Securitizing Terrorism in Southeast Asia
Accounting for the Varying Responses of Singapore and Indonesia

ABSTRACT
This article explains the variable success after the September 11, 2001, attacks of the securitization of terrorism in two ASEAN member states, Singapore and Indonesia. The two countries are selected because of the differences in their government characteristics and their domestic politics. The article argues that differences in the nature of the domestic audience explain the divergence of securitization policy responses.

KEYWORDS: securitization, audience, terrorism, Indonesia, Singapore

In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, terrorism has pushed other security concerns into the background. This was certainly apparent in Southeast Asia, where a major transformation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states’ security focus was witnessed. Prior to September 11, ASEAN member states did not deem terrorism an urgent national or regional security concern. In the subsequent weeks and months, however, we witnessed a swift policy shift. The governments of ASEAN countries, including Singapore and Indonesia, have since adopted strategies for combating terrorism and implemented numerous counterterrorism measures. Nevertheless, there has been significant variance in the counterterrorism campaigns, producing different outcomes over time. Singapore lies at one end of the spectrum, as the steadiest regional supporter of the U.S.

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Asian Survey, Vol. 50, Number 3, pp. 569–590. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2010 by the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2010.50.3.569.
global war against terrorism even though no terrorist attack materialized in this city-state. Indonesia sits at the other end, distancing its security policies from the U.S.-led “war on terror,” even though a series of terrorist attacks occurred in Indonesia.

This article aims to explain the different responses of Indonesia and Singapore in the fight against terrorism. Singapore exemplifies an easy case, where the U.S.’s securitization of terrorism resonates strongly. In this case, the Singaporean government is the primary audience in the securitization process. On the other hand, Indonesia demonstrates a hard securitization case, where, because of political circumstances, the government response is not as strong as in Singapore. In the Indonesian case, the government plays two roles: as the audience and as the communicator to domestic constituents.

This article argues that the diversity of audience characteristics in Singapore and Indonesia influences the securitization of terrorism in each country. It addresses how the issue of audience has been neglected in the securitization literature. Focusing on the importance of audience in facilitating securitization is the best way to identify the likelihood of securitization success. Differentiation among audience categories in a given case reflects the need for the securitizing actor to convince various audiences to allow implementation of exceptional procedures that stem from the specific security issue. The securitization literature notes that a successful securitization move will prompt the same response from divergent audiences, reflecting audience toleration both of rule violations and the implementation of extraordinary measures. This article makes an empirical contribution to the literature by analyzing how Singapore and Indonesia deal with the U.S.-led “war on terror” in Southeast Asia, and the different responses of these two countries in the fight against terrorism.

The article begins by introducing the concept of securitization and highlight the lack of attention to audience role in successful securitization. It then expands the explanation by providing an in-depth analysis of the nature of audience in Singapore and Indonesia through elaboration of each state’s domestic politics.

1. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde define securitization as a process of naming a particular issue as a security concern, through the use of the language of security and a corresponding plot that entails an existential threat. See Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
SECURITIZATION THEORY AND THE UNDER-THEORIZING OF AUDIENCE

Securitization theory presents a security studies framework that conceptualizes security as something more specific than merely dealing with threats or vulnerabilities. Securitization theory argues that security is not necessarily objective practice but can be constructed. This approach adopts a constructivist stance in defining security issues. Thus, an issue can count as a security issue when it “is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object.”

This process of staging something as an existential threat is what in securitization theory is called a speech act. What is essential from the speech act is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures, and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience. Thus, a successful speech act involves a combination of language and society: of both the feature of speech that constructs a plot underlining the presence of an existential threat, and the audience that authorizes and recognizes that grammar of security.

However, in the securitization literature, there is an under-theorization of the role of audience in constructing a more tractable analysis of securitization. Securitization theory primarily assumes that the political choice to securitize a matter takes place within the context of democratic countries. A securitizing actor articulates an issue in security terms through the language he or she uses to persuade the domestic audience of its immediate threat. The acceptance of the security discourse by the public opens the way for the mobilization of state power outside normal politics. Under circumstances where the security practices are not legitimized by the public, the issue is then argued in the public sphere, and the securitizing actor needs to convince society why a certain condition constitutes a security threat.

