Re-Writing The Just War Tradition
An Historical Argument with Moral Implications

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History has to be rewritten in every generation, because although the past does not change the present does; each generation asks new questions of the past, and finds new areas of sympathy as it re-lives different aspects of the experiences of its predecessors.¹

Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down, p. 15.

Introduction

One of the hallmarks of modernity is its rather frosty relationship to history, understood as the study of the past.¹¹ Ever since Renee Descartes compared historical inquiry to foreign travel, quipping that both broaden the mind but neither deepens it, a queue of notables has formed to rubbish the idea that the study of the past may be a worthwhile endeavour in the present.¹³ ‘History is more or less bunk’, Henry Ford told the Chicago Tribune. ‘We don’t want tradition. We want to live in the present and the only history that is worth a tinker’s dam is the history we made today’.¹⁴ Latterly, Tony Blair articulated similar sentiments during his Prime Ministerial tenure. ‘There has never been a time’, he proposed, ‘when, except in the most general sense, a study of history provides so little instruction for our present day’.¹⁵ History, if we are to heed these voices, might make for a diverting pastime for the amateur enthusiast, but is not an appropriate undertaking for the serious-minded among us. Living as we do in an age of unprecedented change, the study of the past is perceived as holding little worth for today’s policymakers.¹⁶ This scepticism towards history is particularly acute when it comes to war. As armies the world over habitually prepare for the previous rather than the next battle, historical inquiry is easily dismissed, not just as a useless indulgence, but as a dangerous distraction.¹⁷
This historical scepticism penetrates sufficiently deep that it troubles mainstream accounts of the ethics of war. Its influence is apparent in Michael Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars*, wherein he declares that his interest lies 'not with the making of the moral world but with its present character'. This formulation—latterly taken up by scholars associated with the Anglo-American Political Theory approach to the ethics of war—conveys both a reluctance to delve into the historical development of the just war tradition, and a preference for a more analytical treatment of the principles that it bestows upon us today. Although appealing, this aspiration ought to raise doubts in the mind of the reader. Foremost among them, can one really, as Walzer and company propose, divorce just war past from just war present, and study 'practical morality' as if it were 'detached from its foundations'? Sympathetic to these concerns, a large but often overlooked group of just war theorists have contested the prevailing historical scepticism. Rejecting the analytical approach, they assert 'the fundamentally historical character' of ethical inquiry into war. This essay will examine the historical approach (as I shall call it) put forward by these scholars. It will contend that while the historical approach has much to commend it, it requires substantive reformulation if it is to overcome its own limitations. Going beyond this, it will propose a means by which this might be realized: namely, an expansion of our historical field of reference to incorporate pre-Christian sources.

The structure of this paper is straightforward. The first section will set out the basic tenets of the historical approach to the ethics of war. The second section will recount the criticisms that may be (and indeed have been) levelled at this approach. Section Three will offer a verdict on the preceding debate.
Section Four will then press beyond this by elaborating a new and more sophisticated research agenda for the historical approach to the ethics of war; one that, by stirring in what we might call the pre-history of the tradition, suggests a radically different conception of the just war. The Conclusion will set this proposal against broader ideas relating to the value of history as a critical tool.

The Case For the Historical Approach

The approach espoused by historical sceptics supposes that one does not need to be versed in Latin, or know the provenance of the *jus ad bellum* or *jus in bello*, to think in a meaningful way about the ethical issues raised by war. Perhaps this is right, but there is a large body of scholarship that would seem to believe otherwise. In actuality, most scholars who write about the ethics of war devote plenty of ink to historical matters. This is evidenced by a cursory glance at the table of contents of almost any primer on the ethics of war: most include at least a chapter dedicated to history. Of course, the history that they serve up is often confined to an opening chapter or even a few pages at the beginning of their discussion, and is presented as a background against which contemporary debates and issues can be more easily understood. In these instances, history is treated as a mapping device that ought to be put aside once proper analysis begins in earnest. But this is not the only way that history features in mainstream treatments of the ethics of war. Alternative, and arguably more expansive, approaches to history abound in the wider literature. This section will outline, first, these approaches and, second, the methodological justifications
Rounding out this section, and paving the way for the one that follows, I will connect this discussion to broader debates about method in the social sciences and humanities.

**Standard Practices**

The literature reveals a number of interesting historical studies of the ethics of war as practiced either at particular junctures in time (e.g. the Middle Ages) or by certain sectors of society (e.g., the knightly class), as well as a number of useful anthologies that gather together historical treatments of the ethics of war. But the most common approach to history found in the literature sets the ethics of war in terms of the deeper traditions from which they ostensibly derive. Though there are many such traditions, the just war tradition is far and away the most prominent, at least in the western world. But what does it mean in practice to set the ethics of war in terms of the just war tradition? Some recent monographs give us a good idea of this.

