we feel a strong or a weak itch, whether we sense our legs to be crossed or to be straight, and so on. However, not all features that are part of the phenomenal character of experiences need to be given to us as properties or aspects of the objects of experience. Arguably, when we see a green hilly meadow in a blurred manner, we do not see the meadow as being blurred, in addition to seeing it as being green and hilly. Rather, blur is more naturally understood as an intrinsic feature of our experience itself, which characterizes the way in which we see the meadow as being green and hilly.

From these considerations, we can extract different notions of phenomenal presence. According to the most general one, a feature may be said to be phenomenally present in an experience whenever it is part of the phenomenal character of that experience, such that it becomes accessible from the inside through attending to the experience in question. In this sense, both blur and greenness are phenomenally present in our perceptual experience of the meadow. When we draw our attention to our experience, we come to notice each of the two features. This general notion of phenomenal presence renders it very close to phenomenal character: whatever forms part of what an experience is like for the subject is phenomenally present, and vice versa. But there are also more specific notions of phenomenal presence. The features that are phenomenally present in the general sense (seem to) pertain either to the objects of experience, or to the experiences themselves. Accordingly, there are two subcategories of general phenomenal presence.

A feature enjoys object-directed phenomenal presence in experience just in case it contributes to the phenomenal character of the experience in question (i.e. it is phenomenally present in the general sense) and seemingly belongs to the object of

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2 See the discussion about the 'transparency' of experience further below. Since there is disagreement among the contributors to this volume whether perceptual presentation should be understood in terms of representation (or intentionality) or acquaintance, I aim to stay neutral on this issue.

3 See, for instance, Peacocke (1983), Boghossian and Velleman (1989), Block (1996), and Dorsch and Soldati (2016). Pace (2007) surveys different attempts of capturing blur in representationalist terms (i.e. without accepting intrinsic aspects of experience) and defends one of them. By the way, note that blur is not the same as having fuzzy borders, say. There is a difference between seeing, in a clear manner, a meadow in the fog and seeing, in a blurry manner, a meadow in clear sunlight.
experience. This excludes, for instance, blur because we do not experience the latter as a feature of the objects that we experience in a blurred manner. But it includes the greenness that the meadow appears to possess. Now, object-directed phenomenal presence may be misleading in two ways. The objects of experience may not be like they are presented as being. For example, the meadow, which seems to us to be green, may in fact be yellow (e.g. at the end of a very sunny and dry summer). Or there may not even be any objects of experience, despite appearances. We might just suffer a hallucination as of a green meadow, say. Furthermore, that the features seem to pertain to the objects of experience need not mean that they seem to be instantiated by those objects. This distinction becomes relevant, for instance, in the case of perceptual constancies and variations. Plausibly, a coin seen from an angle looks both round and elliptical to us. But we only take it to be round, not to be elliptical. So, while the property of being elliptical is phenomenally present as belonging to the coin (rather than to our experience of it), it does not perceptually appear to be instantiated by the coin.

Object-directed phenomenal presence is to be contrasted with experience-directed phenomenal presence. An experienced feature is phenomenally present in an experience-directed way just in case it is salient as part of the character of the experience concerned and is presented as pertaining to the experience itself, rather than to the object of experience. Now, the situation in our example is reversed. While the blur that we are aware of enjoys experience-directed phenomenal presence, the greenness of the meadow does not. That is, we can notice from the inside that the blur does not pertain to the meadow (like the greenness does), but rather characterizes the way in which we experience the meadow and its properties. Although there is perhaps some room for doubt, it is standardly assumed that experience-directed phenomenal presence cannot be misleading. But, again, that a feature appears to belong to the experience does not necessarily imply that it appears to be instantiated by the experience. Some have argued that visualizing is a matter of imagining (i.e. non-committally representing) having an experience of seeing. If this is true, experiences of visualizing presumably just represent perspectivalness, without instantiating it. That is, in visualizing, we do not actually adopt a point of view on some object or scene, but instead merely represent

4 There is also a relational reading of object-directed ‘presence’, according to which something cannot be ‘present’ in experience without actually being in existence. In line with this stronger understanding, the greenness of a hallucinated or dreamt meadow would merely seem to be present, rather than really be present. In what follows, I talk as if hallucinations, dream experiences, and so on, do involve genuine object-directed phenomenal presence, but not much depends on this, since most discussions are concerned with veridical experiences, in any case.

5 It has been argued that object-directed phenomenal presence can be misleading not only with respect to the objects of experience, but also with respect to the experiences themselves (see Martin 2000 and my contribution to this volume for discussion). The idea is that the (seeming) relationality of perceptual experiences is phenomenally present, mainly because the (seeming) existence and externality of the objects of experience are phenomenally present. But, furthermore assuming that hallucinatory perceptual experiences cannot be introspectively distinguished from veridical ones, they also phenomenally seem to be relational—and wrongly so. But, now, if object-directed phenomenal presence can be misleading with respect to the experiences concerned, it is difficult to find a reason why the same should not be true of experience-directed phenomenal presence.
a perceptual experience in which such a point of view is imagined to be adopted (possibly by someone else, such as when we visualize the battle of Austerlitz from Napoleon’s perspective).6

The aim of this volume is to investigate what it means for features to be phenomenally present in the object-directed sense, and also which features are phenomenally present in this way. There are two main reasons for this focus on the phenomenal presence of aspects of the objects of experience, rather than of aspects of the experiences themselves. The first is related to the fact that, while it is relatively uncontroversial that aspects pertaining to distinct objects figure in conscious experience, there is a lively debate about whether phenomenal presence extends to intrinsic features of experiences. Indeed, some have argued that all phenomenally present features pertain to the objects experienced (see section 2.1 below on intrinsic aspects of experience). Since the volume is primarily concerned with the nature of phenomenal presence, and only secondarily with its scope, it is only reasonable to concentrate on the more widely accepted cases of phenomenal presence and avoid the more disputed ones, at least as far as this is possible.

The second motivation for the confinement of the discussion to object-directed phenomenal presence is that it is generally (perceived to be) more puzzling than experience-directed phenomenal presence. Philosophers have questioned whether the phenomenal character of experiences includes some of their intrinsic properties. But the respective debates usually acknowledge that, if the phenomenal character of experiences is indeed partly intrinsic, it is not difficult to understand how this is possible. After all, attending to something (whether from the inside or not) is a common way of coming to notice some of its intrinsic features. By contrast, it is standardly acknowledged that suitable features of external objects can be accessible from the inside through attention to experience—an idea often spelled out in terms of the observation that experience is ‘transparent’ to its objects and their features.7 But it is less obvious how something that is distinct from experience can nonetheless be phenomenally present in experience (a question which, for instance, is addressed in Brown’s and my own contribution to this volume).

1.2 Sensory versus non-sensory presence

Now, much of the current literature on phenomenal presence is concerned with sensory presence, that is, phenomenal presence linked to one of the sense modalities (including the bodily senses).8 When we look at a surface, what we are aware of in a

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6 See Peacocke (1985), Martin (2002), and Dorsch (2010) for further discussion.
7 In fact, Harman (1990); Tye (1995), and Crane (2001: sec. 43f.) argue that the ‘transparency’ of experience shows that there are no intrinsic aspects of phenomenal character at all. Peacocke (1983), Block (1996), and Martin (2002), among many others, reject this line of argument.
8 Sensory presence may also comprise affective aspects of phenomenal character, such as emotional or similar feelings. But since they do not figure in the contributions to this volume, I focus exclusively on experiences that present objects and features in one of the sense modalities (e.g. in a visual manner).
sensory manner are its shape, colour, and texture, among other things. Indeed, these features of the surface are given to us in a particular sensory manner, namely visually. This means, for instance, that how they appear to be is rather specific with respect to the various dimensions of visible properties. We experience the colours as having particular hues and degrees of saturation and brightness; objects seem to be located at specific distances and directions; lines are presented as having concrete lengths and thicknesses; and so on. Another important aspect of visual presence is that objects and their features are visually presented in relation to our spatial point of view, the prevailing illumination conditions and possibly other contextual aspects. That objects are given to us as being constant in size is inseparably linked to the fact that they seemingly diminish in size the further away they move from us. And the colours of objects appear to remain the same over time only if they begin to look darker when the amount of light is decreasing.9 Very similar considerations apply to other sense modalities, that is, to the textures, sounds, smells, postures, itches, and many other features that figure centrally in our tactile, auditory, olfactory, or proprioceptive experiences, or in our bodily sensations.

One open question is, however, whether context-dependence (including perspectivalness) and relative specificity are not merely necessary, but also sufficient for visual—and, more generally, sensory—presence. For example, it is unclear whether non-perceptual (e.g. imaginative) experiences, too, involve sensory presence. After all, episodes of visualizing do involve perspectivalness and are often rather specific about how they present objects as being. But they clearly render features of objects phenomenally present in a different way than perceptual experiences (which is why, for instance, we only endorse the content of the latter in belief). The question is therefore whether this difference means that imaginative and similar experiences involve no sensory presence at all, or just not the same kind of sensory presence as perceptions. In any case, how we are sensorily aware of an object (if we are so aware of it at all) is clearly part of what the respective experience is like for us.10 It makes a phenomenal difference, for instance, whether we see a surface as red or green, or hear a tone as high or low. Our respective experiences differ in what they are like for us from the inside; and they differ precisely with respect to the dimensions of hue or pitch that they present us with.

