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Genocide, Religion and Modernity

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Ladies and Gentlemen. It is a great honour to be invited to deliver this first Holocaust Memorial Lecture at the University of Glasgow. It is important that the Holocaust is commemorated, but that, without in the slightest way diminishing the unique features of the Nazi murder of the Jews of Europe during the Second World War, all victims of genocide are embraced by such commemoration. My knowledge, such as it is, is largely restricted to the Holocaust - the genocide against the Jews. But in what follows, I'd like to try, even if superficially, to relate the Holocaust, with regard to the role of religion and the question of the modernity of genocide, to some of the other most notorious instances of state-sponsored mass killing in the benighted twentieth century - in particular, the Armenian and Rwandan genocides. I won't touch upon a further notorious and extreme case of outright genocide, the Khmer Rouge slaughter in the killing fields of Cambodia, where class, not nationality or ethnicity was the basis of the mass-murder, wiping out about half the Cambodians with bourgeois backgrounds - some one and a half million in all. Nor will I deal with the massive population 'cleansings' on purported class grounds, involving loss of life on a huge scale, under Bolshevism and Maoism.

I hope to reflect upon the ways religion has been used - in the Cambodian case it was not a factor - to justify genocidal actions, and upon the lack of resistance to and complicity in genocide of representatives of major religions. This invariably shocks us. Our more or less axiomatic starting presumption is that those representing transcendental belief-systems upholding the sanctity of life should unquestioningly strive to block the actions of states aimed at destroying life - and on a large scale. Occasionally, this did happen. The criticism of the persecution of the Jews by the Metropolitan Stephan of Sofia was one factor in Bulgaria's reluctance to deport its Jews. But this was untypical. More depressingly normal was the equivocation that seems encapsulated by the silence of Pope Pius XII, and the behaviour and attitudes of churchmen in Nazi Germany, while, as the Rwandan example shows, clergy could even be directly involved in the slaughter.

Though we are shocked, we ought not to be surprised. After all, religion has been frequently an element, sometimes a key motivator, in some of the worst atrocities and massacres throughout the ages. The proselytising religions have been the worst offenders. Islamic conquests were accompanied by terrible atrocities. But the record of Christianity is probably most dire of all religions.
The First Crusade against the Muslim 'infidel', beginning in 1095, spawned pogroms and murders of Jews on the way to the Holy Land as well as massacres of Muslims. And the Albigensian Crusade that started in 1209 - the attempt, authorised by the Pope, to extirpate root and branch the Cathar heresy in the south of France - was both genocidal in attempt and, for its time, in scale. Here, too, Jews were murdered, though they had nothing to do with the actual conflict.

It was in this very era - spanning the period of ecclesiastical reform with its emphasis upon papal authority, doctrinal orthodoxy (including definition at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 of the doctrine of transubstantiation, stressing the blood of Christ), and enhancement of the Catholic Church's temporal as well as spiritual power - that the demonisation of the Jews sharply gathered pace. The more Catholicism sought to codify and militantly enforce rigid orthodoxy, the more it identified, demonised, and persecuted the groups who were different, who did not belong - the 'out-groups'. Heretics and Jews were prime targets. The traditional hostility of Christianity and Judaism, which had indeed always been prone to fuel attacks on Jews, now developed an even more threatening dimension as the figure of the Jew became demonised. Weird and lurid images of the Jew - often linked to the ritual slaughter of Christian children, or the poisoning of wells - fed into popular prejudice. Such images were encouraged by the clergy, and promoted from a high level in the hierarchy. Before we become too complacent, it is perhaps worth recalling that some of the earliest manifestations occurred in England, and that the expulsion of Jews also took place notably early in England, in the reign of Edward I.

By the thirteenth century, then, we can say that the Catholic Church was prepared to instigate, sponsor, or legitimise militant action - on occasion with quasi-genocidal intent and character - to destroy those with other religious beliefs, and was demonising in a special way the Jews, the 'out-group' associated with the most heinous of all crimes, the killing of Christ himself. With such a potential for violent discrimination and militant intolerance, underpinned by the crusading zeal of a tightly-knit belief system, existing in, arguably, the most powerful institution in Europe, it can hardly be a matter of surprise that the Church in a later age could find itself implicated in far more terrible and extensive forms of modern genocide.