Alex Bellamy’s excellent *Just Wars* is a prime candidate. It submits that current debates about the ethics of war are best understood by situating them within the variegated historical development of the just war tradition. In effect, this means relating present-day dilemmas and debates to the different streams of thought that contributed to the formation and evolution of that tradition. Accordingly, Bellamy devotes the second half of this monograph to examining a series of current debates (regarding humanitarian intervention, terrorism, anticipation, and so forth) against the history of the just war tradition as it is traced in the first half of the text. Of interest for reasons that will later become apparent, Bellamy recounts the history of the tradition as comprising a series of
epochs: an originary period dating back to the writings of Augustine and the latter years of the Roman empire, a period of codification associated with the treatises of Thomas Aquinas and his scholastic successors in the late medieval and early modern era, a juridical turn initiated by Hugo Grotius and his followers in the centuries turning on the Wars of Religion, and a partial reformulation in the language of human rights in the latter half of the Twentieth Century.

Readers will recognize that both the structure of Bellamy’s text and the trajectory of the history it traces are quite conventional. Parallels can certainly be drawn with other texts. Consider Paul Christophe’s *The Ethics of War and Peace*, for instance. The first part of this book treats the historical development of the just war tradition – with chapters covering the Roman roots of the tradition, its early formulation in Christian political theology, the specific contribution made by Augustine to its elaboration, and its later secularization– while the latter chapters draw on this history to treat moral issues that arise in contemporary war. David Fisher’s highly valuable *Morality and War* also treads a similar path, at least in terms of the history that it narrates. Once again, the development of the ethics of war is related to the just war tradition, which is itself depicted as a protean body of thought rooted in Augustine’s meditations on the sunset of the Roman Empire, and elaborated by generations of canonists, theologians, and jurists, from Aquinas to Grotius, and right up to the present day. The point here is not to diminish the achievements of these books. Rather it is to draw attention to the prominent but conventional account of (and approach to) the historical development of the just war tradition that they take on. In each case, the history of the just war tradition is both fore-grounded as a valuable historical resource and recounted via a stock developmental narrative.
that commences with Augustine and runs through to the present day.

Four Themes

Despite the apparent prevalence of the historical approach, only a very few scholars have taken the trouble to justify the principles underpinning it. These happy exceptions are James Turner Johnson, John Kelsay, and, to a lesser degree, Alia Brahimi. Although the work produced by these scholars reflects as many differences as commonalities, it makes sense for my purposes to treat them together, glossing four themes that emerge from their aggregate endeavours.

The first of these themes is the idea that the history of the just war tradition is worth studying because it gathers together the learning of previous generations and provides ‘guidelines to moral decision-making today’.xviii According to this perspective, the evolution of the tradition over time reveals a robust but adaptive framework that can be profitably extended to contemporary issues. In Johnson’s words, it represents ‘a fund of practical moral wisdom, based not in abstract speculation or theorization, but in reflection on actual problems encountered in war as these have presented themselves in different historical circumstances’.xix Only a fool would neglect such a body of learning, a corpus described by both Johnson and Kelsay as a ‘storehouse’ of communal wisdom, when confronted by ethical dilemmas pertaining to modern war.xx This, then, is a Burkean view that supposes that attention to historical experience, embodied in tradition, offers the best tutor for the practice of both warfare and moral reflection.xxi

The second theme builds on the first by stressing the contextual quality of all moral rules, including those relating to war. John Kelsay puts it succinctly

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when he states that the rules that govern the use of force are the products of particular communities at particular moments in time. If we are to grasp the full meaning of these rules, he counsels, the trick is not to abstract away from them to generalizable norms, but to situate them within the evolving body of thought and practice that gave rise to them. For it is only through the concrete forms they assumed in particular historical milieu that we can acquire a rich sense of their dimension and reference. By so doing we can glean a more comprehensive understanding of these rules, thereby equipping us all the better to extend or adapt them to contemporary circumstances. A narrow and a broad point both follow from this. The narrow point is that this approach assumes that moral reflection on warfare ought to take the form of a continuing dialogue with past generations and their understandings of what comprises the right and the good in relation to warfare. The broad point is that a dialogue of this kind furnishes us with a better understanding not just of the past, but also of the present. By acquainting ourselves with their historical origins and usage we gain a deeper appreciation of the concepts and terms that are the subject of contemporary discourse, and, by extension, a deeper appreciation of how our history has bequeathed us with a particular moral vocabulary and, ultimately, made us who we now are.