It is less clear, however, whether there are also non-sensory forms of phenomenal presence. Thinking might be a good candidate, given that thoughts possess a phenomenal character. For example, there is a difference in what it is like to see a green meadow and to think about the greenness of the meadow. Perhaps the best explanation of this difference is that, in thinking, the green meadow is phenomenally present in a non-sensory manner. But the claim that thinking involves phenomenal presence at all is controversial. Actually, it may be argued that seeing and thinking differ phenomenally

9 These issues are directly addressed by the chapters in the first group. In addition, the chapters in the second group question how specific visual presence really is.

10 This idea is, in fact, nowadays almost a commonplace. Among the few sceptics have been Churchland (1984) and Dennett (1988).
precisely because only the first, but not the second, renders features phenomenally present (see section 2.2 below on cognitive phenomenology). It is thus perhaps more promising to investigate to which extent experience includes non-sensory phenomenal presence.

Indeed, experiences are more natural objects of investigation than thoughts for phenomenologists in search of non-sensory phenomenal aspects because it is very difficult to deny with respect to experiences—but not necessarily thoughts—that they involve phenomenal presence. This is why the contributions to this collection focus primarily on what is phenomenally present in experiences and, more specifically, on what is phenomenally present in perceptual experiences. One advantage of this approach is that the existence of object-directed perceptual presence—for example, of shapes, colours, and other perceivable properties—can simply be presupposed in the discussions; while there is no need to deal with the more controversial issue of whether phenomenal presence is involved in thought, or even in other kinds of experience (e.g. perhaps ‘visualizing’ is not really visual, after all, but just a matter of thinking about visual experiences). Moreover, most of the discussions in this volume focus on visual perceptual experience, given that this sense modality is still dominant, and best understood, in the respective philosophical debates.

1.3 Being in view versus being out of sight

Another basic distinction—pertaining at least to visual perception—is that between features that are in view and features that are out of sight. Features in view are precisely those that are visible and belong to what is from our perspective the unobstructed front of objects, so that we enjoy a clear line of sight to them. By contrast, features that are—relative to our point of view—hidden from view, or are occluded by other objects, or are absent from the scene before our eyes, or indeed are not visible at all, count as being out of sight. When we walk down a street, the façades of the buildings in the street are in plain view. But their backyards and cellars, as well as the rows of houses in the streets beyond, are usually not; nor is the financial value of the houses, say (even though they might ‘look expensive’).

There is some interesting connection between this distinction and the distinction between sensory and non-sensory presence. For, if features like the shapes or colours of objects are in view, and we look at them, they normally become phenomenally present.

11 The contributions by Brown, Crowther, Dokic, Kind, and me also say something about the kind(s) of phenomenal presence involved in imaginative experiences and/or episodes of memory.

12 Sometimes, the distinction between phenomenally present features that are in view and phenomenally present features that are out of sight is spelled out in terms of ‘presence-in-presence’ and ‘presence-in-absence’ (see, e.g. Noë 2009 and the contribution of Kind). But the label ‘presence-in-absence’ has also been used to describe the phenomenal presence of features of objects that are ‘beyond sight’, given that they are not even (presented as being) part of our environment. This is the case, for instance, with objects and properties that we visually experience as being depicted by a painting (see Martin 2012). To avoid misunderstandings, I prefer to speak of features that are ‘in view’ and ‘out of sight’, when describing the different ways in which features may figure in perceptual experience as pertaining to the objects perceived.
present in a sensory manner—indeed, in a visual manner. We see them from a particular point of view, and under particular lighting conditions; and they are given to us as fairly specific properties of the objects perceived. By contrast, it is open to debate whether features that are out of sight—such as the colours or shapes of the backsides of objects—can be sensorily given in perceptual experience. Again, part of the issue is whether context-dependence (including perspectivalness) and relative specificity are enough for sensory presence. Depending on the right answer to this question, features out of sight might only allow for non-sensory phenomenal presence.

1.4 Qualitative versus categorical features

Another relevant distinction is that between qualitative features, which may vary from object to object perceived, and categorical features, which are the same in all objects of perceptual experience. The objects that we perceive differ in their (apparent) shapes and colours, say. But they all have in common that they are (or at least seem to be) part of our environment (see Brown’s and my contribution). Hence, while shapes and colours are qualitative features, belonging to our surroundings is a categorical aspect of objects of perception. It seems safe to assume that there is no visible (or perceivable) property that all possible objects of experience share. As a consequence, the only candidates for categorical features of objects are features that are out of sight (in the sense of not even being possibly in view) and do not allow for sensory presence. Not surprisingly, the property of being part of our environment is neither perspectival, nor illumination-dependent, nor comes in degrees of specificity.13

1.5 The structure of the volume

With these distinctions in place, we are now in a position to distinguish the four groups of papers in this collection. The first two groups of papers deal with qualitative features—such as the spatial and chromatic properties of the front of objects—that are in view and therefore sensorily present; while the other two groups discuss the phenomenal presence of qualitative and categorical features that are out of sight.

Making up the first group, the chapters by Keith Allen, John O’Dea, and Martine Nida-Rümelin examine the general nature of the phenomenal presence of shapes and colours, with special attention to the contrast between perceptual constancies and perceptual variations. When we look at a plate from an angle, we see its roundness. But there is also a sense in which it looks elliptical to us. The question is how these two aspects of experience are linked to each other, and whether they are phenomenally present in the same way.

As part of the second group, James Stazicker and Craig French investigate instead whether visual perceptual experience always involves the sensory presence of spatial

13 Of course, it may be indeterminate where our environment stops. But this is a question of vagueness, and not of the specificity with which a given determinable is determined. Similarly, while the property of being part of our environment is context-dependent (i.e. it depends partly on our current location), this kind of context-dependence is not one that has any bearing on how objects are visually present in experience (but at best only on whether they are visually present).
properties, and whether this sensory presence is concerned with determinate or determinable properties. For example, it is not conspicuous whether we are visually aware of any spatial properties when looking, from a very close distance, at only a small part of a flat and homogeneously coloured surface. Similarly, it is not evident how defined the lengths, sizes, and distances are that we are perceiving.

The third group of papers is concerned with the phenomenal presence of qualitative features that are out of sight. It is interesting to note that, by looking at an object from a single point of view, we are in a position to acquire perceptual knowledge not only about the parts that are in view, but also about parts that are out of sight. For example, when we see the homogeneously coloured front of a red ball, we are entitled to believe that the ball is red at its back, too. This opens up the questions of how it is possible for us to attain perceptual knowledge about what is not in view and, in particular, whether this requires a distinctive form of phenomenal presence—an issue addressed by Amy Kind and Jérôme Dokic. Depending on the answers to these questions, we may also gain clarity about whether hidden things are phenomenally present in a sensory or a non-sensory manner (assuming that they are phenomenally present at all).

The fourth group of contributions explores instances of phenomenal presence that are clearly non-sensory because they are concerned with categorical features. Derek Brown and I aim to defend the claim that objects of perception phenomenally appear to be external and existing, and to shed more light on what this claim might tell us about the nature of perceptual presence and our access to perceptual reasons. Tom Crowther, finally, considers whether there is a difference in phenomenal presence between wakeful and dream experiences.

2. The Relation to Other Debates

Before introducing each of the chapters in more detail, it is helpful to contrast the issues addressed in this volume with the issues raised by three other contemporary debates. In particular, it is important to be clear about why these debates, which have figured prominently in the recent philosophy of mind, are distinct from the debate about phenomenal presence in perceptual experience. In addition, it is worthwhile to point out how, nonetheless, progress on the issue of phenomenal presence may help to advance the other debates, too.

2.1 Intrinsic aspects of experience

For quite a long period, one central issue in discussions about phenomenal character has been whether it includes—or is even sometimes exhausted by—intrinsic (and thus purely subjective) aspects of the experiences concerned.\(^\text{14}\) Such aspects are characterized by the fact that they cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, their natural properties. Some philosophers have argued that the very possibility of a subjective experience presupposes the existence of such intrinsic properties. Others have denied this, claiming that subjective experiences are reducible to natural properties alone. These debates have been ongoing for many years, and have involved many different philosophical perspectives.

\(^{14}\) Such intrinsic and subjective aspects of phenomenal character are sometimes called ‘qualia’ or ‘raw feels’ (Dennett 1988; Block 1996; Crane 2001: 23). Note, however, that others use the term ‘qualia’ as denoting what is here labelled ‘phenomenal character’ (see Crane 2001: 23 and Martin 2000 for discussion).
representational, functional, or otherwise relational properties of experiences. For example, it has been argued that there are experiences that lack any representationality and functional role, or at least possess non-representational and non-functional aspects of experience (e.g., feelings of orgasm or of vague anxiety); or that two experiences may differ in phenomenal character, despite sharing the same representationality and functional role, thus again suggesting the existence of intrinsic aspects of phenomenal character (e.g., inverted spectrum cases); or that knowledge of the complete physical, representational, and functional facts about experiences of a certain kind does not suffice for knowledge of what these experiences are subjectively like (e.g., Mary’s room and the knowledge argument); and so on.\(^\text{15}\)

However, these arguments and the resulting debates are largely independent of the topic of the current collection of essays, given that the object-directed phenomenal presence at issue concerns the awareness of features of objects distinct of our experiences and, consequently, constitutes a non-intrinsic aspect of phenomenal character.\(^\text{16}\) The only proper point of connection seems to be that, if it is indeed true that experiences involve the phenomenal presence of features of things other than experiences, then phenomenal character cannot be exhausted by intrinsic aspects of experience. Actually, the more central object-directed phenomenal presence turns out to be to phenomenal character, the more support there may be for scepticism about the existence of intrinsic aspects of experience. This is in fact another reason for taking a closer look at phenomenal presence, especially in the object-directed sense.

