I'm interested in what it takes for a belief to be justified or rational. Descartes famously thought that you couldn't justifiably believe a proposition P unless it was absolutely certain - unless there was no chance that you were wrong about P. Most philosophers these days think that this sets the bar too high - in order to justifiably believe P it is enough that P be probable - likely to be true. I think that both of these views are mistaken. On my view, justification requires more than probability, but less than certainty - it requires something that I term normic support. I've developed these ideas in a series of papers and recently set them out in a book, Between Probability and Certainty. Here is my my current CV.
Between Probability and Certainty (Oxford: Oxford University Press), forthcoming
Papers on Justification, Probability and Normic Support
I have been awarded an AHRC Research Leadership Grant for the 2014/2015 academic year for work on a project entitled 'Justification and Probability'.
I received (jointly with Philip Ebert) a grant from the Scots Philosophical Association for a workshop on statistical evidence in the law, held at the University of Glasgow in December 2014.
I received (jointly with Philip Ebert and Peter Milne) grants from the Scots Philosophical Association, and the British Society for the Philosophy of Science for a workshop on beliefs and degrees of belief held at the University of Stirling in 2010.
I received (jointly with Philip Ebert and Peter Milne) grants from the Scots Philosophical Association, the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, to support a workshop on the lottery paradox, held at the University of Glasgow in 2009.