Deep Recessions and Slow Recoveries

Tatiana Kirsanova∗ University of Glasgow
Charles Nolan† University of Glasgow
Maryam Shafiei Deh Abad‡ University of Glasgow

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Abstract

This paper studies the conditions under which a ‘modest’ financial shock can trigger a deep recession with a prolonged period of slow recovery. We suggest that two factors can generate such a profile. The first is that the economy has accumulated a moderately high level of private debt by the time the adverse shock occurs. The second factor is when monetary policy is restricted by the zero lower bound. When present, these factors can result in a sharp contraction in output followed by a slow recovery. Perhaps surprisingly, we use a standard DSGE model with financial frictions along the lines of Jermann and Quadrini (2012) to demonstrate this result and so do not need to rely on dysfunctional interbank markets.

Key Words: financial frictions, credit boom, stagnation, ZLB

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∗Address: Economics, Adam Smith Business School, Gilbert Scott Building, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ; e-mail tatiana.kirsanova@glasgow.ac.uk
†Address: Economics, Adam Smith Business School, Gilbert Scott Building, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ; e-mail charles.nolan@glasgow.ac.uk
‡Address: Economics, Adam Smith Business School, Gilbert Scott Building, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ; e-mail m.shafiei-deh-abad.1@research.gla.ac.uk
1 Introduction

Almost a decade has passed since the onset of the Great Recession in 2008, but for a number of economies recovery is slow and remains fragile. In fact, some even worry it has ushered in a new era of permanently lower trend growth. The origins of some of these concerns are reflected in Figure 1, which plots all post-war recessions for the UK, US and Japan.¹ The Great Recession stands out for at least two reasons. First, in each country the average recession is not as deep as the Great Recession. Second, in each country the average recession experiences its lowest output growth rate at the onset of the recession (period zero in the figure). Thereafter, economies generally return to a more normal growth path within one or two quarters. By way of contrast, following the onset of the Great Recession growth reached its minimum some two to four quarters later and growth remains at the lower end of the typical post-war experience; recovery has been slow by recent historical standards.

The role of ‘financial frictions’ in explaining these observed patterns has been identified as central by many researchers and policymakers and there is now a large and growing body of research which seeks to provide quantitative macroeconomic models to explain how seemingly well-functioning economies might ‘unexpectedly’ end up with financial crises. For example, Boissay et al. (2015) demonstrate how an ‘innocuous’ positive productivity shock can lead to rare but deep financial crises. The role of financial shocks in generating realistically frequent recessions is discussed in Nolan and Thoenissen (2009), Jermann and Quadrini (2012), Christiano et al. (2013) and Mumtaz and Zanetti (2016) to mention only a few. Notably, Jermann and Quadrini (2012) propose a macroeconomic model with financial frictions which is quite closely aligned with the US data since the early 1990s. The authors point out, however, that their model cannot replicate the large reduction in hours worked and output observed during the Great Recession. Moreover, so far researchers in this literature have generally focussed less on explaining the second aspect of the Great Recession that we highlighted above: the ‘slow recovery’.²

In this paper we demonstrate how a simple log-linear DSGE model with financial frictions a la Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and with nominal rigidities a la Rotemberg (1983) is capable of generating the observed deep recessions, and slow recoveries that we argue are present in the

¹Episodes in Figure 1 can be identified in the available data series in the FRED FRB St. Louis database. The data series are NAEXKP01JPQ657S (Japan 1960Q1-2014Q4), NAEXKP01GBQ652S_PCH (UK 1955Q1-2014Q4) and GDPC1_PCH (US 1947Q1-2015Q1). All series are seasonally adjusted.

²This is despite the two-decades of slow growth affecting Japan since the early 1990s. An interesting recent exception is a paper by Benigno and Fornaro (2015) emphasising non-linear features in a growth model to explain ‘stagnation traps’.

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data. In this model, the recession is triggered by a financial shock which reduces the proportion of output which banks will be able to recover when firms default. The implied reduction in bank credit requires substantial deleveraging in the economy and this leads to a recession. This result is interesting as some have argued that the onset of the crisis was essentially an adverse credit event (see e.g., Taylor, 2008), whilst others attribute a large role to adverse section and moral hazard problems in the interbank/money markets (Boissay et al., 2015). We suspect both explanations likely played a role, but our contribution in this paper is simply to argue that standard models of financial frictions explain more than perhaps is generally realised.