While elaborating on the relationship between the securitizing actor’s positions of authority and the audience under a democratic framework, this theory fails to explain securitization in other forms of society. The securitization literature neglects the fact that in order to explain a successful speech act, one must consider the relationship between the actor’s authority position and the audience, as well as the likelihood that the audience will accept

4. Ibid., pp. 28, 24, 32.
the claim. Thus, this article aims to fill the gap in securitization theory and draw our attention to the role of audience in the securitization of terrorism. Our analysis focuses on variations in the domestic politics of Indonesia and Singapore in seeking to explain their different securitization responses.

**THE U.S. SECURITIZATION MOVE**

In embarking upon the war on terrorism campaign in Southeast Asia, the U.S. exercised its military as well as non-military power. President George W. Bush warned that "no nation can be neutral in the struggle," declaring that "either you are with us or against us." One U.S. official in Southeast Asia augmented the warning, noting that "[i]t's not enough to be with us in the war on terrorism . . . you have to trumpet it." 

U.S. involvement in the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia has ranged from financial support to combat operations. Through assistance, the U.S. has sought to enlist Southeast Asian countries in combating terrorism on the "second front." This notion is conceptually compelling because it implies that Southeast Asia is hospitable to terrorists. The first U.S. policy program in the region gave the Philippine government $100 million in training assistance, military equipment, and maintenance support for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). In 2002, 660 U.S. Special Forces were deployed in the southern Philippines to combat the Abu Sayyaf group. The Philippine and U.S. governments labeled the military operation in Mindanao as a training exercise in order to circumvent the Philippine Constitution's banning of foreign forces on Philippine territory—this despite the fact that the U.S. forces were armed and authorized to return fire if attacked.


The U.S. also intensified its bilateral relationship with Singapore. Since Bush and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong signed the Strategic Framework Agreement in July 2005, defense relations between the two countries progressed, with new areas of cooperation across military, technology, and policy areas.

In the case of Indonesia, the U.S. quickly tried to ensure the country’s commitment to the global “war on terror.” Officials pledged a restoration of military aid and a total of US$657.4 million in financial aid, comprising $400,000 to educate Indonesian civilians on defense matters; $10 million for police training; $130 million to help finance legal and judicial reform; $10 million to assist refugees in Maluku; $5 million to rebuild destroyed schools and other infrastructure in Aceh; $2 million to assist East Timorese who have chosen to stay in Indonesia; $400 million to promote trade and investment, especially in the oil and gas sector; as well as a duty-free status worth $100 million for 11 Indonesian products under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).11

The U.S. securitization move has had a profound effect on Southeast Asia’s security. In November 2001, Southeast Asian states promulgated the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counterterrorism. The declaration committed the ASEAN member states to prevent and suppress all forms of terrorist acts, to review and strengthen national mechanisms to combat terrorism, as well as to reinforce cooperation at bilateral, regional, and international levels.12 As a statement of intent and acknowledgement, the declaration signified the conduct of the “war on terror” in Southeast Asia; nonetheless, there was great division among the states over the role of the U.S. in counterterrorism efforts and a major disagreement on how to combat terrorism.13

SINGAPORE: FAVORABLE DOMESTIC CLIMATE

Singapore’s response to the September 11 terrorist attack has been the most forceful among all countries in Southeast Asia. Singapore enthusiastically stated its support for the U.S. “war on terror” and rapidly investigated the

possible existence of terrorist networks within Singaporean territory. There are two important aspects to Singapore’s policy responses to the “war on terror”: fighting terrorism on the domestic front and supporting the U.S. efforts.

Singapore’s comprehensive strategy is derived from the state’s strong perception of the terrorist threat. This is clearly reflected in the 2003 White Paper, “The Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism,” which described the JI network in Southeast Asia, its ties with al-Qaeda, and the threat that they pose to Singapore. The Singapore National Security Strategy (NSS) entitled “The Fight against Terror” identified the city-state as a prime target for terrorists because of its strong stand in the struggle against terrorism and its role in global counterterrorism efforts. Singapore’s Coordinating Minister for Security and Defense Dr. Tony Tan justified establishing a comprehensive homeland security structure by citing the “potential for organized, deliberate and prolonged terrorist action.”