### 2.2 Cognitive phenomenology

The debate on cognitive phenomenology is concerned with the question of whether episodes of thinking possess a phenomenal character and, if so, whether this character contains non-sensory aspects, notably some form of non-sensory phenomenal presence. For instance, philosophers sympathetic to the idea that thoughts do have properties that are accessible from the inside typically argue that it makes a phenomenal difference not only whether distinct thoughts differ in propositional attitude, but also whether they differ in propositional content. What it is like for a subject to judge that it rains is thus not the same as what it is like for a subject to judge that it snows, say—just as it is not the same as what it is like for a subject to imagine that it rains.\(^\text{17}\)

If thoughts do involve phenomenal presence, it is arguably non-sensory in character.\(^\text{18}\) Thoughts about visual appearances, for instance, usually lack perspectivalness and a

\(^{15}\) These and other cases have been introduced or discussed in Jackson (1982), Shoemaker (1982), Block (1990, 1996), Nida-Rümelin (1995), Tye (1995), Crane (2001: ch. 3), and Levine (2001), among many others.

\(^{16}\) In his contribution, Brown does discuss some of the arguments in favour of the postulation of intrinsic qualia, but only in the context of advocating the view that his own projectivist account of perceptual presence fares better than representationalist approaches in accommodating those arguments.

\(^{17}\) See, for instance, Siewert (1998), Pitt (2004), Dorsch and Soldati (2005), and Dorsch (2016b).

\(^{18}\) Among the few dissenters are strict empiricists like Hume (2000) and Prinz (2002), who take thinking to be imagistic.
high degree of specificity. And even if they do involve them (e.g. when we are thinking 'When seen from this particular angle and distance, the plate looks exactly egg-shaped'), thoughts do not do so in the same way as experiences. For how we think of an object does not directly change in response to relevant modifications in the context of perception or in the object itself. In fact, even closing our eyes does not have any immediate effect on how we think about an object’s visual appearance. This strongly suggests that, while experiences involve the sensory presence of properties like colours or shapes, thoughts typically represent such properties without rendering them sensorily present—which then gives rise to the question of which kind of phenomenal presence, if any, thoughts do involve.

The focus of the respective debates is, however, different from the focus of the contributions to the current volume in that the contributions are concerned with the phenomenal character of experiences rather than thoughts. The kind of awareness involved in experiences differs from that involved in thoughts in at least two important respects: it is non-propositional (or objectual, non-conceptual, analogue, imagistic, and so on) and partly sensory (i.e. as noted earlier, by involving context-dependence, relative specificity, and so on). As a result, while the debate about cognitive phenomenology focuses on a kind of awareness that involves at best only non-sensory phenomenal presence, the discussions in the current volume are concerned with the non-sensory aspects of a partly sensory kind of awareness.

But, of course, there are also important commonalities between the two debates, notably the working hypothesis that there are non-sensory forms of phenomenal presence in the first place. During the second half of the twentieth century, it was popular to believe that phenomenal character is limited to the sensory aspects of experience. But, partly thanks to the re-emergence of the debate about cognitive phenomenology, this former orthodoxy has given way to views that are much more open to the possibility of non-sensory forms of phenomenal presence. This volume hopes to advance this development even further, with a special focus on the non-sensory aspects of experience.

2.3 Higher-level perception

A third debate, that has recently gained prominence, is concerned with the issue of which kind of properties perceptual (and other) experiences can make us directly aware of. While some argue that we can experience only certain lower-level properties (e.g. colours, shapes, sounds, etc.), others maintain that experiences may also make us aware of certain higher-level properties (e.g. natural or artefactual kinds, meanings, expressions, values, Gestalt properties, causal or modal properties, etc.). It is important to note that these two options arise independently of how we account for perceptual

19 See, for instance, Crane (2009) for the non-propositionality of experiences, and Peacocke (1983) for their sensory character.
20 See Martin (2000) for discussion.
21 See, for instance, Siewert (1998).
22 See, for example, the various contributions to Macpherson (2011).
awareness. In particular, it does not matter whether we take it to be a form of acquaintance or of representation, or whether we assume its objects to be external or internal to the mind.

In this general context, experienceable properties count as lower- or higher-level relative to the relevant relation(s) of metaphysical realization among them (e.g. supervenience, emergence, constitution, etc.). An experienceable property is lower-level just in case it is not realized by other experienceable properties. All other experienceable properties are higher-level. Take, for example, the shapes and colours of the painted marks on a canvas, which contribute to the aesthetic qualities and value of the painting in question. The shapes and colours are lower-level properties in the sense specified, given that they are realized by properties (e.g. certain molecular structures or reflectance properties) that are not themselves experienceable. By contrast, assuming that we can experience aesthetic properties,\textsuperscript{23} they will count as higher-level due to their realization by colours and other lower-level experienceable properties.

In principle, higher-level properties could be sensorily present in at least two ways. First, they might just be an aggregate of sensorily present lower-level features. This might, for instance, be true of the property of being (the surface of) a chessboard. This property can perhaps be said to figure sensorily in experience simply insofar as the colour, size, shape, and spatial location of each of the sixty-four squares are sensorily present. Second, higher-level properties might be sensorily present by being closely linked to sensorily present aggregates, without being reducible to the latter. In particular, it might be the case that instances of a given aggregate of sensorily present lower-level features are more likely than not also instances of the related higher-level property. The property of being a lemon, for instance, seems to be connected in this way to the combination of a certain voluminous oval shape, a particular yellow colour, a porous texture, and so on. For it happens to be the case that most objects in our environment that show this combination of lower-level properties are in fact lemons (i.e. there are only a few fake lemons, made of wax or plastic, say). We might then learn to pick up in experience on this close connection in such a way that, for us, the property of being a lemon becomes sensorily present whenever the relevant aggregate of lower-level features is sensorily present.\textsuperscript{24}

Now, the debate about higher-level perception is primarily concerned with the issue of whether perceptual awareness is limited to lower-level features or also applies to higher-level features. In other words, it asks whether higher-level properties can be part of the content of perceptual experiences. By contrast, the contributions to the present volume investigate first and foremost how higher-level properties can be phenomenally present, assuming that they are perceivable at all. Nonetheless, some of the

\textsuperscript{23} See, for instance, the dispute between Schellekens (2006) and Dorsch (2013).

\textsuperscript{24} This connection could also be spelled out in terms of objective appearances or looks. Accordingly, a high-level property is sensorily present if it has a unique or at least distinctive complex look, meaning that all or at least most bearers of this look are also bearers of the high-level property. See Martin (2010) and Millar (2010) for discussion.
related discussions bear on the debate about the possibility of higher-level perception insofar as they do not merely presuppose that certain higher-level properties are phenomenally present, but actually argue for this claim. Among the higher-level properties concerned are being alive, being in existence, being external, determining experience, or providing us with a reason for belief (see the contributions by Dokic, Brown, and me). In addition, other chapters of this volume shed more light on which lower-level properties are sensorily present (e.g. determinables or determinates, as discussed by French and Stazicker in their contributions), as well as on how they are sensorily present (e.g. whether in a constant or a changing way, as discussed by Allen, O’Dea, and Nida-Rümelin in their contributions).

3. Perceptual Constancy and Variation

The contributions of Keith Allen, John O’Dea, and Martine Nida-Rümelin are all concerned with the phenomenal presence of perceptual constancies and variations. When we turn a coin in our hand and thereby look at it from different perspectives, there is a sense in which its shape appears changeable. When we view the coin frontally, it seems round, while when seen exactly from the side, it seems completely flat. In between these two extremes, the coin appears elliptical, but with a varying degree of flatness. These changeable appearances are recorded, for instance, by painters and draughtsmen who depict coins from different points of view by drawing the respective elliptical shapes on the canvas or piece of paper (see O’Dea, this volume). However, there is also a sense in which the shape of the coin in our hand seems not to change throughout our observation of it. More specifically, it appears to be round, independently of our perspective on it.25 This constancy is revealed by the fact that each of our various perceptual experiences of the coin normally inclines (and entitles) us to judge that the coin is round—and not elliptical, say.

Philosophers and psychologists have used different labels to describe this distinction. The changeable (or variable) properties that are phenomenally present are often called the ‘apparent’ properties of the objects concerned, since they are not really instantiated by those objects, despite being sensorily present in perception (see, e.g. O’Dea’s and Allen’s contributions, but also Noë 2004). The coin, for example, is not elliptical and does not change in shape, despite appearances. But the changeable properties may also be characterized as ‘presented’ since they are the most basic properties that are presented in a sensory manner (see Nida-Rümelin’s contribution). When we are looking at a white circle from an angle and under red illumination, the sensory aspects that first and foremost figure in our experience are ellipticity and reddishness.26

25 The only exception may be a point of view from which we see the coin exactly from the side, where we are arguably not aware of the real shape of the coin, but just of its thin and seemingly elongated and rectangular edge.

26 Indeed, it is open to discussion whether the phenomenal presence of constant properties is also sensory in nature—that is, whether constant properties are more like changeable properties in being sensorily
By contrast, the constant (or stable) properties, which the objects of perception appear to possess independently of the context of perception, are often said to be their ‘perceived’ properties, on the assumption that they (and not the changeable properties) seem to be the properties that objects perceptually appear to instantiate. The idea is that we normally see the coin as being round rather than elliptical (though see O’Dea for the rival view that we also sometimes experience the coin as being elliptical). Because of this link to appearance, constant properties are also sometimes called ‘appearing’ or, indeed, ‘apparent’ properties (see, e.g. Nida-Rümelin’s contribution).

