I am currently working on two (related) research projects. The first project concerns the relationship between justified belief and evidential probability. Epistemologists (and others) often take it for granted that what it means for one to have justification for believing a claim is for it to be sufficiently probable, given one's evidence. Despite the obvious appeal of this, I think that justified belief has little to do with evidential probability and is determined by very different features of one's evidence. The second project concerns the problem of radical scepticism and the notion of entitlement - of automatic or default justification - that some epistemologists have invoked in order to deal with it. I argue for a novel conception of entitlement based upon the idea that the evidential support relation can be modelled as a kind of variably strict conditional operator. I have also written on conditional logic, the epistemology of deduction and the epistemology of religious belief. Here is my my current CV.
Papers on Justification and Evidential Probability
I have been awarded an AHRC Research Leadership Grant for the 2014/2015 academic year for work on a project entitled 'Justification and Probability'.
I received (jointly with Philip Ebert and Peter Milne) grants from the Scots Philosophical Association, and the British Society for the Philosophy of Science for a workshop on beliefs and degrees of belief held at the University of Stirling in 2010.
I received (jointly with Philip Ebert and Peter Milne) grants from the Scots Philosophical Association, the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, to support a workshop on the lottery paradox, held at the University of Glasgow in 2009.