Singapore introduced new structures in the policy, intelligence, and operational domains. To deal with terrorism on the domestic front, the government formed a Security Policy Review Committee to coordinate a new security architecture. New agencies like the Homefront Security Office and the Joint Counter-terrorism Center were created. Existing organizations, for instance the National Security Secretariat, were enhanced to improve inter-agency coordination and cooperation.

The resonance of the “war on terror” in Singapore can also be traced from cooperation with the U.S. David Wright-Neville has argued that “in no country in Southeast Asia, except Singapore, is the U.S.’s bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation trouble free.” Singapore explicitly called for U.S. engagement to combat terrorism in the region. As Defense Minister Teo


Chee Hean suggested, “Singapore believes that a sustained U.S. presence will continue to be an important stabilizing force.”

Singapore also contributed immediately to supporting the U.S. Then-Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong affirmed on September 19, 2001, that the “U.S. will not be alone [. . .] Singapore will do its part to support the global anti-terrorism effort.” This stance of support for U.S. efforts to hunt down terrorists resonates in numerous statements by Singaporean leaders. Then-Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong said Singapore “has to be on the side of civilized human behavior, and against barbaric and cruel acts.” Similarly, his successor Lee Hsien Loong reiterated in 2006 that “Singapore has made common cause with the U.S. in combating the terrorist threat.” Lee further stated that “the fight against terrorism is a long-term ideological struggle,” therefore “the strength and resolve of the U.S. [. . .] is critical to sustaining this struggle, and prevailing in it.”

Singapore has always been a champion of numerous U.S. counterterrorism initiatives in the region. In the area of intelligence sharing, Singapore seeks to enhance contact between its Joint Counter-terrorism Center and the U.S. Pacific Command Joint Intelligence Center. Further, in maritime security, Singapore became the first major port to secure cargo in keeping with U.S. cargo transportation requirements after the U.S. implemented a Strategic Goods Control law in January 2003. The island state also became the first Asian country to join the U.S.-led Customs’ Container Security Initiative.

Singapore’s strong response in the “war on terror” is facilitated by its unique political context, characterized as a soft authoritarian regime, as well as a combination of growth and popular coalitions. The popular coalition in Singapore is formed by an alignment between middle-class professionals and
labor movement activists. The growth coalition is primarily made up of members from the business sector. Despite the existence of the seemingly competitive political system, with regular elections involving several political parties, Singapore is a de facto one-party state. The People’s Action Party (PAP) has won every general election since 1959. This characteristic of a “strong center” serves to facilitate the government’s decisive measures in the “war on terror.”

Since September 11, 2001, the threat of a terrorist attack in Singapore has been presented as a prominent economic and security concern in official government discourse. Prime Minister Goh suggested that October that “the terrorist attacks on the U.S. and the unfolding war against terrorism” have brought about the “most severe challenges since the city state’s independence in 1965.” With this premise in mind, the state enacted strong interventionist surveillance on the possible influence of the religious fundamentalism resurgence while preparing itself to act preemptively against any terrorist threat. This was achieved first by invoking the use of the Internal Security Act (ISA) and second by exerting pressure to maintain religious harmony.

The ISA is a special law designed to authorize preventive detention: it gives the authorities power to detain and arrest suspects without a warrant or judicial review. In the past, the government used the ISA to arrest political opponents and critics. Currently, in the “war on terror,” the ISA is used to detain what the government calls suspected terrorists.

During the first arrests of terrorist suspects under the ISA in December 2001, 15 people were detained. Following up evidence gained from these arrests, a second wave of arrests in August 2002 detained 21 more suspected terrorists.

24. Ibid., p. 281.
26. “Speech by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong at the Dialogue Session with Union Leaders/ Members and Employers.”
members of JI. The government suggested that the terrorists’ planned targets this time were not American facilities but Singaporean ones, encompassing the waterworks, Changi Airport, Singapore’s petrochemical hub, and a new power plant project on Jurong Island. Nevertheless, as the *Straits Times* newspaper observed, “Whatever qualms some Singaporeans or foreigners may have had before about the use of the Internal Security Act to detain people without trial, few would entertain such qualms now.” Currently, according to the Internal Security Department, 37 people are detained under the ISA for terrorism-related activities in support of the JI and/or the Philippines-based MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front).