The perceptual presence of constant and changeable properties raises several questions. The most fundamental one is, naturally, how best to draw the distinction between the two kinds of properties. While Allen suggests that their difference is genuinely metaphysical and pertains to whether they are relational with respect to contextual features (changeable properties are, while constant properties are not), O’Dea and Nida-Rümelin suggest to draw the distinction instead in phenomenological terms. According to Nida-Rümelin, a phenomenally present property of an object counts as constant (or ‘appearing’ in her terminology) just in case it appears to be instantiated by the object, and as changeable (or ‘presented’) otherwise. By contrast, O’Dea insists that both kinds of property phenomenally seem to us to be instantiated by the objects in question, but that only our experiences of constant properties are stable enough to reflect how things are and to lead to corresponding perceptual judgements or beliefs.

Nida-Rümelin touches on the difference between constant and changeable properties in the context of her discussion of the conditions under which properties are phenomenally present in experience as constant properties, that is, as properties that appear to be instantiated by the objects perceived. In her view, a property phenomenally appears to be a constant feature of an object just in case some understanding of the nature of this property is ‘built into’ the phenomenal character of the respective experience in such a way that having the experience and possessing the relevant concepts suffices to put us in a position to rationally attribute the property concerned to the object of experience. Accordingly, in order to determine which properties are phenomenally present in this way, we first have to get clear about the precise connections between the phenomenal presence of constant properties, our understanding of their nature, and our capacity to form rational perceptual judgements about them. Once we reach clarity in these matters, we can decide, for instance, whether properties described present or more like hidden or occluded aspects in being non-sensorily present. To take an example, when we look at a white surface in red light, reddishness figures in our experience in an explicit way, in which it does not figure in our experience when we look at the orange front of a Rubik’s cube, the backside of which we know to be red. The question is then whether, when we look at a red wall in uneven lighting (i.e. with a lot of lighter and darker shadows), reddishness figures in our experience in the same way as in our experience of the white wall or in the same way as in our experience of the Rubik’s cube.

The answer is likely to depend on the extent to which constant properties are correlated to distinctive sensory appearances, in one of the two ways outlined in section 2.3 on higher-level perception. Also, as Nida-Rümelin notes in her contribution, there is the problem of determining the specific shade of red that the unevenly lit red wall is supposed to have (and to appear to have), if it is assumed that constant colours are sensorily given in experience.
by the natural sciences can be phenomenally present in perception. When we look at surfaces, they appear to be coloured. But do they also appear to possess the reflectance profiles that their colours are correlated to or depend on (and which they are sometimes even identified with)?

Allen and O’Dea, on the other hand, discuss perceptual constancy and variation before the background of the exclusion problem. The issue is how to accommodate the ostensive tension between the phenomenal presence of constant properties and that of changeable properties. More specifically, how is it possible that one and the same perceived object can seem to have two properties that are incompatible (e.g. because they are determinants of the same determinable)? A coin cannot simultaneously be round and elliptical. So how can it phenomenally seem both round and elliptical (e.g. when seen from an angle)? Similarly, how can we explain that a surface in the shade may appear to be both white and grey, say; or that a skyscraper in the distance may seem to be both large and small? That these pairs of properties are indeed in tension is reflected in our inclinations (and entitlements) to judge. For we are normally inclined to ascribe only one property of each pair to the object concerned—usually the property, the appearance of which remains constant during changes in perspective, illumination, distance, or other aspects of the perceptual context.

One strategy of solving the exclusion problem—adopted by Allen, among others—is to argue that the two kinds of property are not really incompatible, so that they can after all figure in one and the same experience as pertaining to one and the same object of experience. Another option—preferred by O’Dea—is to insist that constant and changeable properties are indeed in conflict with each other, but that this is unproblematic since they are present in different, alternating experiences. Both solutions to the exclusion problem have in common that they say something about how the two kinds of phenomenal presence are related to each other, and why each is involved in perceptual experience. That constant properties are phenomenally present should be relatively unsurprising, since perception has the function to inform us about the unchanging aspects of external objects and presumably can fulfil this function only by making us phenomenally aware of these aspects. But this does not yet explain why our awareness of constant properties is accompanied by the phenomenal presence of changeable properties, and how the two are linked. While Allen thinks that there is an explanatory connection between our awareness of constant properties and our awareness of changeable properties, O’Dea assumes the two to be distinct and competitors for our attention.

3.1 Allen

More specifically, Allen tackles the exclusion problem by investigating the explanatory role of the phenomenal presence of changeable properties. The main target in his critical discussion is the idea that the perception of constant properties is partly explained by the experience of changeable properties, meaning that the two are not incompatible after all. This idea can be understood in different ways, though. One way is to understand
it in terms of mediated access. Hence, what is claimed is that we perceive constant properties by, or on the basis of, first experiencing changeable properties. This presupposes that changeable properties can indeed be experienced and instantiated by the objects of experience. Proponents of this view motivate it partly by suggesting that it can solve the exclusion problem. One particular solution that they propose is that we experience the two kinds of property in different manners (e.g. we ‘see’ the changeable properties, while ‘experiencing’ the constant ones; see Noë 2004). For that two properties are incompatible insofar as they cannot be simultaneously instantiated by the same object (e.g. nothing can be both round and elliptical at the same time) does not imply that we cannot be simultaneously aware of them in two different ways (e.g. we can see the roundness of an object and at the same time imagine or believe it to be elliptical).

This proposal, however, raises the question of how our experiences of constant properties are supposed to differ from our experiences of changeable properties (and which of them is to count as ‘perceptual’); and, as Allen highlights, the sketched answers are anything but satisfactory. In addition, the postulation of mediated access is open to sceptical worries (can we really experience anything beyond the ‘veil of changeable properties’?), as well as to the objection that our mediated awareness of constant properties turns out to be non-perceptual and, indeed, doxastic—say, because it is inferential, or because it makes no contribution to the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. Finally, it is widely accepted that the view under consideration can ensure compatibility with direct realism and naturalism, and avoid the related difficulties for sense-data theory, only by assuming that changeable properties are mind-independent and instantiated by the same external objects as constant properties. This means relativizing changeable properties to changing aspects of the context of perception, so that their main difference from constant properties is that they are context-dependent and relational features of external objects. As a result, the view claims that we experience the constant shapes or colours of objects, say, by first experiencing their changeable shapes and colours relative to our various points of view and the changing illumination conditions. But, so understood, changeable properties turn out to be compatible with constant properties: a coin can be both round and elliptical—from this perspective. Hence, there is no exclusion problem anymore, and no need for postulating two kinds of experience (especially if their difference would remain mysterious).

Because of these unresolved problems, Allen considers two further ways of understanding the asymmetric explanatory dependence between constant and changeable properties. One of the conceptions claims that the dependence merely amounts to the metaphysical fact that the perception of (non-relational) constant properties requires the perception of (relational) changeable properties, but not the other way round. However, this claim is false both if perception is understood as presupposing attention (i.e. we do not notice all changeable properties that are open to our view), and if it is understood as not requiring attention (i.e. there are no perceptual experiences that present us just with changeable properties, but not with any corresponding constant properties).
The final conception takes the asymmetric dependence to be epistemic and maintains that, while evidence against perceptual beliefs about changeable properties is always also evidence against some perceptual beliefs about constant properties, the opposite need not be true (see Schellenberg 2008). The thought is that, if we have reason to believe that a coin does not possess the changeable property of being elliptical, then we also have reason to believe that it does not possess the constant property of being round; while doubts about whether we really look at the coin from an angle undermine only our belief that the coin is constantly round (instead of constantly elliptical), but not our belief that the coin seems to be elliptical relative to our actual point of view (whatever it is). But, again, Allen presents counter-examples to this view—more precisely, cases in which we are more reliable with respect to the constant properties than with respect to the changeable properties that objects appear to possess.

Allen’s main conclusion is that the claim about explanatory dependence has to be weakened: while the perceptual presence of changeable properties cannot be used to elucidate the phenomenal presence of constant properties, it can still help to explain perceived differences between divergent contexts of perception. The thought is that—at least if we do not pay too much attention to the changeable properties—our perceptual experiences make us aware not only of constant properties, but also of relevant aspects of the perceptual context, such as our spatial location and orientation relative to the objects of perception, or the nature of the current illumination. Indeed, it is Allen’s contention that, without the perceptual presence of these contextual aspects, it would be difficult to account for why we are inclined and entitled to form beliefs about them.

3.2 O’Dea

O’Dea’s approach to the exclusion problem differs from Allen’s in that O’Dea is critical of attempts to try to render constant and changeable properties compatible with each other. The main motivation for his criticism is that such attempts do not pay justice to the phenomenological fact that the two kinds of property seem in perception to be in tension with each other. Many philosophers and psychologists have observed that, when we shift our attention from constant to changeable properties, we do not just notice a different shape or colour, say, but in addition a different orientation or illumination. For example, if a coin strikes us as elliptical instead of round, it also strikes us as flat (i.e. on a plane perpendicular to our line of sight) instead of tilted. Similarly, a white surface looks to be grey instead of white only if it also looks to be well lit instead of being in the shade. But nothing can phenomenally seem, relative to the same viewpoint, to be simultaneously round-and-tilted and elliptical-and-flat; nor can anything phenomenally seem, relative to the same lighting conditions, to be simultaneously white-and-in-the-shade and grey-and-well-lit. So, if we take this observation seriously, we should acknowledge that there is a genuine tension between the phenomenal presence of constant properties and that of changeable properties if they both concern the same object under the same perceptual circumstances. Otherwise, we would need an
error theory of why so many thinkers have described their own experiences in terms of this incompatibility.

