School of Humanities / Sgoil nan Daonnachdan

Interlace panel from the Govan sarcophagus, carved for the bones of St Constantine, c. 900 AD

Prof Alan Weir

Alan Weir
  • Professor (Philosophy)

email: Alan.Weir@glasgow.ac.uk


My main  main research interest in recent years has been in the foundations of logic and mathematics. I recently published a monograph defending formalism in the philosophy of mathematics- Truth through Proof- a formalist foundation for mathematics, (OUP, 2010). I am currently working on establishing the consistency of naive set theory inside a relatively natural and  user-friendly non-classical logic, on the interpretation of Quine, on the metaphysics of properties, as well as continuing to work on formalism. 

I have also  worked on topics in epistemology, especially with regard to the nature of rationality and in philosophy of mind, for example on externalist, anti-representationalist theories of perception.

RECENT WORK AND PUBLICATIONS

Quine's Naturalism: Forthcoming in  Harman, G. and Lepore, E. (eds.) The Blackwell Companion to Quine. Blackwell. (In Press)

Metatheoretic results for a non-transitive logic 

Formalism in the philosophy of mathematics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .  (2011) ISSN 1095-5054

Truth Through Proof: A Formalist Foundation for Mathematics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. ISBN 9780199541492 (2010)

Jump to: 2013 | 2011 | 2010 | 2007 | 2006 | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001
Number of items: 17.

2013

Weir, A. (2013) Metatheoretic Results for a Non-Transitive Logic. Technical Report. University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK.

Weir, A. (2013) Quine's naturalism. In: Harman, G. and Lepore, E. (eds.) The Blackwell Companion to Quine. Blackwell. (In Press)

2011

Weir, A. (2011) Formalism in the philosophy of mathematics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . ISSN 1095-5054

2010

Weir, A.J. (2010) Truth Through Proof: A Formalist Foundation for Mathematics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. ISBN 9780199541492

2007

Weir, A.J. (2007) Answers to 'Five Questions'. In: Hendricks, V.F. and Leitgeb, H. (eds.) Philosophy of Mathematics: Five Questions. Automatic Press. ISBN 9788799101351

2006

Weir, A.J. (2006) Honest toil or sheer magic? Dialectica, 61 (1). pp. 89-115. ISSN 0012-2017 (doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01076.x )

Weir, A.J. (2006) Indeterminacy of translation. In: The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Language. Series: Oxford handbooks . Oxford University Press, pp. 233-249. ISBN 9780199259410

Weir, A.J. (2006) Is it too much to ask, to ask for everything? In: Rayo, A. and Uzquiano, G. (eds.) Absolute Generality. Clarendon Press, pp. 333-368. ISBN 9780199276424

2005

Weir, A.J. (2005) Naive truth and sophisticated logic. In: Beall, J.C. and Armour-Garb, B. (eds.) Deflationism and Paradox. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 218-249. ISBN 9780199287116

Weir, A.J. (2005) Naturalism reconsidered. In: Shapiro, S. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic. Series: Oxford handbooks in philosophy . Oxford University Press, pp. 460-482. ISBN 9780195148770

Weir, A.J. (2005) On Kit Fine's 'The Limits of Abstraction'. Philosophical Studies, 122 (3). pp. 333-348. ISSN 0031-8116 (doi:10.1007/s11098-004-4926-6)

2004

Weir, A.J. (2004) An ultra-realist theory of perception. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 12 (2). pp. 105-128. ISSN 0967-2559 (doi:10.1080/09672550410001679819)

Weir, A.J. (2004) There are no true contradictions. In: Priest, G., Beall, J.C. and Armour-Garb, B. (eds.) The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays. Clarendon Press, pp. 385-417. ISBN 9780199265176

2003

Weir, A.J. (2003) Neo-Fregeanism: an embarrassment of riches. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 44 (1). pp. 13-48. ISSN 0029-4527 (doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1082637613)

Weir, A.J. (2003) Objective content. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 77 (1). pp. 47-72. ISSN 1467-8349 (doi:10.1111/1467-8349.00102 )

2002

Weir, A.J. (2002) Rejoinder to Laurence Goldstein on the Liar. Analysis, 62 (1). pp. 26-34. ISSN 0003-2638

2001

Weir, A.J. (2001) More trouble for functionalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 101 (1). pp. 267-293. ISSN 0066-7374 (doi:10.1111/j.0066-7372.2003.00031.x)

This list was generated on Tue Oct 1 22:11:20 2013 BST.

I am currently supervising Gareth Young in a thesis on the paradoxes.

1K: Philosophy of Mind section

JH tutoring

Honours lecturing, 2012-13:

  • SH12 Realism and Anti-Realism
  • SH13 Philosophy of Mathematics

MLitt: Logic

Office Hour: 10am Tuesdays and Thursdays

 

  • Administration: Senior Honours Convenor
  • REF 2014: UoA Champion for Philosophy;
  • Member, College Assessment Panel.