The government strategy to manage the different forms of media content, including the Internet, led to the establishment of the Media Development Authority (MDA) on January 1, 2003. To regulate the use and content of the Internet, the MDA established a licensing framework that requires “political parties, individuals, groups, organizations and corporations engaged in providing any program for discussion of political or religious issues relating to Singapore through the Internet” to register themselves.

In 2002, Zulfikar Mohammad Shariff, the head of a local Islamic organization that sponsored a website called Fateha.com, questioned whether JI members were actually terrorists and criticized the Singapore government’s alignment with the U.S. and Israel. The state authority and the government-owned media reacted by directing the “Voice of the Singapore Muslim Community” to register as a political organization in order to continue operating

32. Internal Security Department, “Countering Threat: Terrorism.”
its website (Fateha.com). In addition, Home Affairs Minister Wong Kan Seng said the purpose of the government’s reaction was to expose Fateha “as a real threat to Singapore’s multi-racial and multi-religious harmony.” Similarly, Defense Minister Teo Chee Hean said the group was “slowly poisoning” society in a way designed to transform Singapore into a new Afghanistan. In late January 2002, after a week of denunciation in the state-controlled media, Zulfikar quit Fateha.

Singapore’s strong stance in the “war against terrorism” derives from the country’s durable political coalitions. The stable coalition pattern in Singapore owes much to the PAP’s success in retaining power in every election since independence. For more than four decades with the same coalition in power, there has been sustainability in policy lines, cohesiveness of the ruling elite, and rigidity in political alignments.

The political alignment has been based on the combination of a populist coalition and a growth alliance. The PAP built these two different yet interlocking political coalitions. The populist coalition covers the middle and working class. The growth alliance is with the business sector, including foreign capital.

The PAP has maintained a populist alliance with the strong popular sector since Singapore’s early process of nation building. Historically, the Singaporean state prevailed as the result of the popular and militant anti-colonialist movement, led by an alignment of middle-class professionals and labor movement activists. The PAP, a nationalist middle-class group, was established in


40. Ibid., pp. 281–82.
1954 by Lee Kuan Yew; members then aligned themselves with the socialist labor movement to gain popular support. After the party gained political power in 1959, internal divisions arose between Lee’s faction of English-educated non-communist middle class persons and the more left wing socialist faction of Chinese-educated workers and students. This led to a formal party split in 1961 and the formation of a rival political party, the Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front). The PAP’s success in retaining its executive power gave it a strategic advantage. During the 1960s, the PAP government used its monopoly of state power to repress oppositional forces and organized militant labor groups. Afterward, the government promoted the National Trade Union Congress (NTUC) to consolidate the union movement.

The second political alliance, namely, the growth alliance, developed because of the overlapping interests of Singapore’s government and foreign capital. Christopher Tremewan finds that political alignment with foreign capital had its roots in the colonial period. In 1819, Stamford Raffles of the East India Company established Singapore as a free port for the British to conduct regional trade. This pattern of trade underpinned Singapore’s economic growth throughout the colonial era. Following independence, Singapore promoted itself as a “convenient productive location for international capital.” The state improved the country’s infrastructure, established several new public enterprises, and bolstered the existing ones engaged in the provision of utilities, communications, banking, and shipping.

In the current “war on terror,” the populist and growth coalitions are inextricably tied to each other through the government’s “total defense” strategy. The notion of total defense has been repeatedly articulated in various political leaders’ speeches and statements since September 11. This is shown by Defense Minister Tan’s warning of a possible deadly biological attack by a rogue scientist against small, densely populated countries such as Singapore. Tan has cited this scenario in calling for Interpol’s assistance to tackle cyber-terrorism.

and the threat of a JI attack. The total defense paradigm incorporates not only the conventional conception of military defense. It extends to economic defense to maintain economic strength that “will not break down so easily in times of the war or crisis” and also to civil defense to sustain the functioning of society in times of emergency. It also comprises the aspect of “social defense” to maintain racial and religious harmony, as well as “psychological defense” to unite citizens’ loyalty and commitment to the nation.