Nor, in retrospective view, could the wars of religion accompanying the Reformation in the sixteenth century, prompting numerous massacres in the name of religion, or the intensely bloody Thirty Years War of the seventeenth century offer much hope for a principled defence of human values by the representatives of the Christian churches at a later date. Moreover, religion in a divided Christianity was by this time becoming increasingly associated with the
territorial claims of princes and monarchs; and in some instances, as in England, with the legitimacy of emerging nation-states. Not only did this apply to the various strains of Protestantism; it was also, despite its universalist claims, true of Catholicism. The Churches and their belief-systems were becoming bound up in the interests of what would prove to be the most dynamic political force of the modern era, the nation-state. And, despite their bitter conflicts, both of the major Christian denominations shared a common, deep hostility to Jews. Luther's attitude towards the Jews in itself suffices to remind us that the antagonism crossed the doctrinal divisions which had widened so sharply at the Reformation.

Perhaps, it might be thought, the Churches could have been expected, despite this gloomy impression of involvement in medieval and early-modern atrocities and massacres, to have acted differently following the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. But, for one thing, the Churches were at the forefront of the forces rejecting the humanistic and liberalising ideas of the Enlightenment. And, for another, the spread of anti-Enlightenment values was made possible by the most dynamic political idea which the Enlightenment itself spawned: that of popular sovereignty. This idea, first instrumentalised in the American and French Revolutions, and subsequently becoming the indispensable premiss of political systems of varying kinds and competing ideologies throughout the world has been a defining feature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is one of the most important elements - perhaps even the most important of all - which separate these centuries from what went before, which let us describe them as a 'modern era'. It is, in other words, an important determinant of modernity. And it made ethnic cleansing and genocide far more likely to happen than ever before.

In the north-west of the European continent - Britain, France, Scandinavia, the Low Countries - as well as in Switzerland and north America, the historic development towards nation-states had produced societies divided on class lines but without serious potential for ethnic conflict. The way the state systems emerged, with a constitutional framework underpinning the dominance of an existing, largely unchallenged, ruling class, and relatively homogeneous nationality (Ireland, with its divided national claims, posing a partial exception to this in the British case), encouraged internal, institutionalised conflict-resolution. In such conditions, liberal constitutions showed themselves capable of managing the types of conflict that class divisions produced, and of adapting to pressures for change. This type of state was far from immune from involvement in ethnic cleansing actions in territories it colonised. Settler communities were particularly likely to engage in ethnic cleansing, as the fate of the indigenous native populations in north America and Australasia testifies. And along the way, the acquisition of empire and accompanying colonialism fostered burgeoning racism in the
home community. But serious ethnic violence in the homeland was unlikely to be a product of such state systems.

It was different in the ethnically mixed areas of central and eastern Europe. Here, the growth of popular sovereignty brought mounting pressure on the multi-ethnic empires of the Habsburgs and Ottomans. Even where breakaway nation-states were founded, and especially following the collapse of these empires at the end of the First World War when successor states sprang up in these regions, they were invariably ethnically mixed. Control of the state, with its resources and increasingly expanding and powerful apparatus of government, became a self-evident source of conflict, which frequently split along ethnic lines. Here, the central idea of popular sovereignty shaping the nation-state, in contrast to the thinking which produced the stratified liberal states and institutionalised conflict of western Europe, was that of the organic (or integral) nation, resting on notions of national community and integration, gaining its definition from those it excluded, such as ethnic or religious minorities. In such a context, ethnic cleansing was far more likely to occur, leading in extreme instances to full-scale genocide.

It seems certain that the scale of civilian deaths through ethnic cleansing in the twentieth century - estimates put the number at anywhere between 60 and 120 million - was vastly greater than in any previous century. This was not solely a product of the greater killing capacity of modern technology or the capacity for control and repression of modern bureaucracy. But it does appear to be definable as a product of modernity both in scale and in causation - something differing quantitatively and qualitatively from the massacres and atrocities of the pre-modern age. For the underlying driving-force behind this ethnic cleansing (and, in some cases, genocide) is patently modern: the quest for the unitary and organic nation-state, ethnically defined.

