Dr Martin Smith

  • Lecturer (Philosophy)

Research interests

I'm interested in what it takes for a belief to be justified or rational.  Descartes famously thought that you couldn't justifiably believe a proposition P unless it was absolutely certain - unless there was no chance that you were wrong about P.  Most philosophers these days think that this sets the bar too high - in order to justifiably believe P it is enough that P be probable - likely to be true.  I think that both of these views are mistaken.  On my view, justification requires more than probability, but less than certainty - it requires something that I term normic support.  I've developed these ideas in a series of papers and recently set them out in a book, Between Probability and Certainty.  Here is my my current CV.

Book

  • Between Probability and Certainty (Oxford: Oxford University Press), forthcoming

Papers on Justification, Probability and Normic Support

Papers on Scepticism and Entitlement

  • 'Full Blooded Entitlement' in Pedersen, N. and Graham, P. eds. Epistemic Entitlement (Oxford: Oxford University Press), forthcoming
  • 'Scepticism by a Thousand Cuts' International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, forthcoming
  • 'Entitlement and Evidence' Australasian Journal of Philosophy, v91(4), 2013 (The published version can be found here.)
  • 'Transmission Failure Explained'‌ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research v79(1), 2009 (The published version can be found here.)

Other Papers

A full list of publications and some work in progress can be found on my Philpapers Profile.

Grants

  • I have been awarded an AHRC Research Leadership Grant for the 2014/2015 academic year for work on a project entitled 'Justification and Probability'.
  • I received (jointly with Philip Ebert) a grant from the Scots Philosophical Association for a workshop on statistical evidence in the law, held at the University of Glasgow in December 2014.
  • I received (jointly with Philip Ebert and Peter Milne) grants from the Scots Philosophical Association, and the British Society for the Philosophy of Science for a workshop on beliefs and degrees of belief held at the University of Stirling in 2010.
  • I received (jointly with Philip Ebert and Peter Milne) grants from the Scots Philosophical Association, the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, to support a workshop on the lottery paradox, held at the University of Glasgow in 2009. 

Supervision

I am happy to supervise PhD and Masters students in Epistemology, Logic, Metaphysics and related areas.

 

Some current and recent PhD projects that I have supervised:

  • Plantinga's Theory of Warrant and the Epistemology of Religious Belief
  • Counterfactual Analyses of Causation
  • Foreknowledge and Predestination
  • The Epistemology of Emotional Experience

Teaching

Current teaching:

  • JH3: Epistemology
  • SH26: Justification and Probability

 

Publications

List by: Type | Date

Jump to: 2015 | 2014 | 2013 | 2012 | 2011 | 2010 | 2009 | 2007
Number of items: 14.

2015

Smith, M. (2015) Scepticism by a thousand cuts. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, (Early Online Publication)

2014

Smith, M. (2014) Evidential incomparability and the Principle of Indifference. Erkenntnis, (doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9665-2)

Smith, M. (2014) Knowledge, justification and normative coincidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89(2), pp. 273-295. (doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00605.x)

Smith, M. (2014) The arbitrariness of belief. In: Dodd, D. and Zardini, E. (eds.) Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 322-336. ISBN 9780199658343 (doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.003.0015)

Smith, M. (2014) The epistemology of religion. Analysis, 74(1), pp. 135-147. (doi:10.1093/analys/ant087)

2013

Smith, M. (2013) Two notions of epistemic risk. Erkenntnis, 78(5), pp. 1069-1079. (doi:10.1007/s10670-012-9376-5)

Smith, M. (2013) Entitlement and evidence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91(4), pp. 735-753. (doi:10.1080/00048402.2012.732094)

2012

Smith, M. (2012) Some thoughts on the JK-Rule1. Nous, 46(4), pp. 791-802. (doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2012.00866.x)

Smith, M., and Ebert, P.A. (2012) Introduction: outright belief and degrees of belief. Dialectica, 66(3), pp. 305-308. (doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01306.x)

2011

Smith, M. (2011) God and the external world. Ratio, 24(1), pp. 65-77. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2010.00483.x)

2010

Smith, M. (2010) A generalised lottery paradox for infinite probability spaces. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 61(4), pp. 821-831. (doi:10.1093/bjps/axq019)

Smith, M. (2010) What else justification could be. Nous, 44(1), pp. 10-31. (doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00729.x)

2009

Smith, M.J. (2009) Transmission failure explained. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79(1), pp. 164-189. (doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00270.x)

2007

Smith, M. (2007) Ceteris paribus conditionals and comparative normalcy. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 36(1), pp. 97-121. (doi:10.1007/s10992-006-9030-2)

This list was generated on Wed Jul 1 05:48:47 2015 BST.
Number of items: 14.

Articles

Smith, M. (2015) Scepticism by a thousand cuts. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, (Early Online Publication)

Smith, M. (2014) Evidential incomparability and the Principle of Indifference. Erkenntnis, (doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9665-2)

Smith, M. (2014) Knowledge, justification and normative coincidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89(2), pp. 273-295. (doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00605.x)

Smith, M. (2014) The epistemology of religion. Analysis, 74(1), pp. 135-147. (doi:10.1093/analys/ant087)

Smith, M. (2013) Two notions of epistemic risk. Erkenntnis, 78(5), pp. 1069-1079. (doi:10.1007/s10670-012-9376-5)

Smith, M. (2013) Entitlement and evidence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91(4), pp. 735-753. (doi:10.1080/00048402.2012.732094)

Smith, M. (2012) Some thoughts on the JK-Rule1. Nous, 46(4), pp. 791-802. (doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2012.00866.x)

Smith, M., and Ebert, P.A. (2012) Introduction: outright belief and degrees of belief. Dialectica, 66(3), pp. 305-308. (doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01306.x)

Smith, M. (2011) God and the external world. Ratio, 24(1), pp. 65-77. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2010.00483.x)

Smith, M. (2010) A generalised lottery paradox for infinite probability spaces. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 61(4), pp. 821-831. (doi:10.1093/bjps/axq019)

Smith, M. (2010) What else justification could be. Nous, 44(1), pp. 10-31. (doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00729.x)

Smith, M.J. (2009) Transmission failure explained. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79(1), pp. 164-189. (doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00270.x)

Smith, M. (2007) Ceteris paribus conditionals and comparative normalcy. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 36(1), pp. 97-121. (doi:10.1007/s10992-006-9030-2)

Book Sections

Smith, M. (2014) The arbitrariness of belief. In: Dodd, D. and Zardini, E. (eds.) Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 322-336. ISBN 9780199658343 (doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.003.0015)

This list was generated on Wed Jul 1 05:48:47 2015 BST.