To attract foreign capital, the Singapore government needs to preserve a favorable investment climate. Aware of the impact on the Singapore economy of the September 11 attacks, Prime Minister Goh on October 14, 2001, pointed out that his country “will be hit harder than most other countries” because of its greater dependence on exports. The external demand that constitutes 70% of the island state’s total demand is deemed to be a source of this national vulnerability. As a consequence, the Singapore government took decisive security measures to preserve the country’s reputation as a “safe” destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) and as a hub for security or intelligence exchange in Southeast Asia. For this purpose, after the September 11 terrorist attacks, total defense began to focus more on an anti-terrorism strategy.

To ensure political support from the popular alliance, the “total defense” strategy aims to sensitize all Singaporean citizens to being vigilant. This strategy has produced a crisis mentality among Singaporeans. In turn, the government construction of a “crisis of survival” has revived a legitimizing basis for its policies in the “war on terror.” Efforts to mobilize support from the popular sector are also assisted by government control over the labor movement. Because the government exercises a substantial degree of political dominion over the trade unions, the NTUC articulates the government stance on Singapore’s security campaign against terrorism. This is exemplified

47. “Speech by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong at the Dialogue Session with Union Leaders/ Members and Employers.”
by the statement of Heng Chee How, NTUC deputy secretary-general, that “JI actions have pushed jobs out of the economy” so that the main concern now is to exhaustively “expose the JI plot and let Singaporeans see through [its] ploy, which would make it harder for the terrorists to achieve” their goals.49

INDONESIA: RELUCTANT AUDIENCE

In the case of Indonesia, both official government policy and political rhetoric were carefully designed to distance the state’s fight against terrorism from the American “global war on terror”—despite a series of terrorist attacks in the archipelago. This included two suicide bomb attacks in Bali, in 2002 and 2005; a bomb attack against the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in 2003; a car bomb outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in 2004; and, most recently, simultaneous bomb attacks at the Marriott and the Ritz Carlton Hotels in 2009. This phenomenon raises a puzzling question: why has the U.S. securitization move met with strong resistance in Indonesia? To address this question, we will examine the domestic context that underpins how the “war on terror” is practiced in Indonesia, starting from the era of President Megawati Sukarnoputri to the current administration.

Responding to September 11, Megawati firmly “condemned the barbaric and indiscriminate acts carried out against innocent civilians” and pledged to cooperate with the international community in combating terrorism.50 In her visit to the U.S., on September 19, 2001, she affirmed the intention to broaden bilateral cooperation in this regard.

Nevertheless, as the U.S. carried out the war against Afghanistan, the Megawati administration appeared to distance the “war on terror” in Indonesia from the U.S.-led initiative. Megawati strongly criticized the U.S. government for the use of brute force in Afghanistan and was critical of the invasion of Iraq. In addition, with Megawati’s change of tone in responding to the terrorist threat, Indonesian government officials said that separatism was a more pressing threat to national security than terrorism. The terrorist Bali bombing in October 2002 killed 202 people and spotlighted the JI network operation in the region. Subsequently, over 80 jihadi were captured and put in Indonesian

jails. Nonetheless, a disagreement between Indonesia and the U.S. on the nature of this threat remained.\textsuperscript{51}

The discrepancy between the U.S. and Indonesia on what actually constitutes “terrorism” was reflected in Indonesia’s skepticism over the existence of a JI network there. A high government official characterized the threat to Indonesia of terrorism: he pointed to separatism as being “the most pressing security threat, not terrorism.”\textsuperscript{52}

As a consequence, there has been a widespread perception of Indonesia’s lack of seriousness in the war against terrorism. In February 2002, Singapore Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew went further, labeling Indonesia a “terrorist nest” in an interview with CNN. He claimed that Singapore would be at risk of terrorist attacks as long as leaders of regional extremist cells remained free in Indonesia and suggested that Indonesia was reluctant to act against suspected terrorists.\textsuperscript{53}

Indonesia, particularly after the 2002 Bali bombing, has adopted numerous counterterrorism measures. But in the view of a high government official, these have been “based on its own terms, not on the insistence of the U.S. or neighboring countries, including Singapore” and “should not be directly aligned to the so-called war on terror” announced by President Bush.\textsuperscript{54} As with Singapore, Indonesia’s efforts in the war against terrorism comprises two important dimensions, fighting domestic terrorism and supporting the global “war on terror.”