Two assumptions are helpful in generating a deep recession, consistent with that observed during the recent financial crisis. The first is the existence of ‘overlending’. An initially high level of debt as indeed was observed prior to the Great Recession in many developed countries, see e.g. Schularick and Taylor (2012). Following the shock the reduction in debt presages a fall in the capital stock. In turn the lower capital stock requires less finance and these two effects reinforce one another and the sluggish adjustment of both stocks results in a much greater reduction of capital, output and hours worked. We show that the higher the initial debt to output ratio, the sharper the subsequent recession. For example, if the stock of lending is 10 percent above its steady state level, a financial shock nearly doubles the consequent reduction in output, compared with the case when debt is initially at steady state.

The second assumption is the existence of the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates. We demonstrate that the ZLB, alone, can generate sharp and deep recessions. The inability of the interest rate to help ‘spread’ the cost of the required deleveraging over many periods, results in an immediate and sharp reduction in the capital stock. Once the capital stock returns to the optimal level, further adjustment is slow. This is why the ZLB scenario facilitates capturing the
second stylised fact: Once the initial large reduction in output is corrected, the speed of further
recovery is substantially slowed down as compared to the case when monetary policy operates
without constraints.

The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the model. We discuss
the empirical evidence and the corresponding calibration of the model in section 3. In section 4
we discuss the sequence of policy experiments, which show how to generate stylized post-crisis
dynamics like those with which we motivated this paper. Section 5 concludes.

2 The Model

We present a simple model with firms’ borrowing constraints a la Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
and with nominal rigidities a la Rotemberg (1983). The economy is populated by households
and firms. Firms use labor and capital to produce differentiated goods. Firms issue equity and
debt and use intra-period loans to finance working capital. Firms face credit restrictions because
financial intermediaries fear they may not repay those loans. The detailed model of the economy
is presented in this section.

2.1 Firms

There are two types of firms in this economy. There are flexible price intermediate goods producers
and monopolistically competitive retailers. We discuss each in turn.

2.1.1 Intermediate goods producers

Intermediate goods producers have access to a standard production technology
\[ y_t = F(e^{z_t}, k_t, n_t) = Ae^{z_t}k^\theta_t n^{1-\theta}_t \] (1)
where \( A \) is a constant productivity shifter, \( e^{z_t} \) is stochastic productivity common to all firms, \( n_t \)
is the labor input which can be flexibly changed at time \( t \), \( k_t \) is the capital stock determined at
time \( t-1 \) and \( \theta \) is the capital share. Capital in process for period \( t+1 \) is transformed into capital
for production after the realisation of a multiplicative shock to capital quality, \( \psi_{t+1} \):
\[ k_{t+1} = ((1 - \delta) k_t + I_t) \psi_{t+1} \] (2)
where \( I_t \) is investment and \( \delta \) is the depreciation rate. The capital quality shock will serve as an
exogenous trigger of debt dynamics. The random variable \( \psi_{t+1} \) captures some form of economic
obsolescence, as opposed to physical depreciation.\textsuperscript{3} We allow for occasional disasters in the form of sharp contractions in quality as we describe later. These disaster shocks serve to initiate financial crises. Firms use equity and debt to finance their operations. They prefer debt, $b_t$, to equity because of debt’s tax advantage: see, Jermann and Quadrini (2012).

The budget constraint can be written as:

$$\frac{P_{mt}}{P_t} F(e^{z_t}, k_t, n_t) + \frac{b_{t+1}}{R_t} = b_t + \frac{W_t}{P_t} n_t + I_t + \frac{\Psi(D_t, D_{t-1})}{P_t}$$

(3)

where $P_{mt}$ is the nominal price of produced intermediate goods, $R_t = 1 + r_t (1 - \tau_t)$ is the after tax return on bonds, and $1 + r_t = \frac{1+i_t}{1+\tau_t}$. $\Psi(D_t, D_{t-1})$ is the nominal payout to shareholders.

We assume that firms raise funds via both intertemporal debt, $b_t$, and an intra-period loan, $L_t$, to finance working capital. They pay back the interest-free intra-period loan at the end of the period. Firms start the period with intertemporal debt $b_t$ and they choose labour, investment in capital, the dividend, $D_t$, and new intertemporal debt, $b_{t+1}$, before producing. Therefore the payments to workers $W_t n_t$, suppliers of investment goods $P_t I_t$, shareholders $\Psi(D_t)$ and bondholders $P_t b_t$ are made ahead of the realization of revenues. The intra-period loan contracted by the firm will cover these costs as follows:

$$L_t = P_t I_t + W_t n_t + \Psi(D_t) + P_t b_t - P_t \frac{b_{t+1}}{R_t}.$$

From here and the budget constraint $L_t = P_{mt} F(e^{z_t}, k_t, n_t)$ is repaid at the end of the period and is free of interest.