Religion now finds its place in this modern setting - a setting increasingly of nation-states, would-be nation-states, unifying nation-states, attempts to bring about or enforce ethnic dominance within a nation-state, or to break away to form a new, ethnically defined nation-state. Religion in some instances provides or cements the sense of identity of the ethnic group. Where competing religions coincide with competing ethnic groups in the same territory (as in former Yugoslavia), the scope for ethnic cleansing, possibly escalating to genocide, is considerable. In the context of war, when externally directed violence in conditions of high tension can easily be channelled inwardly at minorities, often ethnically identified, the chances of genocide are greatly magnified. So it is no surprise that, measured by the proportion of the victim population murdered, three of the most extensive genocides of a
genocidal century - the Armenian, Jewish, and Rwandan genocides - all occurred in the context of war. And it should be no surprise, either, that the dominant religious forces in each case sided with and identified with the most powerful secular forces in the state against the persecuted minorities.

The killing in 1915 of at least 800,000 and probably over a million Armenians - by most estimates some 50-70% of all Armenians in Turkish lands - arose in the context of the desperate attempt by Young Turks to revamp the failing Ottoman Empire in new guise, by making it more Islamic and Pan-Turkic, to a backdrop of disastrous military defeat. (That massacres of Muslims took place at the same time does not diminish in the slightest the gravity of what was happening to the Armenians.) As an unpopular ethnic minority, singled out by their Orthodox Christianity, geographically standing in the way of Pan-Turkic expansion, and perceived as supporting the Russian enemy and threatening to establish a separate state with aims of domination, the Armenians provided ideal scapegoats in unplanned ethnic cleansing operations that rapidly spiralled into outright genocide. Religion had been an important ingredient in singling out 'the other'. But the Islamic and Christian communities had traditionally lived relatively peacefully alongside each other before ethnic tensions started to gather in the later nineteenth century. The modernity of ethnic claims over control of the state and the crisis of that state in conditions of major war had conspired to unleash the genocide. Religion had helped define the ethnic distinctions. But it was only when religion served to underpin or give justification to the actions of the dominant groups in the state that it became complicit in genocide.

In the Rwandan genocide of 1994, it is estimated that one million out of a population of under eight million were systematically killed within three months. Some four fifths of the minority Tutsi population were murdered in these mass killings. The Christian Churches cannot in this case merely be accused of acting passively or with indifference in the face of mass slaughter. Rather, what is more shocking still, members of the clergy actively participated in or even helped to organise the killings. And, unlike the Armenian genocide, religion was not used as a distinguishing mark in ethnic conflict. Both perpetrators and victims could identify with the Christian Churches. Killings of fellow parishioners were, in fact, commonplace. What is evident is that the active complicity of the Churches in the Rwandan genocide arose directly from their integration into the structures of power in the country and their keenness to support, to their own advantage, the rulers of a modern, authoritarian state system, even when it was obvious that increasingly dangerous provocations to genocide - then actual genocide - were being deployed to sustain the power of a threatened regime. What is plain in this case, too, is the modernity of the genocide, centring on modern forms of power struggle for control.
of the state, and the whipping up of ethnic tension through modern propaganda methods to create, more or less artificially, an ethnic powder-keg ready to be ignited. In this highly modern genocidal conflict, the Churches proved eager collaborators.

The Nazi genocide against the Jews - the Holocaust, as it has generally come to be known - is estimated to have resulted in the murder of about five and a half million Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe, around half of the number targeted in the notorious Wannsee Conference of January 1942 (which included Jews outside the existing sphere of Nazi domination at the time, for example in Great Britain and Ireland). In practically every respect, this genocide can be regarded as a product of modernity. It was perpetrated by individuals and agencies from a country with a highly modern (for the time) bureaucracy, with modern technology, modern industry, a modern army, and modern forms of control and repression. It was legitimised by modern strains of pseudo-scientific race-theories, developed in the second half of the nineteenth century, and by modern notions of breeding an ideal society (implying elimination of 'negative', 'harmful', or 'dangerous' ethnic and social groups). It was carried out in modern industrialised fashion, through gas chambers in killing centres (though we should not forget that over two million victims were simply shot by execution squads, while countless others died from the ravages of slave labour, starvation, exposure, and epidemic diseases). And it was premissed upon the most extreme variant of the modern concept of the organic nation-state - in this case an envisaged ethnically homogeneous and 'pure' German nation-state, purged of all 'impure' elements, drawing its future life-blood from an east-European empire stratified on racial lines, exploiting a racially-defined helot underclass, and with the ethnic group regarded as most threatening of all to this social and political utopia completely eradicated.