In the domestic realm, following the Bali bombing Jakarta promulgated a Presidential Emergency Decree on the Prevention of Terrorism, and implemented a new anti-terrorism law. Although the legislation does not empower the Indonesian central government to the same degree as Singapore’s Internal Security Act, it enables security personnel to detain suspected terrorists for 20 days, which can be extended for another six months based on preliminary evidence reported by intelligence services.\textsuperscript{55} Jakarta also established an

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{52} Interview with Indonesian high government official, Jakarta, May 14, 2008.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Interview with Indonesian high government official, Jakarta, June 20, 2008.
\end{itemize}
Anti-terrorism Task Force that comprised the Ministries of Justice, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Finance as well as the Attorney General’s Office, the Armed Forces, and the National Intelligence Agency. The government has been seeking actively to unravel terrorist activities. By June 2008, 300 suspects in the Bali bombing and reputed members of JI had been arrested.56 The national police also uncovered terror networks behind the July 17, 2009, hotel attacks.

In general, unlike in neighboring states in Southeast Asia, Indonesia’s domestic “war on terror” campaign has been low key and largely focused on intelligence and police operations.57 Indonesian officials have vigorously opposed any notion of giving in to foreign demands. Responding to Singapore’s allegation that Indonesia provides a safe haven for terrorists, Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda issued a statement that “Indonesia would not accept foreign intervention in dealing with terrorism.”58 Recently, a high government official echoed this stance: “Independence is more important than relying on external factors. It’s better to be unsuccessful in the short term but successful in the long term, [rather] than successful in the short term because of the U.S.’s support but fail in the long-term.”59

Despite Indonesia’s lack of aggressiveness in adopting counterterrorism measures, it has made a positive contribution to the U.S. effort. A leap forward for the Indonesian government was the arrest of senior al-Qaida operative Omar al-Faruq in June 2002.60 Within three days of the arrest, Indonesian authorities handed over al-Faruq to the U.S. At present, Indonesia is seeking to sign a new, strategic Comprehensive Partnership Agreement with the U.S., an event scheduled for President Barack Obama’s visit to Indonesia in June 2010.61 Indonesian military spokesman Rear Marshal Sagoem Tamboen has asserted that Indonesia has “cooperated closely on counterterrorism efforts”

with the U.S. and expects that the partnership agreement will facilitate joint counterterrorism drills.62

To contextualize the dynamics of the securitization of terrorism and the nature of audience in Indonesia, this article surveys the state’s domestic politics, as well as its consequences for foreign and security policy, particularly in regard to government anti-terrorism policy. When the U.S. government embarked upon the “war on terror” campaign, Indonesia was still a fledgling democracy. In May 1998, the resignation of Indonesia’s second president, Suharto, ended the authoritarian political system that had lasted for more than 30 years.

Indonesia’s transition from authoritarian regime to a more democratic participatory political system and society created problems for the government in foreign and security policy: the “floodgates to expressions of public opinion on foreign and security policies” had been opened by democratization and decentralization.63 Democratization made it harder for the political elites to implement unpopular policies such as cracking down on radical Islamic militants or cooperating with the U.S.: almost 90% of Indonesia’s 210 million people are Muslims.64 The government has to respond to insecurities caused by the threat of terrorist attack—without antagonizing Islamic interests.

Public opinion ran strongly against the U.S. “war on terror.” President Megawati quickly withdrew her pledge of cooperation with America after anti-American demonstrations broke out on the streets of Jakarta following her meeting with President Bush on September 19, 2001.65 A Gallup poll published in December and in January 2002 found that large majorities of Indonesians (89%) shared the view that the U.S. military attacks on Afghanistan were morally unjustified.66 Thus, the Indonesian government has had to


mediate between its policy in the “war on terror” and Indonesian public perception. The public’s favorable view of the U.S. declined sharply from 65% in 2002 to less than 30% in 2007. Too close an alignment with the U.S. would be keenly opposed by Indonesian Muslim citizens and would threaten the government’s legitimacy. Moreover, in the context of the Iraq war, anti-Americanism runs deeper than ever in Indonesia, and the positive image of the U.S. plummeted from 61% in 2002 to 15% in 2003. On March 20, the Indonesia government came out with the same stance as the Indonesian people in opposing the U.S. military campaign in Iraq.