The ability of firms to borrow is bounded because they may choose to default on their debt. Default arises after the realization of revenues but before repaying the intra-period loan. The total liabilities of the firm at that time are $L_t + P_t q_t b_{t+1}$, as it will need to pay back the loan and buy back all the bonds. The total liquid resources of the firm are $L_t = P_{mt} F(e^{z_t}, k_t, n_t)$. These can be ‘diverted’ by the firm and so cannot be recovered by the lender after a default. Then, the only asset available to the lender is capital $P_t k_{t+1}$. Following Jermann and Quadrini (2012), we assume that the liquidation value of capital is unknown at the moment of contracting the loan. With probability $\Xi e^{\xi_t}$ the full value $P_t k_{t+1}$ will be recovered, but with probability $1 - \Xi e^{\xi_t}$ the liquidation value is zero. Therefore the enforcement constraint will be as follows:

$$\Xi e^{\xi_t} (P_t k_{t+1} - P_t q_t b_{t+1}) \geq P_{mt} F(e^{z_t}, k_t, n_t).$$

(4)

\textsuperscript{3}Following the finance literature, e.g. Merton (1973), the capital quality shock is a simple way to introduce an exogenous source of variation in the value of capital. Our treatment of this shock follows Gertler et al. (2012).
Whilst $\Xi e^{\xi}$ is stochastic and depends on (uncertain) markets conditions, it is the same for all firms. This variable is what is identified as a ‘financial shock’.

The firm’s nominal payout to shareholders is assumed to be subject to a quadratic adjustment cost:

$$\Psi(D_t, D_{t-1}) = D_t + \kappa \left( \frac{D_t}{D_{t-1}} - 1 \right)^2 D_t$$

where the nominal equity payout $D_t$ is given and $\kappa \geq 0$ is a parameter.

Each firm maximizes profit subject to budget constraint (3) and enforcement constraint (4), so the Lagrangian is:

$$L = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} m_{0,t} \left( \frac{D_t}{P_t} + \mu_t \left( \Xi e^{\xi_t} (Q_t k_{t+1} - q_t b_{t+1}) - \frac{P_{mt}}{P_t} F(e^{zi_t}, k_t, n_t) \right) \right)$$

$$+ \lambda_t \left( (1 - \delta) k_t + \frac{P_{mt}}{P_t} F(e^{zi_t}, k_t, n_t) + \frac{b_{t+1}}{R_t} - b_t - \frac{W_t}{P_t n_t} \right)$$

$$- \frac{k_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}} - \left( \frac{D_t}{P_t} + \kappa \left( \frac{D_t}{D_{t-1}} - 1 \right)^2 D_t \right)\left( \frac{P_{mt}}{P_t} \right)$$

where $m_{t,t+1}$ is the stochastic discount factor, $\mu_t$ and $\lambda_t$ are Lagrange multipliers.

The first order conditions are (3), (4) and derivatives with respect to $n_t, k_{t+1}, b_{t+1}, D_t$:

1. $0 = (\lambda_t - \mu_t) X_t F_n(e^{zi_t}, k_t, n_t) - \lambda_t w_t$ (5)
2. $0 = \mu_t \Xi e^{\xi_t} - \frac{\lambda_t}{\psi_{t+1}} + \mu_t m_{t+1} \left( (\lambda_{t+1} - \mu_{t+1}) X_{t+1} F_k(e^{zi_t+1}, k_{t+1}, n_{t+1}) + \lambda_{t+1} (1 - \delta) \right)$ (6)
3. $0 = \frac{\lambda_t}{R_t} - \mu_t \Xi e^{\xi_t} \frac{1}{1 + \gamma_t} - \mu_t m_{t+1} \lambda_{t+1}$ (7)
4. $0 = 1 + \mu_t m_{t+1} \lambda_{t+1} 2 \kappa \left( \frac{D_{t+1}}{D_t} - 1 \right) \frac{D_{t+1}}{D_t} \frac{1}{\Pi_{t+1}}$ (8)

where $X_t = \frac{P_{mt}}{P_t}$, $w_t = \frac{W_t}{P_t}$ and $\Pi_t = \frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}}$ is gross inflation, $F_n$ and $F_k$ are derivatives of $F(e^{zi_t}, k_t, n_t)$ respect to $n$ and $k$.