The third theme emphasizes the possibility that the history of the just war tradition can be deployed to discipline contemporary usage of just war ideas. This programme is pressed home by Alia Brahimi in her 2010 monograph, *Jihad and Just War in the War on Terror*. In this book, Brahimi’s declared aim is to engage critically with the ideas and arguments offered by the various protagonists in the War on Terror by examining them against their earlier usage
in the traditions that they invoke.\textsuperscript{xxv} Her sharp critique of the Bush administration’s doctrine of pre-emption furnishes a telling example of just how effective this approach can be.\textsuperscript{xxvi} Kelsay and Johnson also endorse it. Kelsay contends that a good grasp of the history of the just war tradition can expose the poverty of much current discourse by revealing those instances where it ‘elides or obfuscates options developed by our forebears’\textsuperscript{xxvii} Johnson is more assertive, claiming that contemporary forms of just war reasoning ‘should be tested by reference to the broader, inclusive conception of just war found in the historical consensus out of which, in various ways, the variety of contemporary just war discourses have come’\textsuperscript{xxviii} In each case the assumption is that the historical tradition supplies both the site and the material for an internal critique of current forms of just war reasoning.

This leads to the fourth and final theme, which is that the ‘conversation with past generations’ advocated by Johnson, Kelsay, and Brahimi ought to fulfil a critical function by highlighting the parochialism of our own reflections on war and introducing us to other, possibly forgotten, ways of thinking about the issues raised by military conflict.\textsuperscript{xxix} Johnson expresses this point quite clearly in his early work when he states that a deep historical perspective on the ethics of war will have a relativizing effect, exposing the tendentious, time- and culture-bound character of contemporary just war thought.\textsuperscript{xxx} But it is Kelsay who puts it most artfully. He draws on a passage from C.S. Lewis to bolster his own claim that historical study acquaints us with ways of thinking that are ‘different from our own’. Good scholarship, he quotes Lewis, is always important, but not the only requirement:
Most of all, perhaps, we need intimate knowledge of the past. Not that the past has any magic about it, but because we cannot study the future, and yet need something to set against the present, to remind us that the basic assumptions have been quite different in different periods and that much which seems certain to the uneducated is merely temporary fashion. A man who has lived in many places is not likely to be deceived by the errors of his native village: the scholar has lived in many times and is therefore in some degree immune from the great cataract of nonsense that pours from the press and microphone of his own age. 

Thus framed, historical study serves to remind us that no matter how natural present arrangements may appear, they are the product of a particular set of historical circumstances, and are therefore subject to revision. As such, an historical approach is essential to any efforts to think in a critical manner about the ethics of war.

**Broader Debates**

The arguments just surveyed connect with certain strands of historicist thought that we might find in the broader methodological debates taking place in the social sciences and humanities. While one could devote plenty of effort to an explication of historicism, I will confine myself to a brief discussion of some of its key tenets as articulated by two of its more notable proponents – one ancient, one contemporary. The aim is not to delve too deeply into the issues they raise, but merely to round out my sketch of the historical approach to the ethics of war. This will prove helpful when we turn in the next section to the criticisms levelled at this approach.

Dionysius of Halycarnassus, a Greek historian of the 1st Century BCE, is best known for giving us the aphorism, ‘History is philosophy teaching by examples’. This gnomic expression could be easily disregarded as a cliché, but
that would be a mistake. In actuality, it captures in a very concise way a set of interpretative principles that emphasize the close relation between context and moral reasoning. Whereas there is a tendency in the modern world to extrapolate abstract universal principles from human experience, Dionysius counsels that we should strive instead to treat historic episodes and phenomena as singularities that refuse assimilation into generalized patterns or laws of behaviour. Teaching (and learning) by this method demands that we ‘infer from each example an explanatory context, and through this act of restoration or archaeology resurrect the medium in which the example makes sense’.

Setting the historical example in its context in this way is, Paul Hamilton explains, a little bit like ‘learning the language in which it speaks’. We must become enlivened to the multiplicity of interpretations that any example is amenable to, and the variety of senses in which it might be taken. This is, in other words, a horizon-expanding exercise that sensitizes us to the different ways in which things were done in the past. As such it supplies a rich backdrop against which to reconsider the way we do them today. As Hamilton puts it, the onerous task of acquainting ourselves with the variety of different ways in which our example could be rendered intelligible will lead us to develop ‘a sharper picture than perhaps we hitherto possessed of our own assumptions and methods’.

This latter point is given fuller expression by a contemporary figure, Quentin Skinner, who is closely associated with the Cambridge School. Skinner has repeatedly argued that the study of history has the power to illuminate the contingencies of our intellectual heritage, thereby providing us with a keener sense of the limitations, and ultimately the mutability, of the institutions it gave
rise to and which endure to the present day. This being the case, the role of the historian is similar, he writes, to that of the exorcist:

An understanding of the past can help us to appreciate how far the values embodied in our present way of life, and our present ways of thinking about those values, reflects a series of choices made at different times between different possible worlds. This awareness can help to liberate us from the grip of any one hegemonal account of those values and how they should be interpreted and understood. Equipped with a broader sense of possibility, we can stand back from the intellectual commitments we have inherited and ask ourselves in a new spirit of enquiry what we should think of them.xxxiv

Here we have, then, a clear expression of the hopes and principles that appear to underlie the writings of those who practice an historical approach to the ethics of war. Namely, that the study of the past can provide us with a ‘salutary point of vantage’ on the present, enabling us to look beyond the limited confines of local beliefs and current arrangements.xxxv On a passing note, the reader would do well to note the subtext that it is precisely the difference of the past, its strangeness, its distance from the present world, the renders it useful in the way described here.xxxvi We will return to this point later.