Faced with a state suffering from economic and political disorder since the 1997–98 Asian economic crisis, Megawati sought to provide more favorable economic conditions and restore stability. This compelled her to maintain the delicate balance among various factions encompassing the military, Islamic parties, business interests, and others. Megawati’s weak and heterogeneous political coalition hindered her administration from taking aggressive measures against terrorism. To grasp the effect of domestic coalitions on national counterterrorism policy, it is helpful to further explore the discourse of terrorism from both mainstream and radical sources.

Megawati’s conciliatory and sympathetic remarks to the U.S. in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks were met with anti-American demonstrations at home. When the American military operation in Afghanistan began, a small number of radical groups in Indonesia such as the Islamic Defenders Front called on the government to freeze or sever diplomatic ties with the U.S. Members of these groups threatened to expel American citizens and their allies from Indonesia if Jakarta declined their demands.

The most forceful opposition to Megawati’s anti-terrorism stance was reflected by her own vice president’s counterpoint. Vice President Hamzah


Haz—who also headed the largest Islamic party, the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP)—articulated his condolences at the U.S. loss of life in the September 11 attacks; however, he also stated that "the terrorist attack may help the U.S. atone for its sin." As Sebastian suggests, Haz may have been referring to U.S. policy in the Middle East. Leaders of Indonesia’s two mainstream Muslim groups Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, literally, “Awakening of the Ulama,” a relatively traditionalist organization focusing on Islamic schooling comprising 35 million members) and Muhammadiyah (“the Followers of Muhammad,” a reformist group comprising 30 million members) joined more-radical factions in condemning the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, although they refrained from calling for radical action. Indonesia’s Islamic authority, the Indonesian Ulemas Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) also strongly denounced what it labeled as aggression toward Afghanistan, and “called on Muslims all over the world to wage a jihad should the U.S. and its allies go ahead with their planned aggression toward Afghanistan.” The council urged the Indonesian government not to support the U.S. war in Afghanistan in any form, including providing access to Indonesian territory or airspace for U.S. naval ships or military airplanes.

A similar tone emerged when the U.S. embarked on the war in Iraq. As Amien Rais, the former chairman of Muhammadiyah and the founder of the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN) asserted, “The issue on Terror is orchestrated by the West to clobber Islam as it is impossible to attack [the Muslim world] directly as in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq . . .” Similarly, Hasyim Muzadi, NU chairman and Megawati’s running mate put it: “The international community seemed to judge them [Muslims] as terrorist. . . . In Indonesia, that arbitrary allegation seemed . . . heightened when the 12th October 2002 tragedy in Bali was said to have been carried out by an Islamic radical group.”

72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
75. Bahtiar Effendy, “Putting All Cards on the Table: Trust as a Factor in the War against Terror,” presented in the 21st Asia Pacific Roundtable.
Yudhoyono Government: 2004 to Present

During the tenure of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, as before, the delicate status of the government was a major challenge to coping with the terrorist threat. President Yudhoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla won the 2004 election with 61% of the vote. However, this strong popular support was not reflected in the House of Representatives, where Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party gained only 8% of the vote in the election.77 This weak parliamentary representation required Yudhoyono to carefully select a coalition cabinet that mirrored the delicate political coalitions. In contrast, in the 2009 legislative elections, the Democratic Party prevailed as the largest party in Parliament, with 20.85% of the vote.78 Although this figure indicated a sharp increase in party support, Yudhoyono, to win the presidential election in a single round, had to garner support from coalition partners that also included Islamic parties. With the support from his coalition partners, Yudhoyono gained 60.8% of the total vote, compared with his key rivals, former President Megawati, who won 26.8% and Vice President Kalla, who gained 12.4%.79 As a consequence, in fighting homegrown terrorism, Yudhoyono needs to maintain the balance between cracking down on terror networks and cooperating with foreign countries—without going against the will of other members of the coalition.