2.1.2 Retailers

We introduce nominal rigidities *a la* Rotemberg (1983). Each final good producer $i$ buys goods at price $P_{mt}$, and repackages them, producing the final good, which may also be costlessly transformed into capital. It sets its optimal price $p_i$ and produces quantity $y_i$ (i). The firm faces a
familiar demand for its good
\[ y_t(i) = \left( \frac{p_t^i}{P_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon} Y_t. \]
Here the elasticity of substitution between any pair of goods is given by \( \varepsilon > 1 \). Firm chooses price \( p_t^i \) which solves the following optimization problem:
\[
\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} m_{t,r} \left( \frac{p_t^i}{P_t} \right)^{1-\varepsilon} Y_t - \frac{\omega}{2} \left( \frac{p_t^i}{p_{t-1}^i} - 1 \right)^2 Y_t
\]
where \( \frac{\omega}{2} \left( \frac{p_t^i}{p_{t-1}^i} - 1 \right)^2 Y_t \) represents the cost of adjusting prices.

The aggregate first order condition is:
\[
\omega (\Pi_t - 1) \Pi_t = (1 - \varepsilon) + \varepsilon X_t + \omega m_{t,t+1} (\Pi_{t+1} - 1) \frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_t} \Pi_{t+1}
\]
Finally, the profit \( \Phi_t \) in the household budget constraint can be found from the aggregation of firms’ budget constraints:
\[
P_t \Phi_t = P_t Y_t - P_m Y_t - \frac{\omega}{2} (\Pi_t - 1) Y_t P_t
\]

2.2 Households

There is a continuum of homogeneous households of measure one. Households are indexed by \( j \).

The typical household seeks to maximize the following utility function:
\[
\max \quad \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U \left( C_t^j, n_t^j \right)
\]
where \( \mathbb{E}_t \) indicates expectations conditional on information available at time \( t \); \( 0 < \beta < 1 \) is the discount factor; \( C_t \) and \( n_t \) are a consumption aggregate and labor supply in period \( t \), respectively.

The period utility is:
\[
U \left( C_t^j, n_t^j \right) = \frac{C_t^j 1-\sigma}{1-\sigma} - \frac{\alpha n_t^j 1+\psi}{1+\psi}
\]
where \( \sigma \) is elasticity of relative risk aversion, \( \psi \) is the elasticity of labour supply and \( \alpha \) is a ‘preference’ parameter. The households are assumed to hold equity, shares and corporate bonds.

The household’s budget constraint in nominal term can be written as:
\[
W_i n_i^j + b_t P_t + \psi_t s_t (D_t + \bar{p}_t) + P_t \Phi_t = P_t q_{t+1} b_{t+1} + s_{t+1} \bar{p}_t + P_t C_t^j + P_t T_t
\]
where $W_t$ is the nominal wage rate, $P_t$ is the price of goods, $\bar{p}_t$ is the market price of shares, $D_t$ is the dividend, $s_t$ is equity holdings. $b_t P_t$ is the market value of one-period nominal bonds held by the households, $T_t$ is a government transfer and the nominal return on bonds is

$$1 + i_t = \frac{\Pi_{t+1}}{q_t}.$$ 

Finally, $P_t \Phi_t$ is nominal profit from the ownership of final good firms.

The standard optimization of utility with respect to $C^j_t$, $n^j_t$, $b_{t+1}$, and $s_{t+1}$, subject to the budget constraint yields the following system of first order conditions:

1. $0 = U_n \tau_t + U_{C,t} w_t;$
2. $q_t = \beta E_t U_{C,t+1} / U_{C,t};$
3. $\bar{p}_t / \bar{P}_t = \beta E_t U_{C,t+1} (D_{t+1} + \bar{p}_{t+1}) \psi_{t+1};$
4. $b_t = q_t b_{t+1} + s_{t+1} \bar{p}_t / \bar{P}_t + C^j_t + T_t - \psi_t s_t (D_t + \bar{p}_t) P_t - W_t P_t n^j_t - \Phi_t.$

Here $U_C$ and $U_n$ indicate derivatives of $U(C^j_t, n^j_t)$ with respect to $C^j_t$ and $n^j_t$ respectively. These conditions are familiar, reflecting optimal labour supply decisions, bond purchases, equity purchases and intertemporal resource allocation.