In these ways, the Holocaust fits Zygmunt Bauman's assertion that it was - though surely not solely this? - 'an element of social engineering, meant to bring about a social order conforming to the design of the perfect society'. Baumann, in fact, applies this definition to 'modern genocide' in general. He adds to this his claim that the Holocaust 'arose out of a genuinely rational concern, and ... was generated by bureaucracy true to its form and purpose'. Again, the implication, from the tenor of his overall argument, is that it is in this way that genocide can be regarded as a product of modernity. But in arguing from the specific (the Holocaust) to the general (genocide more widely regarded), it may be that Bauman is concentrating too heavily on one, admittedly vital, aspect of modernity - bureaucracy (as emphasised by Max Weber) - at the expense of others. At any rate, it is not easy to see how his definition, stressing rationality and the design of the perfect society, so readily applies to the other two cases of outright genocide under discussion in this volume, the Armenian and
the Rwandan. Rather, it might be suggested that the 'modernity' of the three genocides taken
together can most obviously be seen in the modernity of the notion of the ethnically defined,
organic nation-state, with the corresponding need to exclude, eliminate, and even exterminate
the antithetical 'other' or 'out-group'. Circumstances and relative advancement or
backwardness of technology and state apparatus would then determine the means of killing
and level of quasi-rationality involved.

Even taking the aim of the ethnically defined, organic nation-state as the essence of
genocide's modernity, which links the three cases of genocide dealt with here, the Nazi
genocide stands out in a number of ways. These have not primarily to do with the means of
killing. States engaged in genocide will use whatever means are available. In Germany's case,
the level of modernity of the country meant that it was possible to resort to mechanised mass-
slaughter. Elsewhere, more 'primitive' methods of mass shooting (also of course used by the
Germans) sufficed and corresponded to a relatively unplanned, opportunistic lurch into
genocide.

One peculiarity is that the genocide against the Jews was not opportunistic or contingent as
was the case in the Armenian and Rwandan genocides. It is true that much recent scholarship
has succeeded in showing the gradual emergence, with many changes of plans and much
improvisation, of a systematic programme of extermination of the Jews, taking shape in the
changing conditions of war in eastern Europe in 1941-2 in bursts of escalating radicalism. It
was indeed a 'twisted road to Auschwitz'. Nevertheless, a genocidal intent - meaning initially
the gradual dying out of Jews in the terrible conditions of some mass reservation through
starvation, freezing to death, or the ravages of forced labour - had been present for some
considerable time before the 'Final Solution' offered a direct and immediate mass killing
programme as a practical possibility. Genocide, in this instance, then, was intended, even if
the route and method were not worked out thoroughly in advance.

Unlike the other two genocides, moreover, this was given a quasi-rational legitimation
through race-theory - something which had not existed before the nineteenth century. The
Jews, according to such race-theory, were not simply an 'out-group' in the way that
Armenians could be targeted by the Turks or Tutsi by the Hutu. There was not even the
semblance of an objective contest for power in the state or apparent block by the 'out-group'
on the ambitions of the state. Rather, a modern form of demonisation on alleged race-grounds
of Jews was used as justification for eliminating them systematically from German society,
then expanding the aim of total elimination to the whole of German-occupied Europe. Only
this demonisation could be used to justify the all-out onslaught on an ethnic group (which,
oddly enough, the Nazis had to use religious criteria to define) comprising only 0.76 per cent of the population in 1933. Obviously, there was no objective threat from this quarter, even if - as the Nazis never ceased to hammer home - Jews were over-represented in certain economic sectors or cultural spheres. But - another oddity - far from seeing the 'threat' diminishing as the Jewish community in Germany declined, the demonisation was massively intensified. The notion, present from the start in Hitler's rhetoric but also that of others on the extreme racist Right, that the Jews were the wire-pullers of capitalism, run from the City of London and Wall Street, as well as being the controllers of Bolshevism in Moscow, had been combined with the 'world conspiracy' threat popularised in the forged Protocols of the Elders of Zion to create the image of the Jews as not just a national, but an international danger that had to be eradicated. In the context of growing international tension in the later 1930s and the looming certainty of a second world war within a generation, this demonisation of the Jews became, as Norman Cohn remarked many years ago, a 'warrant for genocide'.