The Case Against the Historical Approach

The idea that the best way to study the ethics of war is to study the history of the ethics of war is vulnerable to three primary lines of critique. The first is the notion that a reliance on history is indicative of a conservative approach, one that is unduly impressed by established authorities and familiar ideas. The second is the refrain that the study of the remote past is an ivory tower pursuit
that has little connection to the real world. The third is the claim that any time spent researching the historical development of the just war tradition is a distraction from the ‘fierce urgency of now’. The sharpness of these critiques is a good indicator of the strength of the challenge posed by historical scepticism. This section will provide a brief synopsis and examination of each in turn.

‘A Nightmare From Which We Cannot Awake’\textsuperscript{xxxvii}

To talk about the ethics of war in the terms of a particular historical tradition such as the just war is, of course, to fall back upon the wisdom of a pre-selected canon of great texts, extending at least from Augustine to Grotius. As various scholars have already pointed out, this is not unproblematic.\textsuperscript{xxxviii} To talk about the ethics of war in these terms, as if it were an inheritance drawn directly from the great and the good of previous generations, may be perceived as a form of subservience to the experience of the past. For instance, why hark back to Aquinas or Vitoria or some other such long-dead figure, we might ask, when looking for an answer or a response to a contemporary problem, such as how to think about the rights and wrongs of drone warfare? What light can they shed on present-day ethical dilemmas? Critics would respond that they have very little direct illumination to offer. Their venerability in the literature instead reflects the view that their ideas have endured the test of time. Their authority, it follows, is borne merely of their age, that is, of the fact that they have been around for a long time.

None of this is to gainsay the attraction of the historical approach. There are many reasons why one might find it an appealing way to think about the ethics of war. Hayden White describes history as a ‘refuge’ for those who wish to
find ‘the familiar in the strange’, while John Tosh labels it a superior form of nostalgia for those who are so inclined.\textsuperscript{xxxix} There is certainly evidence of a wistful yearning for a putative golden or heroic age in some of the wider contemporary literature on warfare: the work of John Keegan and Victor Davis Hanson springs to mind here, as does William James’ famous essay, ‘The Moral Equivalent of War’.\textsuperscript{xl} It is also arguably apparent in Jean Bethke Elshtain’s celebrations of Saint Augustine and Johnson’s repeated invocations of the ’classic just war doctrine’ of the late Middle Ages.\textsuperscript{xli}

However, while some may find in the past a welcome respite from the rapidly changing world in which we now live, it poses certain constraints. Sheldon Wolin observes that attention to historical traditions can have a ‘conservatizing’ effect on political thought, reducing it to dull repetitions of past enterprises.\textsuperscript{xlii} Charles Taylor similarly warns that although attention to the past may yield a sense of comfort, it can also sometimes feel like a ‘prison’ from which we cannot escape.\textsuperscript{xliii} Their point is the Joycean one that history too often functions as a substitute for imagination, discounting creativity and locking us in to established or time-honoured ways of thinking about things. By telling the story of the present in terms of the past from which it is derived, the current order is validated rather than challenged, and we become trapped in a circular, enclosing logic whereby past and present are mutually constitutive.\textsuperscript{xlv} This is not progress, or learning, only reproduction. Constantin Fasolt puts it beautifully when he writes that history now ’teaches human beings in a school whose doors are shut ... Outside the world is surging. Inside, history demands attention’.\textsuperscript{xlv}

This critique is supported by the tendency of many contemporary just war theorists to respond to the moral dilemmas raised by modern war with
exegetical accounts of what classical just war thinkers had to say on analogous topics. So, for instance, instead of treating the case for anticipatory war against Iraq directly, the past decade witnessed a vigorous debate among just war scholars about the finer points of the right to pre-emption as discussed by Aquinas, Grotius, and other figures from the historical just war tradition. In a similar manner, when nuclear deterrence was a matter of public controversy during the Cold War, just war theorists busied themselves arguing about whether or not the writings of Augustine and followers reflect a ‘presumption against war’ or a ‘presumption against injustice’. At issue here is the disciplining effect of the historical approach to the ethics of war, whereby all questions are directed through traditional channels, with the result that new ideas are circumvented while familiar patterns of thought are sustained and perpetuated.