Assuming that the tension is real, O’Dea proposes an alternative conception of the distinction between constant and changeable properties, and of our awareness of them. First, he maintains that both constant and changeable properties are of the same kind, namely non-relational, perceivable properties. A coin seen from an angle is not phenomenally presented as having the relational changeable shape of being elliptical-relative-to-our-viewpoint, but as having the non-relational changeable shape of being genuinely elliptical. Second, O’Dea thinks that our access to both constant and changeable properties is perceptual; and that, as already noted, we can perceive either only in conjunction with relevant aspects of the context of perception (e.g. perspective, orientation, distance, illumination, etc.). Third, one and the same retinal stimulation can give rise to various perceptual experiences that are incompatible with each other (i.e. attribute incompatible properties to the same object) because they concern conflicting pairs of non-relational properties and contextual features. For example, when looking at a round coin from an angle, we may see it either as being round and tilted, or as elliptical and flat, but not as both at the same time. The reason for this is that the two combinations of properties themselves cannot be instantiated at the same time. Fourth, these distinct experiences differ both in their (degree of) veridicality and in their (degree of) stability, whereby an experience counts as stable if we enter into it spontaneously and without any effort, and as unstable if we have to actively and strenuously occasion and sustain it. The properties that are phenomenally present in (relatively) stable experiences are the constant properties which we are inclined to attribute to the objects perceived; while the properties that are phenomenally present in (relatively) unstable experiences are the changeable properties which, despite appearing to be instantiated by the objects concerned, we do not really take to be among their genuine properties.

The resulting solution to the exclusion problem is then to say that we are never at the same time aware of the (real) constant properties of a given object and its (merely apparent) changeable ones, even though we can switch from experiencing one to experiencing the other. O’Dea’s view is also well placed to explain why our awareness of changeable properties is rather elusive, but may still be facilitated by certain top-down methods (like closing one eye, minimizing movement, or following relevant instructions). In addition, the view promises to elucidate why our ability to notice changeable visual properties has developed in parallel to, and has been enhanced by, our familiarity with realist paintings. For it is part of the nature of such paintings that they have to make use of flat ovoids and grey patches in order to depict objects like tilted coins and white walls in the shade, say. Finally, O’Dea’s proposal avoids the controversial and potentially problematic postulation of three elements prominent in many of the rival views: (i) complex perceptual contents that involve both non-relational and relational properties; (ii) the perceivable relational properties themselves
that link shapes, colours, and so on, to contextual features; and (iii) an epistemic link between the experience of constant properties and that of changeable properties.

3.3 Nida-Rümelin

In contrast to Allen and O'Dea, Martine Nida-Rümelin is not concerned with the relationship between phenomenally present constant and changeable properties. Rather, her main interest is to ask under which conditions the phenomenally present constant properties are identical with the properties perceived, that is, with the external properties that our perceptions track. Her conclusion is that this identity obtains in the case of real and apparent shapes, but not in the case of reflectance profiles and apparent colours. Her argument proceeds by raising the question of what it means for a property to be constant in perceptual experience, in the sense of phenomenally appearing to be instantiated by the perceived object. For once we arrive at a good understanding of when a property counts as being phenomenally present in this sense, we are in a position to decide which properties do figure in experience in this way (e.g. shape properties), and which do not (e.g. reflectance properties).

The various proposals that Nida-Rümelin discusses have in common that they account for the phenomenal presence of constancy in terms of the link between the phenomenal character of the perceptual experiences, on the one hand, and our cognitive access to the phenomenally present properties, on the other. More specifically, the general thought is that perceptual experiences with a certain phenomenal character phenomenally present their object as having a particular property just in case a substantial (though possibly only partial) conception of this property is ‘built into’ that phenomenal character. For example, an experience of a line on a flat surface makes us phenomenally aware of the line as circular just in case the phenomenal character of the experience ‘contains’ some understanding of what circularity consists in (e.g. in being constituted by points that are equidistant from a single central point). This raises the question of what it means for some grasp of a property \( P \) to be ‘built into’ the phenomenal character \( C \) of a perceptual experience in the required sense—and, hence, for \( P \) to phenomenally appear to be instantiated by the perceived object. Nida-Rümelin considers three possible answers.

According to the first, that an experience with the phenomenal character \( C \) ‘contains’ the conception of a property \( P \) means that it is possible, simply on the basis of having such an experience, to acquire full understanding of the nature of \( P \). In other words, the suggestion is that, in making us phenomenally aware of the circular shape of an object, perceptual experiences enable us on their own to grasp the full nature of circularity. However, as Nida-Rümelin points out, this cannot be the right account of phenomenal presence since it is not applicable to certain higher-level properties. In perception, people may phenomenally appear to be angry, and objects to be plants. But the respective perceptual experiences do not allow us to acquire full (or even partial) understanding of what it is to be angry, or a plant.
The second answer characterizes the perceptual presence of a property $P$ by reference to the possibility, on the basis of having experiences with the phenomenal character $C$ and understanding at least partially what having $P$ consists in, of rationally judging that the objects perceived possess $P$. Accordingly, the idea is that consciously enjoying a perceptual experience that phenomenally presents its object as being round, say, together with partially understanding what being round consists in, puts us in a position to rationally judge that the object concerned is round. But, again, the proposal is problematic because it seems unable to handle certain counter-examples. For instance, we might be surrounded by an equal number of real apples and plastic apples and be unable to distinguish them just by looking. In this situation, we would be confronted with objects that perceptually appear to be genuine apples. But, unlike in normal cases, this appearance would not suffice to render it rational for us to judge that there is a genuine apple before us. Without further evidence, we should instead refrain from deciding whether we are faced with a real apple or just a replica.

Finally, the third answer—which is advocated by Nida-Rümelin—maintains that perceptual experiences with a certain phenomenal character phenomenally present a particular property $P$ as instantiated just in case it is possible, simply on the basis of having experiences with that character and understanding at least partially what having $P$ consists in, to rationally judge that those experiences are rendered veridical by suitable instances of $P$. What this means is that our partial understanding of the nature of roundness ensures that, in phenomenally presenting an object as being round, a perceptual experience allows us on its own to rationally judge that it is veridical just in case the object concerned is indeed round. The resulting view can not only handle the counter-examples to the first two answers, but also promises to get the extension of phenomenal presence right. In particular, while properties like being square, being red, or being a table turn out to be phenomenally present in suitable perceptual experiences, properties like having a certain reflectance profile do not. For even enjoying a colour experience, together with fully understanding what having the reflectance profile linked to the colour perceived consists in, is never enough to put us in a position to rationally judge that this experience is veridical just in case the object perceived has the reflectance profile at issue.

Nida-Rümelin’s account of phenomenal presence has some interesting philosophical consequences. First, it implies that colours—that is, the properties that objects phenomenally appear to have in colour experiences—cannot be reduced to reflectance profiles (or similar properties), thus undermining most objectivist approaches to the ontology of colours (with the exception of primitivism). Second, her account provides a satisfactory way of drawing the distinction between primary and secondary qualities: both are phenomenally present in perceptual experiences, but only the essence of secondary qualities is to be specified in terms of how they phenomenally appear to be, while the essence of primary qualities is to be specified in non-phenomenological terms. Third, Nida-Rümelin’s considerations reveal that, at least with respect to perceptual and similar experiences, the purpose of phenomenological reflection is to
provide a description of the phenomenal character of the experiences by characterizing the nature of the properties the instantiation of which renders the experiences veridical. For example, we describe what it is like to have an experience of something red and round by saying what it means for an object to be red and round, whereby redness and roundness are the properties that the object phenomenally appears to have (and not, say, any distinct physical properties in the world that the experiences might track).

4. The Determinacy and Ubiquity of Spatial Awareness

James Stazicker’s and Craig French’s contributions are also concerned with qualitative features that are in view and thus sensorily present in perceptual experience. But they concentrate specifically on the visual presence of spatial properties in experience and question two assumptions that are often—if only implicitly—made in discussions about visual perception.27

The first is that the spatial properties that we see objects as having are always maximally determinate properties. The idea is that, when we see the shape, size, distance, or location of an object, we see its most specific shape, size, distance, or location. For instance, when looking at a wall, we see it as being rectangular with a most particular proportion of height to width (e.g. exactly the one shared by standard printer paper), or as being at a precise distance in front of us (e.g. at strictly double the distance between us and the wall).

The second common assumption is that, when seeing objects, we need not always be visually aware of any of their spatial properties, notably their location. Imagine looking at the wall from very close up, or from a distance but through some powerful monocular, such that your visual field is completely filled by just a very small part of the wall. It seems that, in this case, you are visually aware neither of the wall’s size, nor of its shape. Indeed, you may not even be visually aware of its distance from you, especially if you are looking at the wall through the monocular. Similarly, there are people who have genuine visual perceptions of objects, despite suffering from heavy impairments to their capacity of visually recognizing and experiencing spatial properties. For example, subjects with Balint’s syndrome visually experience only one object at a time, even if they are faced with a multitude of objects in the direction of their gaze. As a result, they appear to remain visually unaware of the spatial relations among objects in their surroundings, as well as of the object’s spatial locations (see the discussion in French’s contribution).