We come back at this point to the role of religion and of the Christian Churches in this genocide. Plainly, the Church-led demonisation of Jews in the pre-modern era had fed into the modern pseudo-scientific racist forms of antisemitism to produce a lethal brew. In many cases of twentieth-century ethnic cleansings (merging sometimes into genocide), the hostility towards the outsider target group had been linked, as in the Armenian and also the Rwandan cases, to real or presumed economic exploitation and advantage over the majority, 'perpetrator' population. This played, of course, a role, too, in the welling hostility towards Jews in Germany. But it was in this case no more than a modern overlay on a primary, religious-based hatred of Jews, now converted into a racial demonisation. Both major Christian denominations in Germany had continued in the modern era, down to the period of Nazi rule itself, to uphold and promote the religious foundations of antagonism towards the Jews. Even in conditions of the liberal democracy of the Weimar Republic, they did little or nothing to dent the widespread and growing feeling that the Jews were a harmful presence in German society.

In the case of the Protestant Church, it went further than this. Leading theologians, as well as other Church leaders, clergy with still strong influence over opinion-formation, and extensive sections of the Protestant church-going population, were prepared to uphold Nazi racial thinking on the Jews and to marry this to the age-old forms of religious discrimination. Catholic clergy, whether in the hierarchy or at parish level, were more inclined to distance themselves from Nazi race doctrine - though the ingrained, traditional, religious-based antagonism towards Jews, alongside the Church's conventional emphasis upon obedience to authority and keenness not to offend the Nazi masters and incite intensified attacks on the
Church itself, offered scant hope of any principled opposition to the increasingly radical persecution of Jews under Hitler. So while the Bishop of Münster, Clemens von Galen could take a courageous public stand in 1941 against the regime on church-related issues, and even on the 'euthanasia action' (which potentially affected those under his pastoral care), he had nothing to say about the attacks on Jews, whether following the notorious 'Reichskristallnacht' pogrom of 1938, or at the time of their deportation in 1941.

The point could be widened. Catholic protest at interference with Church observances, arrests of clergy, abolition of denominational schools, or removal of Crucifixes from classrooms, was frequent. But there was no public, institutional opposition at any time - despite the continuing high level of churchleaders' influence over wide sections of the population - to the persecution of the Jews. Whatever the private disquiet at the disturbing rumours, and even hard news, from the east, this was not seen as a matter of direct concern for the Church. For both major denominations, traditional prejudice and institutional self-interest undermined what might have been regarded as a duty implicit in the doctrinal precept of Christianity itself, the words attributed to Jesus Christ, to 'love thy neighbour as thyself, for God's sake'. Without the constraints the Churches might have provided, it was not difficult for gross inhumanity to flourish.

In one further, perhaps unique way, religion - of a sort - modernity, and genocide might be said to have come together in the Holocaust: for Nazism itself could be seen as containing strains of a 'political religion'. This, too, would set the genocide against the Jews apart from the other major genocides - Armenian, Cambodian, and Rwandan - of the twentieth century. Admittedly, the Cambodian genocide, and the massive ethnic cleansings bordering on genocide which took place under Stalin and Mao, were perpetrated under the aegis of a type of 'crusading', exclusivist modern ideology aimed at the renewal of society along restructured class lines. But even in their self-image, these were rigidly secular ideologies.

In the case of Nazism, the pseudo-religious component was much stronger. The close relationship of Church and State in Germany since the Reformation, the investiture of religious symbolism in the person of the Kaiser, and the mystical, millenarian element - evoking the legend of the sleeping Kaiser beneath the Kyffhäuser mountain awaiting the reawakening of a new Reich - built into expectations of the new, unified German state after 1871 formed strands of the backcloth. But even before 1914, the 'dark' side of an almost manichean imagery saw the embodiment of all that was 'evil' in the figure of the Jew. The traumatic collapse of the 'old' Germany in the defeat and Revolution of 1918, then ushered in a fundamentally contested, pluralist state system in continuing crisis conditions, with a
completely polarised society. This was amid distinct signs of a weakening of institutional religion - certainly of the Protestant Church, where there was much talk of a 'crisis of faith'. These then provided the preconditions for the rise of a new type of political leader.