### 2.3 Private Sector Equilibrium and Market Clearing

Private Sector Equilibrium is determined by the system (3), (4), (5)-(8), (9), (12)-(15). We substitute out equations which determine share prices, and arrive to the following system

1. $0 = (\lambda_t - \mu_t) X_t F_{\alpha}(e^\tau, k_t, n_t) - \lambda_t w_t$
2. $0 = -\frac{\lambda_t}{\psi_{t+1}} + \mu_t \Xi \varepsilon^\xi_t + \beta E_t U_{C,t+1} / U_{C,t} \left((\lambda_{t+1} - \mu_{t+1}) X_{t+1} \theta \frac{Y_{t+1}}{k_{t+1}} + \lambda_{t+1} (1 - \delta)\right)$
3. $0 = \frac{\lambda_t}{R_t} - \mu_t \Xi \varepsilon^\xi_t \Pi_{t+1} / \lambda_{t+1} - \beta E_t U_{C,t+1} / U_{C,t} \lambda_{t+1}$

4. $0 = 1 + 2 \kappa \beta E_t U_{C,t+1} \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\Pi_{t+1}} \left(\frac{d_{t+1}}{d_t} \Pi_{t+1} - 1\right) \left(\frac{d_{t+1}}{d_t} \Pi_{t+1}\right)^2$

$$-\lambda_t \left(1 + 2 \kappa \left(\frac{d_{t+1}}{d_{t-1}} \Pi_{t-1} - 1\right) \frac{d_t}{d_{t-1}} \Pi_t + \kappa \left(\frac{d_t}{d_{t-1}} \Pi_{t-1} - 1\right)^2\right),$$
5. $X_t Y_t = \Xi \varepsilon^\xi_t \left(k_{t+1} - b_{t+1} \Pi_{t+1} / (1 + \psi_t)\right)$. 

7
\[
\frac{b_{t+1}}{R_t} = b_t + w_t n_t + \frac{k_{t+1}}{\psi_{t+1}} - (1 - \delta) k_t + d_t \left(1 + \kappa \left(\frac{d_t}{d_{t-1}}\Pi_t - 1\right)^2\right) - X_t Y_t \tag{21}
\]

\[
\omega (\Pi_t - 1) \Pi_t = (1 - \varepsilon) + \varepsilon X_t + \omega \beta E_t \frac{U_{C,t+1}}{U_{C,t}} \frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_t} \Pi_{t+1} \tag{22}
\]

\[
\frac{\Pi_{t+1}}{1 + i_t} = \beta E_t \frac{U_{C,t+1}}{U_{C,t}} \tag{23}
\]

\[
\alpha n_t^\psi = w_t C_t - \sigma t \tag{24}
\]

where \( Y_t = Ae^{\xi_t} k_t^{\theta} n_t^{1-\theta}, \) \( R_t = 1 + r_t(1 - \tau_t) \) and \( 1 + r_t = \frac{\Pi_{t+1}}{1 + i_t}. \)

Finally, the resource constraint yields

\[
Y_t = C_t + \frac{k_{t+1}}{\psi_{t+1}} - (1 - \delta) k_t + \kappa \left(\frac{d_t}{d_{t-1}}\Pi_t - 1\right)^2 d_t + \frac{\omega}{2} (\Pi_t - 1)^2 Y_t \tag{25}
\]

and system (16)-(25) is used to determine equilibrium variables for \( \lambda_t, \mu_t, X_t, C_t, k_t, \Pi_t, n_t, d_t, w_t, b_t \) given the policy instruments \( i_t \) and \( \tau_t. \)

### 2.4 Linearization

We linearize the system around the efficient steady state, which is the flexile price equilibrium without credit shocks. Specifically, for every variable \( Z_t \) we define \( \hat{z}_t = \log \frac{Z_t}{Z_t^*} \) where \( Z_t \) is the steady state level. We then define \( \tilde{z}_t = \hat{z}_t - \hat{z}_t^e \) where \( \hat{z}_t^e \) is the log-deviation from the efficient steady state. We arrive to the following system:

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{\omega}_t &= \frac{\mu}{1 - \mu} \left(\tilde{\lambda}_t - \tilde{\mu}_t\right) + \tilde{\omega}_t + \theta \tilde{k}_t - \theta \tilde{n}_t \\
\tilde{\lambda}_t &= \beta \left(X \theta Y \frac{1}{\kappa} \left(\tilde{\lambda}_{t+1} - \mu \tilde{\mu}_{t+1}\right) + X \theta Y \frac{1}{\kappa} \left(\theta \tilde{k}_{t+1} + \kappa \left(\frac{d_t}{d_{t-1}}\Pi_t - 1\right)^2 d_t + \frac{\omega}{2} (\Pi_t - 1)^2 Y_t\right) - (1 - \mu \Xi) \sigma \tilde{c}_{t+1} + (1 - \delta) \tilde{\lambda}_{t+1}\right) + \tilde{\psi}_{t+1} + \mu \Xi \left(\tilde{\mu}_t + \tilde{\xi}_t\right) + \beta (1 - \mu \Xi) \sigma \tilde{c}_t \\
0 &= \beta \left(\sigma \tilde{c}_t - \sigma \tilde{c}_{t+1} + \tilde{\lambda}_{t+1}\right) - \frac{1}{R} \left(\tilde{\lambda}_t - \frac{1}{\beta R} (\tilde{\mu}_t - \tilde{n}_{t+1}) + \frac{r}{R} \tilde{\tau}_t\right) \\
&+ \frac{\Xi \mu}{1 + r} \left(\tilde{\mu}_t + \tilde{\xi}_t - \tilde{n}_t + \tilde{n}_{t+1}\right) \\
\tilde{\lambda}_t &= 2 \kappa \beta \left(\tilde{\pi}_{t+1} + \tilde{d}_{t+1} - \tilde{d}_t\right) - 2 \kappa \left(\tilde{\pi}_t + \tilde{d}_t - \tilde{d}_{t-1}\right)
\end{align*}
\]
\[ \theta \tilde{k}_t = \frac{\Xi}{XY} \left( k \left( \tilde{k}_{t+1} + \tilde{\xi}_t \right) - b \frac{1 + r}{1 + r} \left( \tilde{b}_{t+1} - \tilde{i}_t + \tilde{\pi}_{t+1} + \tilde{\xi}_t \right) \right) - (1 - \theta) \tilde{n}_t - \tilde{x}_t \]

\[ K \tilde{k}_{t+1} = XY \left( \tilde{x}_t + \theta \tilde{k}_t + (1 - \theta) \tilde{n}_t \right) + \frac{b}{R} \left( \tilde{b}_{t+1} - \frac{(1 - \tau)}{\beta R} (\tilde{i}_t - \tilde{\pi}_{t+1}) + \frac{r \tau}{R} \tilde{r}_t \right) \]

\[ \tilde{\pi}_t = \frac{\varepsilon \omega}{\omega} \tilde{x}_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \tilde{\pi}_{t+1} \]

\[ \tilde{c}_t = \tilde{c}_{t+1} - \frac{1}{\sigma} (\tilde{i}_t - \tilde{\pi}_{t+1}) \]

\[ \tilde{w}_t = \psi \tilde{n}_t + \sigma \tilde{c}_t \]

\[ Y \theta \tilde{k}_t = C \tilde{c}_t + K \tilde{k}_{t+1} - K (1 - \delta) \tilde{k}_t - K \tilde{\psi}_{t+1} - Y (1 - \theta) \tilde{n}_t \]

2.5 Policy

Monetary policy is assumed to behave optimally, minimizing an ad hoc welfare loss, given by the objective

\[ L = \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left( \tilde{\pi}_t^2 + \kappa \tilde{y}_t^2 + \kappa_1 (\tilde{i}_t - \tilde{r}_{t-1})^2 \right). \]

Thus we assume that the policymaker has objectives over inflation and output, \( \tilde{y}_t = \theta \tilde{k}_t + (1 - \theta) \tilde{n}_t \), as well as over interest rate smoothing. This policy objective has significant empirical support, one recent discussion can be found in Chen, Kirsanova, and Leith (2013).45

Note that the interest rate may be constrained by the ZLB. We compute numerically the implications of such a restriction using the approach developed in Laseen and Svensson (2011) and extended to the case of discretion in Chen et al. (2013).

3 Calibration

The model is calibrated to a quarterly frequency. We fix \( \beta = 0.9825 \). The capital depreciation rate is set to \( \delta = 0.025 \). The capital ratio in production function is set to \( \theta = 0.36 \), and the mean value of \( A \) is normalized to 1. The tax wedge which corresponds to the advantage of debt over equity is determined to be \( \tau = 0.35 \), and the dividend adjustment cost parameter set to \( \kappa = 0.146 \) as in Jermann and Quadrini (2012).

We calibrate the steady state debt to output ratio to match the data. The quarterly ratio of debt to output for the non-financial business sector is 3.25 over the sample period 1984:I-2010:II.

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4See also estimation of policy objectives in e.g. Dennis (2006), Ilbas (2010) and Givens (2012).
5We can derive microfounded objectives for some other classes of policies using approach developed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). The comparison of those policies for different specifications of objectives allows demonstrates great robustness of results to specifications of policy objectives.
Figure 2: Historical data in the US.
see the top panel in Figure 2. In order to match that, we set the steady state value of the financial variable, $\Xi$, to 0.1634.  

Parameters of the household utility function are determined as follows. The calibration of the Frisch intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply, $\psi$, is assumed to be equal to 1 and the risk aversion parameter is: $\sigma = 2$. The relative weight on the disutility of labour, $\alpha = 1.8834$, is chosen so as to set steady state hours worked equal to 0.3.