‘As Instructive as an Abattoir’

If the first line of critique suggests that there is something pernicious or entrapping about the historical approach, the second is mild in comparison. It supposes that the approach advocated by Johnson et al is not likely to be of very much use to anyone other than those who boast a professional interest in the History of Ideas. In a sense, we are drawn back to Sir Geoffrey Elton’s grumpy observation that intellectual history of this kind is, by its very nature, ‘removed from real life’ and liable to ‘lose contact with reality’. Of course, when we push this line of argument a little further, we find that it does actually carry more punch than it first appears to. How so? If one is engaged in what Elton’s successors would undoubtedly label ‘frippery’, one is not only guilty of indulging
one's own academic fancies, there are also opportunity costs to be accounted for. If one is busy reading and writing about the intricacies of Book II of Grotius’s *Rights of War and Peace*, one is precluded from doing other, presumably more useful, things – such as potentially contributing to debates about matters of urgency or importance. Impressed by these objections, it is, as Seamus Heaney once wrote, ‘difficult at times to repress the thought that history is about as instructive as an abattoir’.

The argument can be put somewhat differently, in terms of the body of work produced by purveyors of the historical approach. The slant in this case would be that the body of work they have produced must appear dense and impenetrable to the casual reader. The narratives through which it discloses the historical development of the just war tradition have assumed a very circumscribed complexion, circling again and again over the same congested terrain, producing a progressively introspective discourse. So, for instance, there are copious treatments of the Augustine-to-Grotius-and-beyond story that we discussed earlier in relation to Bellamy and Christopher. What is particularly striking about these treatments is the sameness across them and their constrictive narrowness. The difference from one to the next is usually little more than a slight change of emphasis or enhanced level of detail. While this may represent rich fodder for exegetical debates, it also has the retrograde effect of channelling just war thought into ever tighter and more esoteric spirals, thereby restricting it in terms of scope, accessibility, and critical bite. This is the point at which, to borrow J.G.A. Pocock’s useful phrase, ‘the abridgment of tradition into ideology’ takes place.1

Evidence of this occurrence is easy to come by. Consider, for example, a
recent round of exchanges between Jean Bethke Elshtain and her critics. Anthony Burke, Nicholas Rengger, and Cian O’Driscoll, among others, published a series of essays that were critical of Elshtain’s controversial 2003 monograph, *Just War Against Terror*, and, more specifically, her faith that US military might can be a force for good in the world. Elshtain responded in kind with a robust defence of her position. What is of interest here, however, is the ground that was contested. Though ostensibly a debate about whether the use of force to spread human rights and forestall the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is justified, these exchanges reduced to a narrow examination of the finer points of Book 19 of Augustine’s *City of God*. Though interesting in its own right, this debate can also be caricatured as an example of what critics deride as the historical approach’s tendency towards naval-gazing.

*Whither The Fierce Urgency of Now?*

The final critique is that the modus operandi of the historical approach constitutes a refusal to figure out present-day solutions to present-day ethical dilemmas. Instead it drafts in the help of our forebears in the expectation that they might have ready-made answers for us. One is brought to mind, once again, of the essay cited earlier, ‘Preemptive War: What Would Aquinas Say?’. It is, one might notice, a short step from titles such as this to the WWJD (What Would Jesus Do?) bracelets sported by some Evangelic Christians in the US in the 1990s. The operative idea in both cases appears to be that, rather than thinking through our problems for ourselves, we ought to adopt a more deferential approach, and refer the issue to our more illustrious predecessors.

This prompts three quibbles. The first is that, echoing a point made
earlier, the historical approach circumvents other ways of thinking about the moral dilemmas raised by modern conflict. For instance, it closes down the space available for ethical analysis that purports to begin from ‘first principles’. If one is already engaged in an attempt to decipher, say, Aquinas’s views on pre-emption, it is difficult to imagine how one can ally this to a philosophical exploration of the deep morality of war. Generally speaking, one can start with one approach or the other, but not both; and any time spent on one necessarily subtracts from time on the other. Once again then, we are in the realm of opportunity costs. The second quibble relates to the anachronistic character of any attempts to shoehorn Augustine or any other long-dead notable of the just war tradition into the discussion of contemporary issues. The point does not need to be laboured that the problems we face today bear scant resemblance to those confronted in different epochs, whether we are talking about the early or late Middle Ages or the Modern period. The advent of new technologies, the realities of globalization, and so on, mean that the un-translated words of our forefathers have little if any application today. The third quibble follows directly from this allusion to translation. It is the assertion that any attempt to render the wisdom of those same forefathers applicable to the modern world must necessarily be freighted with outmoded prejudices and values. This is the view that any attempt to broker a dialogue between the classical just war tradition and contemporary discourse must import the archaic eschatologies of the former into the latter. The question then arises, why turn the clock back in this way when such a move would constitute a turning away from the fierce urgency of now?
History is Dead, Long Live History?