Before Hitler was even heard of, voices on the conservative Right were calling for a new leader who would combine the qualities of statesman, warrior, and high-priest - the last of these an evident evocation of quasi-religious qualities. The mass of his fanatical following increasingly depicted Hitler as a national saviour or redeemer, which is certainly how he saw himself. And Hitler was adept at using quasi-religious rhetoric to good effect in couching his mass appeal. The demonisation of the Jews fitted perfectly into the countervailing vision of national salvation, a utopia to be attained through stamping out the sources of 'disease' in a presumed 'decadent' society, eradication of the 'enemies of the people' and creation of an ethnically pure 'national community'. The depth and extent of the crisis in German society opened the way to the radicality of the presumed solution to that crisis, and readiness to accept it.

It then took the modernity of the German state - here I would follow Bauman - to convert this pseudo-religious vision of national salvation, involving the 'removal' of those who were seen as Germany's enemies, into genocidal reality. Bureaucratic data-collection and organisation, railway timetables, industrial production of Zyklon-B, and profit margins of modern capitalism were all part of the most systematic genocide in history. This was after they had harnessed their services to the demands of a chiliastic vision of nation redemption, embodied in an enthusiastically supported political leader who saw it as his 'mission' - again a religiously freighted word - to destroy the Jews in bringing about Germany's rebirth. In this way, the unique character of the Nazi genocide against the Jews finds part of its explanation precisely in this combination of a dynamic movement driven by the pseudo-religious vision of national redemption allied to the bureaucratic apparatus of a highly modern state system.

The genocidal twentieth century is now itself receding into history. Unfortunately, there are scant grounds for hope that the twenty-first century will see an end to genocide. But there is unlikely, so far as the eye can see, to be anything resembling a repetition or recurrence of the Holocaust. Of the major genocides of the twentieth century, the Nazi genocide seems the least likely to provide the pattern for future genocide. For the reasons given above, it was historically unique, with a number of characteristics not encountered in other genocides, and arising from conditions in Europe which cannot be replicated, not least since Nazi ravages so thoroughly destroyed the traditional structures of European Jewry. Though antisemitism is far from eradicated, it no longer has the lethal force which it possessed between the wars, and the
demonisation of the Jews no longer has any resonance, either in Christian thinking or in secular society. Of course, major antagonisms towards Jews continue to play a major part in the politics of the Middle East. 'Ethnic cleansing', even genocide, could under certain circumstances be conceivable there on a substantial scale. But the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is increasingly recognisable as a conventional, if highly dangerous, element of nationalist, also inter-state, conflict, part of the fragile international political framework in that unstable part of the world. There is nothing in it which warrants comparison with the proto-genocidal climate of the 1930s in Germany.

More likely is that the type of antagonism which gave rise to the Armenian and Rwandan genocides - pressure for ethnic homogeneity in a nation-state with mixed and competing ethnic groups in the same geographical area, with the ultimate aim of creating an 'organic' nation - will lead to further genocidal horror. The Middle-East conflict, with its potential for two-sided 'ethnic cleansing', gives pause for thought here. As the 1990s showed, international intervention was probably responsible for preventing the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo from escalating into full-scale genocide. Religion and nationalism were closely intertwined in the tragic events there, which were driven by demands of ethnic homogeneity and have resulted in the promotion of precisely that in the regions of former Yugoslavia afflicted by the state-sponsored ethnic tension. In the ex-colonial territories of Africa, repetitions of the Rwandan catastrophe seem to be waiting to happen. Sudan seems one such possibility. Whether what is often euphemistically labelled 'the international community' will have the unity and strength of the will to prevent it remains to be seen.

Depressingly, too, when such ethnic cleansing, stretching into genocide, does happen, there will almost certainly be little prospect of looking to the Christian Churches, even if they are not actively involved in it as they were in Rwanda, to put a brake on it.

On such a sombre concluding note, Ladies and Gentlemen, might I thank you most sincerely for your patient attention.
* A version of this lecture will appear as the concluding contribution to Omer Bartov and Phyllis Mack (eds.), In God's Name. Genocide and Religion in the Twentieth Century (forthcoming, Berghahn Books, Providence etc., 2001).