27 As Stazicker notes, some of the following considerations and conclusions are unlikely to apply to the visual presence of response-dependent perceivable properties (like, arguably, colours), given that there are no instances of such properties—including maximally determinate ones—that are not open to becoming visually present in perceptual experience. For example, assuming that colours do depend for their instantiation on our ability to perceive them, an object could not be said to possess a specific shade of red if no human (or other) being would be able to see or visually discriminate this shade.
4.1 Stazicker

Now, while French raises doubts about both assumptions, Stazicker focuses his criticism on the first. His case against the idea that we always see maximally determinate spatial properties centres on the possibility that visible discriminability of lengths is not transitive. His concrete example consists in a series of parallel lines that are such that, although each pair of neighbouring lines visually seems to involve equally long lines, the two outmost lines of the series are experienced as having different lengths. According to Stazicker, proponents of the view that we always perceive maximally determinate properties can account for this example only if they assume that visual experience is ‘shifty’ in the sense that which length we experience the lines as having changes relative to which of the other lines we are comparing them with. But this explanation has the highly problematic implication that at least some of our visual experiences are misleading with respect to the true lengths of the lines concerned.

In addition, Stazicker argues that the perceivability of maximally determinate properties is in tension with the observation that the spatial resolution of vision is limited. Since we are not sensitive to differences in length below a certain threshold (e.g. 0.01 cm), we can at best maintain that we experience a length between 9.998 and 10.008 cm, say, rather than the exact length of 10.003 cm. In other words, the lengths that are visually present to us are usually determinable rather than maximally determinate. Stazicker’s own explanation of the intransitivity of length discrimination relies on the idea that the visual discrimination of two visually present lengths requires more than that they are different. They also have to be incompatible with each other, in the sense of not allowing for their simultaneous instantiation by the same line (or other object). Given that visually present lengths are determinable, this means that we can only visually discriminate lengths that do not overlap in their potential determinations.

However, once the determinacy of phenomenally present properties is given up in response to the possibility of intransitive visual discriminations of lengths, our access to those properties comes under threat as well. Stazicker’s claim here is that, whenever two visual experiences make us aware of distinct determinable properties which we are unable to visually discriminate because they are possibly determined by the same maximally specific property, we are also unable to recognize in introspection that the two experiences do make us aware of distinct determinables. For instance, if we experience a length between 9.995 and 10.005 cm and another length between 10.002 and 10.012 cm, this difference in the visual presence of determinable length will not be open to us from the inside. This conclusion also promises to block an argument from Peacocke to the effect that visual presence cannot be said to extend to precise properties (whether they are determinables or determinants).

Stazicker finishes his chapter with four further points. First, he maintains that the idea that we are always in a position to know which determinable we are aware of in experience should be rejected not only because of the possible intransitivity of visual presence, but also because it is in tension with the transparency of visual experiences of
determinable properties. Second, Stazicker suggests that the falsity of this idea deprives proponents of the claim that we always perceive maximally determinate properties of the option to point to introspective evidence in favour of their view. Third, he insists that the functional role of visual experience actually speaks against this determinacy claim. Finally, Stazicker notes that the preceding considerations and conclusions may not apply to the visual presence of response-dependent properties (like, as some think, colours), given that it is unclear how the visually present instances of such properties could fail to include the maximally determinate ones.

4.2 French

French’s aim, on the other hand, is to argue for the coherence and plausibility of the claim that seeing an object always involves seeing spatial properties. He spends most of his chapter defending this claim with respect to location properties. The idea is that, whenever we see an object, we see it as being located somewhere. Indeed, French maintains that seeing an object implies not only the existence of the object concerned, but also the object’s instantiation of some of those location properties that it is seen as having. Hence, it is his contention that, in seeing an object, we always see its actual location. However, contrary to Quassim Cassam, French does not think that it is possible to argue for this claim on the basis of the two premises that seeing an object requires its visual differentiation from other objects, and that the visual differentiation of two objects is a matter of distinguishing their locations. The problem with this line of reasoning is, for French, that we can construe cases in which we see an object without being able to visually identify it or differentiate it from other objects. For instance, when we know that we are standing on the roof of a bunker, which camouflage has rendered completely indistinguishable from the surrounding field, we may arguably see the roof, despite being unable to tell where it stops and where the field begins.

Instead, French defends the coherence and plausibility of the claim that seeing an object always amounts to seeing some of its actual location properties by offering three strategies for dealing with putative counter-examples. Cases of perceptual mislocation, for example, may be accommodated in one of two ways. First, it may be argued that, while they involve the misperception of relative locations (e.g. that something is to our right, or to the right of the table), they still involve the veridical perception of the absolute locations of the objects concerned. Second, it is possible to maintain that, while we always see the actual location properties of the mislocated objects, we need not see these properties for what they are. In other words, seeing the true location of an object (e.g. its being to our right) is compatible with mistaking this location for a different one (e.g. its being to our left). The examples of Balint’s syndrome or of the partial perception of a wall, on the other hand, require a third strategy, namely to insist that we can see determinable spatial properties without seeing their maximal determinations. While we do not see the particular locations of the objects concerned, it is still plausible to say that we see them as being located somewhere. Similar considerations apply
to spatial properties other than locations. For instance, the wall visually seems to us to be shaped and extended, even though we cannot tell which concrete shape and extension it has. French’s conclusion is therefore that, while seeing an object always involves seeing some of its spatial properties (notably aspects of location), these need not be maximally determinate properties, nor seen for what they really are.

These considerations reveal that French takes even our perceptual access to determinable spatial properties to be limited. Stazicker agrees with him on this general point, although he highlights a different limitation. Instead of focusing—like French—on the issue of whether we always see determinable properties for what they are, Stazicker observes that we cannot always tell from the inside which determinables we are perceiving. For, whenever two visual experiences make us aware of distinct determinables that do not render their bearers discriminable because they are possibly determined by the same maximally specific property, we are also unable to recognize in introspection that the two experiences make us aware of distinct determinables. For instance, if we experience a length between 9.995 and 10.005 cm and another length between 10.002 and 10.012 cm, this difference in the visual presence of determinable length will not be open to our introspection. In this respect, Stazicker suggests that the idea that we can always tell introspectively which determinable property we are currently seeing is in tension with the transparency of visual experiences of determinable properties.

5. Hidden and Occluded Things

Amy Kind and Jérôme Dokic shift the debate to qualitative features that are out of sight because they are hidden or occluded. When we are looking at ordinary objects, we usually experience them as three-dimensional wholes, even though we do not have a perceptual impression of their backsides and occluded parts. For example, we experience a person facing us from behind a lectern as a person with a back and with legs, although we see neither her back, nor her legs. In Dokic’s terminology, we are ‘visually aware’ of a whole person and prepared to form the perceptual judgement that there is a whole person in front of us, although only part of the person is ‘visually apparent’ to us.

Cases like this give rise to the question of how such unseen aspects can figure in our respective perceptual experiences and, especially, whether they are phenomenally present in a visual or a non-visual manner. One answer that has recently gained popularity is to argue that our awareness of the part out of sight is, in one way or another, due to our sensorimotor abilities. For example, according to Alva Noë’s prominent theory of enactive perception, we experience the person as having legs and a back because our experience of her upper front involves our implicit understanding or anticipation of how she would look if we were to move around her, or if she herself would move (i.e. we have a grasp of what Noë calls the ‘sensorimotor profile’ of the person). Insofar as we implicitly know that we would see her back and legs when looking at her from behind, or if she would come out from behind the lectern, we are already aware of her as a
whole person while seeing just her upper torso from the front. Kind and Dokic are united in objecting to this sensorimotor view. But they provide different alternative accounts of the phenomenal presence of hidden features of objects.

5.1 Kind

For one thing, Kind argues that sensorimotor expectation is not sufficient for phenomenal presence. In particular, implicit knowledge that we would come to see a certain, currently hidden feature of an object if the object changed its position, or if we adopted a different perspective on it, is not sufficient for experiencing the object as possessing this feature. For instance, although we know or expect that we would see the liquid inside if we looked into the opening of a new can of diet coke, the liquid in the can does not figure—not even in a non-sensory manner—in our perceptual experience of the can when we are looking at it from the side. Or, at least, it does not figure in our experience to the same extent, say, as the backside of the can, of which we know that we would see it if we looked at the can from the other side. Kind’s point is that, when seeing the can, we are aware of it as a whole with a backside, but not to the same degree as a container with some specific fluid inside.

Similarly, Noë’s view has problems to account for the fact that whether certain unseen aspects of objects figure in our perceptual experiences is a matter of degree and open to dynamic changes. If the person briefly emerges from behind the lectern and reveals bright orange shoes, these shoes will figure more vividly or strongly in our experience of her once she will step again behind the lectern than did her shoes before we caught a glimpse of their distinctive colour; while this effect is likely to diminish over time, once our initial surprise about the colour has receded. By contrast, our expectations concerning the sensorimotor profile of the shoes are relatively stable and do not vary in their strength relative to the colour that we anticipate the shoes to look as having.

Besides, Kind notes that Noë can at best hope to establish the claim that the presence of the unseen features in perceptual experience depends on our sensorimotor knowledge and expectations. But this does not answer the question what our conscious awareness of these features consists in, given that aspects of conscious experience cannot be reduced to non-occurrent instances of implicit understanding or anticipation.