Is the historical approach to the ethics of war dead in the water then? Or does it have enough about it to withstand the charges levelled at it by its detractors? This section will seek a judgment on this matter. It will contend that while many of the criticisms directed at the historical approach hit the mark when it comes to the particular form it takes vis-à-vis the ethics of war, they fail to trouble the key tenets of historical study in its general form. That is, they expose serious deficiencies, not in the integrity of the historical approach itself, but in the particular way that this approach has been applied to the ethics of war and the just war tradition. Going beyond this observation, this section will conclude with a proposal for how we might more fully realize the potential of the historical approach to the ethics of war.

Some Particular Concerns

The criticisms surveyed in the previous section alert us to the problems that dog the way the historical approach has typically been applied to the ethics of war. The principal issue here is the manner by which the history of the ethics of war is disclosed via, and reduced to, a singular developmental narrative (that is then presented as ‘the’ narrative). This is the familiar story we traced earlier: the chronicle by which our contemporary understanding of the ethics of war is dated back to Augustine; tracked through the Middle Ages of Gratian, Aquinas, and others; brought forward to the formal structure it assumed in Hugo Grotius’ early modern legal theory; leading finally, after a period of quiet, to its revival by rights theorists in the latter half of the Twentieth Century. If one wishes to
think historically about the ethics of war, this necessarily involves engaging with this well-trodden narrative. Or, as it is put in the literature, stepping into this particular historical stream. The emphasis here is important: not any narrative or stream, but *this* one. Accordingly, to think in a meaningful way about the ethics of war, ‘it is necessary to attend to both the form and the content of the classical just war tradition and the underlying values it expresses’. The result of this is a lapse into a form of conservativism that fosters a tightly disciplined field that both repeats and reproduces itself at the expense of fresh thinking.

The problem appears to be that scholars practicing a historical approach to the ethics of war have first overlooked the ‘constructed’ or ‘mythopoeic’ character of the just war tradition, and then compounded this error by treating it as if it were an actual historical practice. In other words, they have reified what is merely an interpretative category that enables scholars to produce a rationalized history of the ethics of war, and treated it as a pre-constituted discursive framework that thinkers from the past self-consciously engaged. These scholars, captured by their own myths, and forgetful of the act of abridgement that they have contributed to, have then gone on to seal off the tradition they have just created by arguing about where its boundaries properly lie and what historical thinkers fall within and beyond them. The result is the claustrophobic narrative just described. Adding to the problem, this claustrophobic narrative bears a strong—some would say exclusive—relation to the history of Christian reflection on war. This is to the extent that questions have been raised about the cross-cultural appeal of the tradition. Some sceptics have suggested that its close (almost symbiotic) association with the development of Christian political theology limits its range of applicability.
The sneaking suspicion remains, however, that the criticisms of the historical approach to the ethics of war that we have just canvassed are somewhat overegged. The doubt arises in relation to their limited purchase. They speak only to the way that the historical approach has typically been applied (or, one might say, mis-applied) to the ethics of war, and more specifically to the just war tradition. But they do not trouble the underlying principles, or indeed the integrity and potential, of the historical approach more generally. The remainder of this section seeks to make this case, paving the way for a final verdict on the utility of the historical approach to the ethics of war and a proposal for how we might fortify it.

Readers will recall that the first critique supposed that the historical approach is constrained by conservatism, that is, an attraction to the familiar and a propensity to reproduce authority rather than challenge it. But practicing historians have denounced as a misconception the view that historians seek refuge in the past because it appears comfortable or safe. Butterfield claims that the aim of the historian is not a quest for sanctuary, but ‘the elucidation of the unlikeness between past and present’. Historians, he elaborates, are interested in the past precisely because it is different from what we know today. Its charm lies in its strangeness. Similarly, Richard Evans inverts White’s line of attack to contend that the main purpose of the modern historian is not to seek familiarity in the strange, but to ‘find the strange in the familiar’. History, on this view, necessarily involves the pursuit of complexity and the appreciation of difference. It is, Evans adds, ‘a destroyer of myths rather than a creator of them’. But what
about the assertion that recourse to history serves only to buttress established authority, never challenging it? This is a tendentious allegation that does not tell the whole story. Although history is often equated with continuity, it can also be invoked in the service of rupture and revolution. It supplies a critical perspective on the present, enabling us to call into question those aspects of the world that are variously justified to us as natural, necessary, inevitable, or incontrovertible. And it does all of this by furnishing us with a perspective from which we can ‘view our own form of life in a more self-critical way, enlarging our present horizons instead of fortifying local prejudices’. Without such a perspective, we would suffer from a reduced awareness of the possibilities inherent in the present, and understate future prospects for change and reform.