We calibrate the measure of price stickiness, $\omega = 80$, in a way that corresponds to a probability of firms changing prices every 3 quarters (in a corresponding Calvo model). The elasticity of substitution between any pair of goods $\varepsilon$ is equal to 11 in steady state which gives a 10% mark up.

Parameters of the policy objective function are chosen to be $k_y = 0.5$ and $k_\iota = 0.6$, see Chen, Kirsanova, and Leith (2013).  

It remains to calibrate the shock and the initial states to simulate the scenarios of interest. The second panel in Figure 2 plots the historical data of corporate debt to output ratio (quarterly). The average value of this ratio during 1984-2009 is 3.25. The peak of 3.87 in 2008 was somewhat above the average value, and the consequent reduction to 3.55 in 2011 constitutes a reduction of about 10% relative to its peak. We use these numbers as a guide to our simulations.

Note that the model suggests the following steady state relationship

$$b = \frac{\theta (\varepsilon - 1)}{\varepsilon \left( 2 - \frac{1}{\beta \rho(R)} - \beta (1 - \delta) \right)} - \left( \frac{\theta (\varepsilon - 1) \left( \frac{1}{\beta \rho(R)} - 1 \right)}{\varepsilon \left( 2 - \frac{1}{\beta \rho(R)} - \beta (1 - \delta) \right)} + \frac{(\varepsilon - 1)}{\beta \varepsilon} \right) \cdot \Xi$$

so that a reduction in the debt to output ratio can be explained by a reduction in the recovered share of output, $\Xi$, as all other parameters are structural. Rough calculations indicate that a shock of about 10% is not unreasonable.

Based on this evidence, we consider an AR(1) credit shock $\hat{\xi}_t = \rho \hat{\xi}_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$ with persistence $\rho = 0.95$, and we examine the dynamic implications of a negative 10% innovation in $\varepsilon_t$.

4 Discussion

Figure 3 is taken from Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and it demonstrates the ability of an RBC-type model with financial frictions to explain the three episodes of recessions. As the authors note, it is evident that the model fails to account for the depth of the Great Recession.

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6 Data sources: NIPA and FoF tables. The calculations follow Jermann and Quadrini (2012).

7 The results are very robust to wide range of parameters $k_y$ and $k_\iota$ between zero and one.
In this paper we claim that deep recessions can still be generated by a very similar model. To support this claim we run two numerical experiments. In the first experiment we demonstrate how an initial state with ‘excess’ lending results in deeper recessions following a financial shock. In the second experiment we demonstrate how ZLB on interest rates may results in a large reduction in output.

4.1 The effect of over-lending

We start with the baseline scenario of a negative credit shock, impacting the economy which is initially at steady state. Such a shock reduces the proportion of output which banks will be able to recover in the case of default. Banks lend to firms at the beginning of the period, so that firms are able to pay wages. As the enforcement constraint is always binding, the difference between bonds and capital is covered by a loan. As the financial shock reduces the probability of recovery, the amount of bank lending falls. Firms which are not able to obtain funds up front have to deleverage or reduce production. Firms reduce their labour demand, produce less output and also pay lower wages, see Figure 5. The equilibrium prices of intermediate goods and final goods fall as a result of lower income and lower demand. Firms reduce the amount of borrowing. Both constraints for firms are tightened, as the values of the Lagrange multipliers indicate.

In response to lower inflation and output the central bank reduces the nominal interest rate sufficiently to guarantee a reduction in the real rate. Low real interest rates result in falling consumption profile over time.

Lower interest rates also make it easier for firms to pay out the existing stock of corporate
Figure 4: Ten years of positive productivity shock

debt, so it helps to reduce the debt stock quickly. In addition, output falls by less than wages, profits of firms fall and so dividends fall.

The reduction of output doubles if the financial shock requires greater deleveraging. We can illustrate this in the following scenario. Suppose the economy suffers from an one-off but permanent reduction in capital quality, where agents suddenly realise that the level of accumulated debt is above the current level of the underlying capital stock. The resulting deleveraging brings the level of debt down towards the steady state level of new, quality-adjusted capital. In figure 3 we assume that the over-lending is 10 percent, i.e., as a result of the permanent contraction in capital quality the initial debt to output ratio is exactly 10 percent higher than its steady state level in the economy with quality adjusted capital stock. Such a degree of over-lending may be plausible, see Section 3. Moreover, this excess can easily be achieved in this model, see Figure 4, which demonstrates that the stock of outstanding corporate debt accumulates more than the required 10 percent above the steady state level in the course of 10 years.\footnote{Boissay, Collard, and Smets (2015) discuss that the ‘average’ development before the deep recession is a period of positive productivity shocks, their model suggest at least 10 years of AR(1) productivity shocks with $\rho_z = 0.9$ and standard error of 0.013. We stick to Jermann and Quadrini (2012) calibration of the model and we hit the economy with positive AR(1) productivity shocks with $\rho_z = 0.95$ and standard error of 0.008.} This high initial level of debt requires greater deleveraging than in the default scenario. Following the shock the reduction in debt reduces the capital stock and the lower capital stock requires less financing. These two effects reinforce each other and the sluggish adjustment of both stocks results in much overshooting of debt below the steady state in the course of adjustment. As a result, there is greater reduction in labour demand and wages, and much lower inflation. The interest rate falls by more, not only because of inflation, but because it also helps to stabilize debt – and thus all policy-relevant variables – faster. The reduction in output and labour doubles, which is
Figure 5: The effect of high corporate debt
consistent with the evidence presented in Figure 3.