As a better alternative to the sensorimotor approach, Kind defends the view that our awareness of the relevant hidden features of perceived objects is imaginative in nature. The kind of imagining concerned is imagistic and objectual, rather than non-imagistic and propositional; and, at least in many cases, spontaneous rather than deliberate. This view elucidates cases like the initial example as follows: while we see the upper front of the person behind the lectern, we simultaneously visualize her back, her legs, and possibly also her orange shoes as part of the same perceptual experience. It is in this sense that her hidden features are phenomenally present to us, despite the fact that they are ‘absent’ in the sense of being currently out of sight. Moreover, since the kind of imagination involved is imagistic, the hidden features are presumably phenomenally
present in a sensory and, indeed, visual manner (i.e. perspectivally and, at least often, with a relatively high degree of specificity).

In addition, Kind maintains that her own proposal can explain the quantitative variations and dynamic changes in phenomenal presence. More specifically, what may be able to do the explaining is the fact that episodes of visualizing—as well as its counterparts in other sensory modalities—allow for differences in degree (e.g. in vivacity, control, etc.) and may lead to changes in our knowledge and practical interests. Her view thus promises a better explanation of phenomenal presence than Noë’s enactive proposal.

5.2 Dokic

Dokic agrees with Kind’s rejection of the sensorimotor view. One of his additional arguments is that implicit sensorimotor understanding or anticipation is not necessary for non-sensory phenomenal presence. Being aware of someone as a person (in contrast, say, to being aware of them as a robot) involves being aware of them as a living being (i.e. as a being with a certain kind of DNA), which evidently is not a property open to sensorimotor detection or representation. Moreover, it is tempting to understand the implicit knowledge involved in sensorimotor anticipation as a matter of some kind of inclination to believe. But this raises the question of how belief tendencies are supposed to give rise to phenomenal presence. After all, while phenomenal presence is an occurrent episode in the stream of consciousness, doxastic inclinations are nothing but non-conscious dispositions or standing conditions. True, we may follow the tendencies concerned and form corresponding occurrent beliefs or thoughts (i.e. the dispositions or standing conditions may manifest themselves in consciousness). But, as Dokic rightly points out, it seems to be perfectly possible to be perceptually aware of a person as a whole (and not only of the parts of her that are in view) without forming any judgements or occurrent beliefs about there being a whole person in front of us.

Before Dokic provides his own account of how a doxastic account of phenomenal presence might work, he also objects to Kind’s account in terms of imagination. He lists three particular objections to the idea of Kind and others that the phenomenal presence of hidden or occluded features in perception is imaginative. His first objection is that it is difficult to reconcile the active character of imagining and its resulting lack of justificatory power with the passivity and knowledge-conduciveness of our perceptual awareness of objects as wholes with hidden or occluded parts. For example, it is unclear how imagining the back and the legs of the person behind the lectern could justify us in coming to believe her to be a living person with a back and legs. The second worry is the imagination view cannot account for the fact that we appear to be unable to influence our perception of an object by imagining its hidden or occluded parts as being a certain way. Merely imagining the person behind the lectern not to have legs, or to be robot, does not appear to change that we see her as a living person with legs. Third, as already observed by Husserl, imagination itself allows for the
distinction between features 'seen' and 'unseen.' When we close our eyes and visualize a woman behind a lectern, our imaginative experience makes us aware of her as a whole living person with legs and a back, although these parts of her are not 'in view' from the point of view inherent to our imaginative experience. So, the difference between the two kinds of phenomenal presence does not seem to be one in imagination—especially if the imagination concerned is said to be imagistic.

As an alternative to both the sensorimotor and the imagination approach, Dokic defends his own doxastic account, according to which the kind of phenomenal presence at issue consists in a felt inclination to believe that is caused by a relevant instance of more basic, clearly sensory phenomenal presence. To return to our example, seeing the front of the upper torso of the person behind the lectern causes us to be inclined to judge that there is a whole living person before our eyes. This view improves on the doxastic interpretation of the sensorimotor view in that it takes the belief tendencies to be felt, that is, to be accompanied by an experience of being compelled to believe, which forms part of the stream of consciousness.

Dokic elaborates on this view by highlighting five further aspects of it. First, which beliefs we are inclined to have depends partly on our background knowledge or similar contextual features. While visiting an exhibition of robots, we might instead be disposed to believe the figure behind the lectern to be an automaton. Second, the respective aspects of the perceived objects are phenomenally present because the inclinations concerned are felt in an affective-like way. For instance, we are not just disposed, but feel motivated to form the judgement that there is a normal living person behind the lectern. Third, because the hidden and occluded features of objects are salient due to felt inclinations to believe, they are phenomenally present in a non-sensory manner (unlike the perceivable features that are in our view). So, the disagreement between Kind and Dokic extends not only to the issue of whether the kind of phenomenal presence under discussion is imaginative or doxastic, but also to the issue of whether it is sensory or not. Fourth, Dokic notes that the fact that objects are phenomenally present as a whole need not imply that their hidden or occluded parts are phenomenally present, too. While our perceptual experience prompts us to judge that there is a whole person behind the lectern, this experience alone might not be enough to also incline us to judge that this person has a back and legs. Fifth, the doxastic view promises to be applicable not only to the perception of objects with hidden or occluded parts, but also to perception of higher-level properties, such as belonging to a certain natural or artefactual kind, or being a particular person.

6. Categorical Aspects of Perceptual Experience

The final three contributions examine aspects of phenomenal presence that do not change from perceptual experience to perceptual experience. Indeed, an argument can be made that these categorical aspects are not restricted to perception, but are also involved in other kinds of experience, and possibly even in thought. As already noted,
the objects and properties that are visually present to us usually differ from case to case. One moment, we see a black cat; the next, a white dog; and then something else again. In other words, perceptual phenomenal presence is changeable with respect to the qualitative properties that objects are visually perceived as having. By contrast, there are some phenomenally present aspects that remain constant in most, if not all, cases of perceptual experience; or so we argue.

Tom Crowther emphasizes the fact that it matters for phenomenal presence whether it occurs while we are awake or while we are asleep. His contention is that, without getting clearer about what wakeful experiences are like and how they phenomenally differ from non-wakeful experiences, we cannot arrive at a full account of perceptual (or other kinds of) phenomenal presence.

By contrast, Derek Brown and I draw attention to phenomenally present features that appear to pertain to all objects of perception—but, arguably, are missing in other kinds of experience, such as imaginative ones. In particular, both of us maintain that perceived objects and properties strike us as external (or mind-independent) and existing (or real). When we see cats, dogs, or other objects, we have the impression that they are actually there, before our eyes, as part of the objective world. Merely imagined entities typically lack these two aspects: our imaginative experiences usually do not present their objects as existing independently of our awareness of them, or as belonging to our actual surroundings.

Of course, the impressions of externality and existence involved in perceptual experience may be misleading. On the one hand, what is perceived may not really be part of the external world, either because it is internal to the mind (as claimed, say, by sense-data theories), or because it is merely projected by us into the external world (as maintained by projectivist views). On the other hand, the perceived objects or properties may not always exist—for instance, if intentionalist accounts of perception are right in claiming that perceptual experiences allow for error and thus can be hallucinatory or illusionary. But it is Brown’s and my contention that, even if some or all perceptual experiences fail to establish a direct perceptual relation to existing external entities, it still appears to us as if they manage to do so.  

This aspect of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences is particularly interesting because the aspects of externality and existence (unlike, say, the blackness of the cat or the whiteness of the dog) are phenomenally present in a non-sensory manner and, moreover, pertain centrally to all perceptions alike. Getting clearer about these aspects of experience may thus promise a general solution to the puzzle of how objects and

28 While projectivists usually accept the claim that perceived objects strike us as external (e.g. Boghossian and Velleman 1989 or Brown’s contribution), sense-data theorists sometimes deny this claim. However, even then, they typically do not replace it with the opposing claim that perceived entities strike us as internal, but rather tend to stay neutral on this issue (e.g. Hume 2000: 1.4.2; see Martin 2000 for discussion). Besides, there are good reasons for proponents of sense-data theory (and everyone else) to accept that perception involves an impression of externality (Martin 2000; Dorsch 2016a).
features distinct from experience can still be phenomenally present in experience. Brown’s proposal is that perceptual phenomenal presence is a matter of projection. Accordingly, what we directly perceive merely seems to be external and distinct from experience, while it is in fact just experientially projected into the world. By contrast, my suggestion is that perceptual presence—and phenomenal presence, more generally (see Dorsch 2016a)—is, fundamentally, due to the determination of perceptual experiences by external objects.

6.1 Dorsch

My discussion starts off with a defence of the idea that the externality and existence of perceived entities are indeed phenomenally present to us. According to the traditional argument from hallucination, the naïve realist claim that perceptions make us aware of existing external objects is in tension with the possibility of hallucinatory perceptions (i.e. perceptual experiences that occur without the existence of a perceived external object). While disjunctivists reject the idea that hallucinatory experiences should count as perceptual in the first place, intentionalists and sense-data theorists accept this idea and debate whether to give up on the externality or the existence of the perceived objects (at least in the case of hallucinations). But, independently of how this dispute should be resolved, it is conspicuous that all parties to the debate maintain that it is ‘obvious’ that they are right about the nature of the perceived entities (i.e. that they are external, existing, or both). In my view, the best explanation for this ‘obviousness’ is that we have defeasible introspective evidence for both the externality and the existence of what we perceive. For instance, sense-data theorists claim that it is ‘evident’ that we perceive existing objects and properties because their existence is phenomenally present to us and therefore accessible from the inside. Alternative explanations—such that sense-data theorists have fallen victim to the intentional fallacy of moving from the thought ‘it perceptually seems as if there is a black cat’ to the thought ‘there exists something that perceptually seems to be a black cat’—would simply be too uncharitable.

