School of Humanities / Sgoil nan Daonnachdan

 

Stuart Crutchfield

  
E-mail: s.crutchfield.1@research.gla.ac.uk
Degrees: BA (Hons) (Stirling,) MLitt (Distinction) (Glasgow)
Current Degree Course: PhD
Supervisor: Dr Fiona Macpherson



Thesis Topic

 The Phenomenal Unity of Perceptual Experience

This thesis is concerned with the unity of consciousness, specifically the phenomenal unity of perceptual experiences. Most extant descriptions of phenomenal unity suggest that perceptual experiences are phenomenally unified when they possess conjoint phenomenology. However, this is hardly perspicuous. The best way to kick-start the question over what exactly phenomenal unity is may be put as the following question:

‘Does the character of the set of perceptual experiences had by a single subject at a time ever add up to more than the sum of the individual experiences?’

If you think the answer to the above question is 'no' then you will be likely to hold a deflationary account of phenomenal unity. if you think the answer is 'yes', then you are obliged to give some positive account of phenomenal unity, and thus provide an explanation of the extra phenomenology.

There are two questions that can be asked with respect to phenomenal unity, 'what is it?' and 'how should we explain it?'. My thesis will address both of these questions, exploring the various conceptions of phenomenal unity and the various reductive, and non-reductive methods of explaining it.

 Papers (In Progress)

'The Big-Numb-Arm & Other Problems: Why Phenomenal Unity Cannot be Spatial Unity'

'Can We Experience Empty Space? A Puzzle About Spatial Representation in The Sensory Modalities'

'On A Primitive Unity Relation'
 

Other Research Interests

I am also interested in various other issues in the philosophy of mind and perception (and related issues in metaphysics, such as issues of conceivability and possibility) such as how we should individuate the senses, and the differences between them, especially the different ways they represent space; questions about the admissible contents of perceptual experience, and questions about how we should count experiences.

I am also interested in the metaphysics of sounds, and in auditory perception.

I have also become increasingly interested in methodological questions, and metaphilosophy, particularly questions about how we should view the status of thought experiments.

Selected Recent Presentations

'The Evidence for Phenomenal Consciousness in the Absence of Access Consciousness' Mind, Science and Everything Graduate Conference, University of Glasgow, 26th June 2010

'Can We Experience Empty Space?' Graduate Philosophy Conference, Oxford University, 21st November 2009

'The Evidence for Phenomenal Consciousness in the Absence of Access Consciousness' Philosophy of Mind & Psychology Research Seminar, Psychology Dept. University of Glasgow, 2nd November 2009

'Phenomenal Unity & the Trouble With Tye' Postgraduate Seminar, University of Glasgow, 25th September 2009

'Can We Experience Empty Space?' European Society for Philosphy & Psychology Annual Conference, Central European University, Budapest, 27th August 2009

'On a Primitive Unity Relation', ANU/RSSS Philosophy Society, 14th April 2009, Australian National University.

'Can We Experience Empty Space?', Consciousness at The Beach Conference, ANU, 20th - 22nd February 2009

'Spatial Representation in the Sensory Modalities: An Attempt at a First Taxonomy', Postgraduate Seminar, University of Glasgow, 14th November 2008.

'The Big-Numb-Arm and Other Problems',  Sixth European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, Jagiellionian University, Krakow, 26 August 2008.

'The Big-Numb-Arm and Other Problems', Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind Graduate Conference, Durham University, 1 July 2008.

'The Big-Numb-Arm and Other Problems: Why Phenomenal Unity Cannot be Spatial Unity', May 2008, Macquarrie University.

'Phenomenal Unity as Spatial Unity?', APPC Graduate Conference, March 2008, University of Sydney.

'Phenomenal Unity, Introspective Unity, and the Big-Numb-Arm Problem for Spatial Unity', ANU/RSSS Philosophy Society, March 2008, Australian National University.

'Phenomenal Unity', Postgraduate Seminar, September 2007, University of Glasgow.

'What are the Options for Unity of Consciousness?', Postgraduate Seminar, June 2007, University of Glasgow.

Further Information

I spent February-May 2008, and February-May 2009 as a visiting PhD student at the Australian National University, RSSS Philosophy Program. I  received a travel grant from the Mac Robertson Trust for this visit.
 
I am Graduate Assistant at the Centre for the Study of Perceptual Experience.

I edit the Unity of Consciousness section of the Philpapers website

I have been awarded a Royal Institute of Philosophy Jacobsen Fellowship for 2008-09. and 2009-10