The argument that the historical approach is unduly in thrall to the past is equally overblown. Proponents of this critique allege that the historical approach entails the contrivance of an imaginary dialogue with the great and the good of previous generations, from whom we then extrapolate counsel on how to handle present-day dilemmas. But this description of the historical approach is riddled with infelicities. The aim behind the historical approach is not to glean readymade lessons from our forebears, nor to ‘reconstruct’ or channel their theories so that they speak more directly to contemporary concerns. Instead it is to use the diverse range of how these great thinkers conceived of and responded to the problems of their day as a backdrop against which to set (and understand) the issues we confront today. This, then, is a subtle horizon-expanding exercise rather than an act of deference to those who have gone before us. As such, it is a crucial step towards identifying what is novel and unique about the issues we face today. And also a crucial step, one might add,
towards both escaping the shadows cast by our forefathers and the ideas they bequeathed to us, and learning how to think through these issues for ourselves.\textsuperscript{lxiv}

Finally, what of the argument that the historical approach signifies a love of the past for its own sake, a useless antiquarian indulgence that has no practical or political merit? This position supposes that the study of the past, which is by definition remote, does not have any 'lessons' to teach us, and cannot have any practical bearing on today's world. Yet, as Tosh points out, the value of the past 'lies precisely in what is different from our world'. By giving us another vantage point', he writes, history 'enables us to look at our own circumstances with sharper vision, alert to the possibility that they might have been different, and that they will probably turn out differently in the future'.\textsuperscript{lxv} So history functions, not as a mirror held up to the present, but as 'a set of counter-images' that place the present in its proper perspective and remind us of its inherent contingency. Seen in this light, he continues, 'history is not a dead weight to the present, but an intimation of possibilities'.\textsuperscript{lxvi} It is a world-revealing praxis that enables us to think more clearly about the structures and choices that confront us today, where they have come from, and the various ways that we might tackle them. As such, while history may not have too many neatly packaged lessons to deliver, it can impart something far more valuable, namely, the critical sensibility that is the key to properly understanding the so-called fierce urgency of now.\textsuperscript{lxvii}

Bearing this general defence of the historical approach in mind, how can we ensure that it is realized in practice (rather than squandered in application)? This is where a reconstructed historical approach to the ethics of war would depart from the standard approach that we find in the extant literature. It would
do so, not by dully accepting and reaffirming the parameters of its object of inquiry, the just war tradition, but by seeking to unsettle them. This could obviously take many forms. For example, it could comprise a genealogy of the tradition; one that asks why standard histories of the tradition fixate exclusively on Augustine, Aquinas, and the usual suspects, while largely ignoring the contributions of a host of other likely candidates (including literary greats like William Shakespeare or Leo Tolstoy). A study of this kind would provoke us to reflect upon, and perhaps re-consider, certain stock beliefs that we hold about the tradition. To paraphrase Evans, this, then, is the historical approach reconstructed and deployed as a destroyer of myths rather than a creator of them. Mindful of the vagueness of this argument, I will round out this essay by fleshing out one direction that a reconstructed historical approach to the ethics of war might take.

A New Start

This avenue of research is one that I am currently pursuing, and so I write about it with a certain degree of excitement. It comprises a critical re-evaluation of the starting-point assumed by the standard historical account of the just war tradition. Why this particular focus? As figures as diverse as Butterfield, E. H. Carr, R. B. J. Walker, and Michael Oakeshott have observed, the starting-point assigned by convention to a historical tradition is always (no pun intended) a matter of great moment. Its importance is apparent in two principal respects. First, the identification of a particular point of origin is more often than not likely to be tendentious. Borrowing Butterfield’s terminology, it is prone to reflect a whig perspective that arranges the historical past through the prism of present-
day interests and concerns. The result of this proclivity is ‘to impose a certain
form upon the whole historical story, and to produce a scheme of general history
that is bound to converge beautifully upon the present’. Second, following
from this, the assumption of a fixed starting-point cultivates and, furthermore,
ratifies a particular understanding of the tradition while foreclosing rival
conceptions. As Walker cautions, the positing of an originary moment is always
liable to slide into a ‘powerful myth of origin’ that both consolidates a particular
historical narrative and renders alternative starting-points and understandings
of the tradition implausible or even unthinkable. Bringing these points
together, it seems sensible to say that the origins assigned to the just war in the
extant literature should not be taken as an historical given, as has hitherto been
the case, but should themselves be opened up to further historical inquiry.