A key feature of the “war on terror” in the Yudhoyono era (as with previous presidents) has been the official refusal to declare JI a terrorist organization, despite its listing by the U.N. as a component of the “global terrorist network.” As some observers see it, for fear of offending Muslim leaders, government officials are willing to condemn certain terrorist actions in abstract terms

without explicitly mentioning JI as the organization they hold responsible.80 The term JI denotes “Islamic Community” and according to Geoffrey Hainsworth, “[M]any Muslims have viewed it as a legitimate political movement.”81 Indonesia’s government, in waging its war against terrorism, has deemed it necessary to distance its anti-terrorist campaign from the U.S.-led “global war on terror.” In their cooperation, President Yudhoyono has felt it “necessary to qualify Indonesia’s relationship with America carefully as that of a friend and equal partner, not an ally.”82 Recently, an Indonesian high government official substantiated this view, asserting that

the U.S. by definition is omnipresent because it’s too powerful economically, politically, and militarily. The real issue is to calibrate the relationship in a way that is not insistent, not intrusive. . . . If we are always being told what to do by foreigners, the government’s legitimacy is reduced.83

Even following the hotel bombings in July 2009 and the police uncovering of a terrorist assassination plot against Yudhoyono in August, Indonesia’s counterterrorism attempts remained low key and focused primarily on de-radicalization programs. According to national security officials, the deradicalization program was created to correct misconceived radical Islamic teachings adhered to by terrorists. It was designed to involve well-known religious figures, Islamic scholars, and Islamic boarding schools. Nevertheless, this program has not produced an optimum result and has been difficult to implement.

The 2009 bombings of the Marriott and Ritz Carlton Hotels in Jakarta prompted growing discussion about possibly monitoring Islamic preachers in mosques and pesantrens (Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia); however, this has generated public controversy. After the July bombings, the Indonesian police started an operation named “Condition Creation Operation” that incorporated a plan to monitor preaching and eradicate preaching practice that might provoke terrorist actions. Because of growing public uneasiness about

83. June 20, 2008, interview with Indonesian high government official.
the monitoring program, National Police Chief General Bambang Hendarso Danuri said that the police “would not control preachers, and affirmed that religious propagation was not under the police’s authority.”

Indonesian government officials do not openly mention the U.S. as a country heavily involved in promoting “moderate” Islam in Indonesia. Nor do they associate the deradicalization program with U.S.-led outreach efforts to Muslims, even though there is a remarkable array of such outreach programs administered by the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Indonesia. Seen in this light, it is apparent that the Jakarta government made attempts to prudently placate domestic coalition concerns while at the same time curbing the terrorist networks.

CONCLUSION

This article has brought to our attention one key point: the role of audience in influencing the success of securitization. In the securitization of terrorism, government can play the role of audience in bargaining with other states, as well as being a communicator to domestic constituents. The state response to U.S. securitization moves, therefore, is generated from the interface between interstate negotiation on the one hand and interaction within the domestic realm on the other: among individuals, social and interest groups, and the state.


From an account of the different features of audiences provided in this study, we may obtain an explanation regarding the varying degrees of securitization success. Contrasting Indonesia’s and Singapore’s domestic politics, this article asserts that the different approaches to fighting terrorism stem from the dissimilarity of the two states’ domestic audiences.

Indonesia demonstrates a hard case for the securitization of terrorism. With respect to its domestic politics, we have seen that as Indonesia has adopted a pluralistic system, the government has faced immediate constraint from public opinion because the domestic public can support or displace leaders from their political positions. In Indonesia, the allegations of politicians who link the fight against terrorism with an attack on Islam have helped to shape negative public perceptions of the “war on terror.”

Facing this domestic constraint, the government may invite other countries to cooperate in curbing terrorist activities by Islamic extremists; however, it must carefully explain its policy, in order not to build a facile association between Islam and terrorism. Additionally, Indonesia’s weak as well as heterogeneous domestic coalition contributed to the seemingly slow and unaggressive government responses to terrorist attacks. The government’s political support is drawn from various factions such as the military, Islamic parties, and business interests. Consequently, this diverse coalition hinders the government from taking a strong stance in the “war on terror.”

By contrast, the Singaporean government is not subject to the same pressures. Here, Singapore is an easy case of securitization, where government plays a greater role as audience and a lesser one as a communicator to the domestic public. The state has the ability to exercise decisive intervention in interpreting the “reality” of the “war on terror” and to strongly counteract competing narratives. This capacity makes society see this “reality” of the “war on terror” the way the government does: as an immediate threat to the economy and to political and social life. For Singapore, the cohesiveness of domestic coalitions created favorable conditions for the city-state’s firm stance in the war against terrorism. Under the banner of a total defense strategy, the populists and growth alliances emerged with the same voice as the government.