However, in the process of this adjustment, the optimal interest rate violates the ZLB. Therefore, next we discuss the implications of the ZLB on the dynamics of the economy.

4.2 The effect of ZLB

The effect of ZLB is illustrated in Figure 6. We compare two scenarios: the first one is the default case of ‘unconstrained discretion’, discussed in the section above, where the interest rate can move below the ZLB, and the second scenario, where such movements are prohibited. When the optimal interest rate is constrained by the ZLB, the recession is deeper. Inflation does not fall immediately but adjusts with a delay and converges back to the steady state, and is higher than in the previous scenario without the ZLB. When the financial shock occurs both constraints are tightened and the interest is reduced but not as much as the policymaker would like. The enforcement constraint is tightened much more than in the ‘no ZLB’ scenario, see Figure 6. As the interest rate on debt remains ‘too high’, greater deleveraging is required. Consumption drastically falls, and so does output and demand. Both bond and capital stocks fall quickly and by large amounts. Wages and labor fall instantaneously. The absence of monetary intervention results in a deep recession.

As capital and labour fall, the production of intermediate goods fall too. The supply of intermediate goods is greatly reduced, much lower than the demand for final goods. As a result, the initial-periods price of intermediate goods rises, and so does inflation. However, expected inflation remains negative. Together with relatively high interest rate this results in only a small reduction of the real interest rate and so consumption falls only slow over time. As a result, we observe reduction in consumption and investment reflecting the reduction in output in the first few periods following the shock.

Once the initial-periods capital and debt de-accumulation is done, the constraint is weakened substantially. There is no further need to reduce bonds and capital quickly, and no need to restrain investment as much. Investment remains negative, but somewhat higher than in the first several periods. Intermediate goods firms increase output, and the price of intermediate goods falls to equalize demand and supply. Therefore, inflation falls as costs fall. Inflation is negative and it is optimal to keep the interest rate below the steady state level in order to stabilize the economy, but the interest rate does not need to be below the ZLB. We show that it is optimal to slightly raise the interest rate above the ZLB. The higher interest rate increases the real interest rate, but it still remains below the steady state level. As such, consumption continues falling.
Figure 6: The effect of ZLB
Figure 7: The effect of ZLB and over-lending.
to match the desired path for capital and supply. At some point the optimal deleveraging is achieved, the real rate rises back to the steady state level and above so that expected future consumption is higher than current consumption. Finally, consumption and demand start rising, prices and inflation rise and the economy converges back to the steady state. The adjustments is however slow and the growth rate of the economy, measured by $\bar{y}_t - \bar{y}_{t-1}$, is noticeably slower than in scenarios with no ZLB.

Note that this model requires convergence to the well-defined steady state. That means that the economy grows faster when recovering from a negative shock than if it were not hit by a shock at all. However, we compare the speed of recovery in different scenarios after a negative financial shock. We have shown that an initial stock of over-lending results in higher output growth rate and the ZLB results in lower growth rate along the most of recovery path, excluding several initial periods. The effect of the ZLB dominates, see Figure 7. In the Figure the economy is hit by a financial shock when there is 10% over-lending, and there is a restriction on interest rate movements below the ZLB. This simple superposition of two scenarios generates a very substantial reduction in output, and slow recovery. The slow recovery is the ‘cost’ of rapid deleveraging, due to the presence of ZLB.

5 Conclusion

In this paper we demonstrate how a simple model with borrowing constrained firms is able to replicate two empirical facts, observed during the recent financial crisis. We demonstrate that, in response to a moderate financial shock, the economy may generate a very deep recession. We then show that if the interest rate is constrained by the zero lower bound the dynamics of the economy involve a ‘stagnation’ period, when the recovery is very slow.

References