The convention in the literature is, of course, to trace the origins of the
just war tradition to the early Christian writings of Saint Augustine. Elshtain
provides the clearest example of this convention. She contends that ‘just war as
a continuous narrative starts with Augustine’ and endorses his status as ‘the
acknowledged forefather of the just war tradition’. John Mark Mattox,
Jonathan Barnes, Inis Claude, William Stevenson, William V. O’Brien, Frederick
Russell, Mark Totten, and Robert Myers, among others, also pronounce
Augustine ‘the fons et origo’ of the tradition. Offering a more refined take on
this convention, a number of scholars—including Bellamy, Christopher, Johnson,
Brahimi, Brian Orend, Ian Clark, and Gregory Reichberg, Henrik Syse, and Endre
Begby—acknowledge Augustine as the key figure in the development of the just
war tradition, but add that he built it upon the prior structures of Greek and
Roman understandings of the ethics of war. Nonetheless, these prior
understandings of just war receive scant attention (and certainly no systematic
treatment) in the literature.\textsuperscript{lxiv} Even those scholars who recognize their
relevance to the just war tradition skim over them in brief prefatory comments,
while still generally embracing Augustine as the \textit{de facto} starting-point for their
historical accounts of the tradition.

The effect of this particular convention (whereby the just war is rooted in
the early writings of Saint Augustine) is to associate the provenance of that
tradition very closely to the general history of Christian reflection on war. It
infers a deep-rooted connection between the tradition and the unfolding of the
Christian conscience as it is addressed to war. Evidence of this inference resides
in the manner by which the evolution of the tradition is still, to this day, typically
chronicled in terms of the major shifts in its relation to Christianity. Supposedly
rooted in the writings of Augustine, its formative elaboration is usually
attributed to medieval Christian theologians and canonists, and its reformulation
by early modern legal theorists and philosophers is standardly depicted in terms
of a secularization of the previously sacred. This story—or rather this way of
telling the story of the just war tradition—is so well established that it appears
ridiculous, even unthinkable, to call it into question. This is problematic because,
as we noted earlier, the tradition's close association with the history of Christian
reflection on war potentially limits its appeal and applicability beyond the
Christian world.

I propose that we can challenge this conventional account of the just war
tradition by challenging its origins, that is, its starting point, and opening them
up to historical inquiry. What would happen, for instance, if we were to peer
behind the standard starting-point of the just war tradition and examine its
antecedents in the pre-Christian political thought of ancient societies like Greece and Rome?

**Conclusion**

Winston Churchill once opined that the Balkans have produced ‘more history than they can consume’.\textsuperscript{lxxv} The implication here is that, taken in excess, history may be bad for you. Echoes of this assumption can be found in the contemporary literature on the ethics of war, wherein the just war tradition is often casually dismissed as an ‘embarrassment, a burden to be escaped rather than a patrimony to be reclaimed’.\textsuperscript{lxxvi} To be fair to those who make this claim, advocates of the historical approach to the ethics of war have not always helped their own cause. They have sometimes fanned rather than assuaged the doubts of detractors by adhering tightly to an entrenched narrative that fosters an introspective conservatism and suffocates fresh thinking. Yet, when we peer deeper into the matter, we find grounds for believing that a fully realized application of the historical approach would seek to critique this narrative rather than reaffirm it. More history, then, would not be bad for you, but would instead offer an antidote to its own apparent failings vis-à-vis the ethics of war, and would validate the critical potential of the historical approach more generally. This essay, then, has argued that the present limitations evident in the historical approach to the ethics of war may be overcome by extending our frame of reference to incorporate sources that fall outside the dominant narrative by which the just war tradition is typically disclosed. In particular, it has proposed extending our historical treatment of that tradition beyond the advent of
Augustinian political theology to include the variety of perspectives on the ethics of war offered to us by Ancient Greek and Roman political thought and practice.

On a more general note, this essay confirms that how we think historically about the ethics of war matters because it shapes the ethics of war that we practice in a myriad of ways: it underlies not just the judgements we reach, but also the questions we ask and the values we strive to defend. It also goes beyond this point, however, by reminding us that thinking historically about the ethics of war fosters a critical departure in just war thought by encouraging us to reflect not just on where we go from here, but on how we got to here in the first place.

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x Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, xxix.


Brahimi, *Jihad and Just War in the War on Terror*, Chapter 2.


Hamilton, Historicism, p. 16. Also: Schorske, Thinking With History, p. 5.


For an interesting meditation upon, and realization of, this idea: Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down.


Totten, First Strike, pp. 99-146.


See Footnote 46.


For an account of this narrative: Johnson, 'The Just War Idea', p. 168.

Johnson, 'Thinking Morally About War in the Middle Ages and Today', p. 4.


This issue is discussed by David Fisher and Brian Wicker, 'Introduction: A Clash of Civilizations?', in David Fisher and Brian Wicker (eds.), *Just War on Terror? A Christian and Muslim Response* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), p. 5.


Butterfield, *The Whig Interpretation of History*, p. 12

Walker, *Inside/Outside*, p. 27.


On the rare occasions that they are mentioned, they tend to be glossed over as background detail that is useful insofar as it informs a fuller understanding of later just war thought. Christopher, for example, introduces the classical roots of the just war tradition as the ‘foundations … from which Christian philosophers derived their ideas’. Christopher, *The Ethics of War and Peace*, p. 7.