My contribution continues to address the issue of what follows from the fact that perceived entities phenomenally seem to be part of mind-independent reality. The main thought is that this fact reveals the distinctive relationality of perception. More specifically, in presenting us with existing external entities, perceptual experiences strike us as being determined by those entities. That is, the perceived entities appear to influence how we perceive them as being. When we see a green chameleon, we have the impression that our experience presents the chameleon as green (and not yellow, say) because it is green. Indeed, we normally expect that, if the animal were to move to a different location and, as a result, were to change its colour, which colour we experience it as having would change, too. Again, our impression might be false—for example, if the experience concerned is non-veridical in the relevant respect. But even if we just were to hallucinate a green chameleon, it would
still appear to us (at least as long as we would remain unaware of the hallucinatory character of our experience) as if the phenomenal presence of greenness is due to the fact that the animal is actually green.

Finally, I argue for the claim that the phenomenal presence of perceptual determination gives rise to the phenomenal presence of perceptual reasons. It is widely accepted that (veridical) perceptual experiences provide us with reasons for beliefs about the appearance of the perceived objects. Furthermore, perceptions do so primarily because which appearance they present objects as having is normally determined by which appearance those objects actually have. Indeed, we could not be in any better epistemic position with respect to the perceivable appearances of external objects. As a consequence, it seems plausible to say that perceptual reasons are phenomenally present insofar as what is responsible for their occurrence—namely the determination relation—is phenomenally present. But this means that we are able to notice reasons in an experiential, non-conceptual manner—which helps to avoid a pertinent dilemma concerning rational motivation. It is very common to endorse the doxasticist view that we can become aware of reasons only by means of normative beliefs (e.g. ‘p gives me reason to believe that q’). But, on the assumption that infants are incapable of having such beliefs, doxasticists face the dilemma of having to choose between the Kantian claim that being motivated requires recognizing reasons and the Humean claim that infants are capable of being motivated. The idea that reasons can be phenomenally present offers an elegant solution to this problem by rejecting doxasticism.

6.2 Brown

Brown's central goal, on the other hand, is to provide support for a projectivist theory of perception, primarily by arguing that it is well placed to account for the phenomenal presence of (what seem to be) existing external entities while paying justice to various challenges to the actual externality of said entities. Standard accounts of perceptual presence (like my own) assume that the impressions of externality and existence are reflections of the real externality and existence of the entities concerned. In other words, that our perception of a black cat presents it as existing in our external environment is said to be due to the fact that the cat is actually part of that environment. By contrast, Brown's projectivism maintains that perceptual experiences can present something as being part of the outside world, even though it is nothing but a projection of our mind into that world. Indeed, according to his view, the cat perceptually strikes us as being there before our eyes because our perception (or our perceptual system) projects it into the external world. Nonetheless, Brown intends to leave it open for the time being whether the kind of projection involved is literal (i.e. what is projected are really existing internal qualia or sense-data) or figurative (i.e. what is projected into the outside world does not exist at all, not even inside the mind).

It should be unproblematic to assume the existence of our capacity for projection, given that, as Brown observes, there are many non-perceptual or non-veridical experiences—such as after-images, phantom pains, or auditory hallucinations—that
are difficult to explain without reference to some form of projection. What is more controversial, however, is the extension of projectivism to veridical perception. Brown illustrates that this extension is not novel, given that several extant accounts of perception—notably sense-data theory, Chalmer's (2006) Edenic view, and versions of realism about intrinsic qualia that accept that we experience at least some of these qualia as features of external objects—are arguably forms of projectivism themselves. But Brown's form of projectivism differs from these views in that it is committed neither to the existence of sense-data, nor to the truth of mind/body dualism, nor necessarily to the existence or projection of intrinsic qualia.

His defence of projectivism is centred on the idea that this view fares better on a number of scores than its main direct realist and intentionalist rivals, namely: representationalism, which generally denies that perceptual experience involves projection; and the kind of qualia realism that denies qualia are projected and presented as external. According to Brown, projectivism is more successful than this kind of qualia realism with respect to accommodating the pro-representationalist observation that perceptual experiences are transparent to external entities. And projectivism is to be preferred over representationalism (and non-intentionalist naïve realism, for that matter) because it can handle better pro-qua1ia arguments from blurry vision, variations in unique hue perception, and the possibility of spectrum inversion. As a result, projectivism promises to preserve both the intentionalist idea that the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences is just a matter of what is directly perceived, and the projectivist idea that what is directly perceived is just a projection.

Brown further defends this view by criticizing several attempts at showing that not all aspects of perceptual phenomenal presence can be explained solely in terms of projection, but also require reference to other factors (such as imagination or emotional feeling). His conclusion is therefore that projection is all that is needed to account for the perceptual phenomenal presence of (seemingly) existing external objects.

6.3 Crowther

In addition to the issue of which features may be phenomenally present, there is also the issue of how they may be phenomenally present. At the beginning, I already introduced one particular distinction among the ways in which features may be phenomenally present: they may contribute to the phenomenal character of the experiences concerned either in a sensory or in a non-sensory manner. But, as Thomas Crowther notes in his contribution to this volume, there is another important distinction, namely that between wakeful and non-wakeful phenomenal presence. It is difficult to deny that we enjoy conscious experiences of objects phenomenally appearing to be a certain way not only while we are awake, but also while we are asleep. For example, our dream of walking through a city is likely to involve visual experiences of the buildings and people surrounding us, or auditory experiences of street noises, even though these experiences may very well turn out to be non-veridical or concerned with internal rather than external objects. This raises the question of whether the kind of phenomenal presence
involved in wakeful experience is the same as the kind of phenomenal presence involved in non-wakeful experience.

Crowther maintains that we should give a negative answer to this question. In consequence, he explores different options of how best to spell out the phenomenal difference between wakeful and non-wakeful awareness. Crowther’s main goal is to identify the aspects of phenomenal presence that are distinctive of wakeful experiences and distinguishes them from non-wakeful experiences. His primary foci of comparison are thereby imaginings and dreams—dreams because they are the prime example of non-wakeful awareness; and imaginings because they are very similar to dreams (e.g. much more so than perceptions). Indeed, Crowther assumes that dreaming is an instance of imagination, and that, in comparing wakeful imagining to dreaming, we in fact compare it to non-wakeful imagining. Nonetheless, he intends his considerations to apply to wakeful and non-wakeful experiences more generally, and thus ultimately also to perceptual experiences.

Crowther’s specific starting point is the observation that there is in fact a phenomenal difference between, say, wakefully imagining a certain scenario in a sensory manner and dreaming that scenario in the very same manner (both times in the complete absence of any actual perceptions or bodily sensations). Now, if dreaming indeed involves the same kind of imaginative experiences and thoughts as in wakeful imagining, the phenomenal difference has to pertain to the strict contrast between being awake and being asleep. In particular, as Crowther argues at length, the difference cannot just be a matter of degree. For instance, it is not the case that non-wakeful imaginings are phenomenologically closer to perceptions, involve a higher degree of immersion of the subject (e.g. in the shape of additional imagined or real beliefs), or are more replete, determinate, or intense than wakeful imaginings.

We therefore need an account of the nature of wakeful consciousness and how it compares with non-wakeful awareness. Crowther begins with a critical discussion of O’Shaughnessy’s view on the matter. According to the latter, wakeful consciousness is to be characterized in terms of its involvement of self-knowing agency which influences the occurrence and order of experiences and renders the resulting stream of consciousness intelligible to the subject (e.g. concerning why, and how, the experiences occurred). Because non-wakeful states of consciousness lack this phenomenologically salient agency (though they may involve other forms of mental activity), they differ phenomenally from the state of being awake. However, one problem with O’Shaughnessy’s view is that we seem to enjoy periods of wakefulness that do not involve any self-knowing agency, or even any activity at all (e.g. when we daydream and let our mind wander, or when we experience hypnagogic images or images induced by hallucinogens). Moreover, instances of ludic dreaming are arguably self-knowingly active in the way described, again undermining the attempt to use this kind of agency to draw the contrast between wakeful and non-wakeful awareness of phenomenal presence. Finally, it is not easy to apply O’Shaughnessy’s account to animals that are capable of sleeping and being awake, but lack the capacity for self-knowing agency.
Crowther’s main suggestion is that we can overcome these problems if we replace the condition of self-knowing agency with the condition of being empowered to make use of one’s various capacities (including self-knowing agency, but also sense perception and other abilities). Accordingly, a non-lucidly or lucidly dreaming person counts as asleep because she is incapacitated with respect to all, or at least most, of her general powers to perceive, think, act, and so on; while an imagining, daydreaming, or hallucinating person counts as awake because she is, on the whole, in a position to actualize her different potentials, even if she may not currently do so. More specifically, wakeful experiences differ from non-wakeful experiences in that only the former, but not the latter, are to be explained by reference to the subject’s being empowered to employ her various capacities. These considerations apply to animals, too, only with the proviso that they possess fewer, or different, abilities with respect to which they may be capacitated or not.

One important result of Crowther’s proposal is that wakefulness may become phenomenologically salient in very different ways, depending on which capacities are concerned. That is, what it is like to be awake for a person who is enjoying a passive experience of seeing may greatly diverge from what it is like to be awake for a person who is enjoying an active experience of imagining. In accordance with this, Crowther concludes that there is no single ‘quality’ of wakefulness, and that perceptual phenomenal presence is one, but by no means the only way for wakefulness to become phenomenologically salient. But his considerations also show that an account of perceptual phenomenal presence is incomplete if it does not pay justice to the fact that they occur while we are awake, and that they phenomenally differ in this respect from experiences that occur while we are asleep.

References


